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The generality and compositional power of sentential, symbolic structures has made it 
central to knowledge representation and processing in cognitive architectures. General, 
cognitive architectures have proven useful in modeling mental processes for both 
scientific, psychological research and real-world applications such as simulation entities 
and robots. However, cognitive architectures have failed to address and account for 
inherently perceptual and modality-specific thought processes that some argue should 
participate directly in thinking rather than serve exclusively as a source of sensory 
information (Barsalou, 1999; Chandrasekaran, 2006). Spatial and visual imagery are 
examples of such thought processes. 
With a few exceptions (Kurup, 2008), there has not been a proposed coherent 
system from the Artificial Intelligence or Cognitive Science community that integrates 
and uses symbolic and perceptual representations for reasoning. Current cognitive 
architectures use metric representations, but for control, and not for representing and 
manipulating task knowledge (Anderson et al., 2004; Laird, 2008; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 
2005). No architecture reasons with visual depictive representations. Metric and depictive 
structures may serve as perceptual input but not as first-class knowledge structures that 
an agent can use for inferring new knowledge.  
In this research, we explore the utility of general-purpose, intelligent systems 
supporting mechanisms to encode, compose, manipulate, and retrieve symbolic and 
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perceptual-based representations. In addition to the traditional symbolic representation, 
the resulting architecture uses quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations 
that serve as a basis for spatial and visual imagery processing. Behavioral and biological 
constraints, primarily derived from Kosslyn (1980; Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn, Thompson, 
& Ganis, 2006),  and computational constraints influenced by Newell (1990), inform the 
architectural design. From a theoretical standpoint, we account for high-level vision, as 
spatial and visual imagery are dependent on both cognition and visual perception (Finke, 
1989; Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006; Palmer, 1999; Peronnet, 
Farah, & Gonon, 1988; Podgorny & Shepard, 1978).  At this point, underlying visual 
processing algorithms are ad hoc and do not model the details of human performance, but 
modeling the interdependence facilitates an enhanced understanding of the constraints 
imposed between the thought processes.  
The work reflects a computational synthesis of spatial and visual imagery, visual 
perception, and cognition within the computational constraints of the Soar cognitive 
architecture (Laird, 2008). Empirical results from three different domains illustrate the 
computational gain and functional value the resulting architecture achieves. The results 
show how specialized, architectural components processing quantitative spatial and 
visual depictive representations can achieve an order of magnitude (or more) speed up 
over traditional symbolic processing without trading off generality. Furthermore, the 
architecture demonstrates new functional capability and improved problem-solving 
quality when using imagery in tasks rich with spatial and visual properties.  
The psychological basis for the research is mental imagery processing. Humans 
use mental imagery to assist them with reasoning, problem solving, decision-making, 
creativity, learning, and motor rehearsal (Helstrup, 1988). Some attribute creativity to the 
observation that one can combine objects in  their mental images to reveal novel objects 
and relationships (Finke, 1989). Athletes often report using imagery or ―visualization 
techniques‖ to rehearse their motor skills prior to competition. People with certain forms 
of autism report relying almost exclusively on imagery in their thought processes 
(Grandin, 2006). Even to learn non-visual concepts, such as ―love,‖ they must have a 
visual, concrete representation of the concept (e.g. a heart). This research focuses on 
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using two forms of mental imagery, spatial and visual, for reasoning, decision-making, 
and problem solving.  
Spatial imagery assists humans with spatial reasoning tasks. For example, 
imagine that you are facing south and we ask you to simulate the following movements: 
step forward, turn right, step forward, turn right, and step forward. If we then ask you 
what your final location and orientation is, most people can respond that they are to the 
left of where they started facing north. This task requires you to infer a global spatial 
relationship (i.e. your final location and orientation) from a set of local spatial 
relationships provided in the task instructions. Your shape or contour characteristics as 
well as the shape of the area you are stepping are not relevant to the problem.  
Humans rely on visual imagery for the detection of spatial and visual properties 
not previously encoded as symbols where the specific shape or color of object(s) is 
necessary for the inference. For example, consider how you answer the following 
questions. Does the letter ‗A‘ have an enclosed space? What is the shape of a dog‘s ears? 
What is wider in the center, Michigan‘s lower peninsula or the state of Ohio? When 
asked, most people respond that they create a visual depiction of the object(s) and then 
―look at‖ the image to answer the question. This type of reasoning requires a depiction 
because the inference is directed at a feature (e.g. enclosed space) or spatial property (e.g. 
width) requiring specific shape to formulate an answer. On the other hand, if asked, 
―What state is larger geographically, Alaska or Rhode Island,‖ most American adults can 
formulate an answer without having to create an image. They know from previous study 
that Alaska is the largest state and Rhode Island is the smallest state, which is a general 
fact easily encoded with symbolic representations. 
General problem solving may use all three types of representations. If you are at a 
furniture store trying to choose a new sofa for your living room, you may imagine your 
living room to see if the shape and color of the furniture matches your current decorum 
(visual imagery) and possibly simulate moving your furniture around to ―see‖ where the 
new sofa fits best (spatial and visual imagery). On the other hand, sometimes you use 
spatial imagery to form a general answer and then, if given time (or prodding), use visual 
imagery to form a more accurate inference. Consider another geography question. What 
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city is further to the west, San Diego, California or Reno, Nevada?
1
 Initially, you might 
build a quantitative spatial structure representing California and Nevada as geometric 
shapes (such as rectangles). Then using symbolic, factual knowledge that California is to 
the west of Nevada, arrange the geometric figures accordingly (Figure 1-1a). Again based 
on your knowledge that San Diego is in the southwest corner of California and Reno is in 
the west central section of Nevada, you place ―dots‖ in those locations. You then reason 
that San Diego is west of Reno. This answer is a common mistake people make. 
However, if you add more ―detail‖ by adding the specific shape of the two states (visual 
depictive), you can correctly ―see‖ that Reno is west of San Diego (Figure 1-1b). Note 
that even though we illustrate the quantitative spatial representation as a picture in Figure 
1-1a, we can represent the objects (California, Nevada, San Diego, and Reno) as a set of 
points in a Cartesian coordinate system—a picture is not required. However, when we 
add shape to the specification (i.e. the shape of the states), an image is a more suitable 
structure where space is inherent in the representation. 
 
  
(a) Quantitative Spatial Representation (b) Visual Depictive Representation 
Figure 1-1: Representations Involved in Spatial and Visual Imagery 
 
What the previous examples illustrate is the power of being able to reason by 
combining these representations through imagery processing. Of course, to perform these 
tasks assumes: 
                                                 
1
 Example from (Stevens & Coupe, 1978) 
 
 5 
 You have previously encoded a representation of each object‘s shape and 
color and stored it somewhere in memory (e.g. letter, states, or furniture). 
 You have previously encoded local spatial relationships between pairs of 
objects (e.g., California is west of Nevada, Reno is in Nevada, your sofa is 
in front of the T.V.). Note that the types of spatial relationships include 
direction (west, in front of), distance (number of steps), orientation (the 
orientation of the objects), topology (in), and size (sofa is larger than 
chair). 
 You recognize your current state and goal (e.g. determine if the letter ―A‖ 
has an enclosed space, determine what direction you are facing, decide 
what furniture you should purchase, etc.). 
 You are able to combine these different forms of knowledge and retrieve 
the desired information.   
 You can access the results of your retrieval to make a decision and form a 
response.  
These issues are the types we explore in this research to determine the computational 
mechanisms underlying spatial and visual imagery. The goals and relevant questions of 
our research follow: 
 
(1) To incorporate spatial and visual imagery within the context of a cognitive 
architecture inspired and constrained by behavioral, biological, functional, and 
computational evidence. 
 
 What are the representations and processes that are architectural? 
 What knowledge is necessary to create these representations and control 
the processing? 
 What is the relationship between spatial imagery, visual imagery, and 
visual perception? What underlying structures and mechanisms do they 
share? What components are unique to imagery? 
 Where is information stored and in what representational format?  
 Where is the information processed?  
 What information is transmitted between the architecture‘s functional 
components? 
 
(2) To understand spatial and visual imagery‘s capabilities and limitations. 
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 How does cognition use spatial and visual imagery to solve problems? 
What are the types of problems? 
 What are the environment and task conditions where spatial and visual 
imagery processing provides additional functional capabilities? 
 What types of tasks are computationally more efficient using a 
quantitative spatial or visual depictive representation versus using a 
symbolic representation? What are the tradeoffs? 
 
(3) To expand the integration between perception and cognition. We are focused 
specifically on how cognition uses perceptually based representations for 
reasoning and problem solving rather than how the system processes bottom-up 
perception into symbols (e.g. computer vision, robotics) or how perception 
constrains the timing, processing, and control behavior of the architecture (e.g. 
EPIC, ACT-R). 
 
(4) To determine and build appropriate tools for debugging and evaluating a spatial 
and visual imagery component within a cognitive architecture (software 
engineering aspect). 
 
As further clarification, the following is a list of what are not our research goals. 
  
(1) Detailed modeling of human behavior (Cognitive modeling). We are using 
psychological theories, experimental evidence, and neuropsychological results as 
inspiration in our architectural design. We would like the system to exhibit the 
general behavior and be plausible in accordance with how we believe humans 
solve problems using spatial and visual imagery. At this time, however, we are 
not concerned with matching human experimental results. 
 
(2) Building a stand-alone model of mental imagery. We are not trying to model 
mental imagery without taking into consideration how it fits into the overall 
architecture. Our goals are much more general in that we want to discover how 
the different representations are used for problem solving. The system has to work 
together as a whole with spatial and visual imagery processing as one of 
cognition‘s possible tools. 
 
(3) Designing and evaluating specific algorithms or attempting to claim we have all 
imagery functionality implemented. As a follow-up from the previous point, the 
scope of this work is general so that attempting to analyze, design, and evaluate 
the details of specific algorithms would take away from our focus.  
 
We organize the remainder of this dissertation as follows. Chapter 2 and 3 present 
our design space constraints and theory. We devote Chapter 2 to the discussion of the 
quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations, as they are central to our theory. 
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The chapter includes a summary of the mental imagery debate and its influence on our 
decisions. Chapter 3 presents the remaining design space constraints and summarizes our 
theory. Appendix A provides additional background on the relevant psychological and 
neuroimaging experiments supporting our theory. 
Chapter 4 compares previous work in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive 
Science. Included in this chapter are computational approaches that have either modeled 
mental imagery or used it as motivation for a specific application. Chapter 5 summarizes 
task and environmental characteristics where spatial and visual imagery is useful. The 
chapter also presents an overview of our three experimental domains to facilitate the 
architectural discussion in Chapter 6. The three experimental domains include an agent 
using spatial imagery to solve a geometry problem, visual imagery to recognize features 
on individual alphabet letters, and both spatial and visual imagery to inform its decision 
making in a simulation of an Army small-unit leader. Chapter 6 discusses the memories 
and processes associated with the architecture that include Soar and its Spatial-Visual 
Imagery (SVI) component. Appendix B and Appendix C provided more details on the 
design and implementation of the system. Chapter 7 provides the subjective and objective 
evaluation of the architecture across the three experimental domains. The evaluation 
metrics include behavioral, biological, functional, and computational design space 
constraints; computational gain; functional capability; and problem-solving quality. We 












A key result from mental imagery experiments is that humans use multiple types of 
representations during imagery processing. As the distinction between these 
representations is central to our theory, we focus exclusively on them in this chapter. We 
begin by summarizing the three representations that support spatial and visual imagery 
processing and discuss their functional and computational tradeoffs. We then summarize 
the mental imagery debate. The debate is important to understand as it directly influences 
the decision as to whether a cognitive architecture should include separate mechanisms 
for spatial and visual imagery. The alternative is to assume that symbolic cognitive 
architectures are sufficient for imagery processing and what an agent requires is simply 
additional knowledge.  
2.1 Symbolic, Quantitative, and Depictive Structures 
From a functional and computational perspective, our hypothesis is that spatial and visual 
imagery use at least three distinct representations to include (1) a symbolic, (2) a 
quantitative spatial, and (3) a visual depictive representation (Figure 2-1). The symbolic 
representation (first row of Figure 2-1) is the amodal, stable medium useful for general 
reasoning (Newell, 1990). Symbols may denote an object, visual properties of that object, 
and spatial relationships between objects. They are sentential, or sentence-like, in that 
their meaning is dependent on context and interpretation rather than their spatial 
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arrangement. The power of symbols comes from their composability using universal and 
existential quantification, conjunction, disjunction, negation, and other predicate 
symbols. For example, the right-hand column of Figure 2-1 represents two objects, a can 
and a box with symbols denoting visual features (e.g. (can, yellow)) and spatial properties 
(e.g. on(can, box)). In addition to visual and spatial properties, symbols can represent 
non-visual or non-spatial content, which is necessary for associating an object with other 
modalities and concepts.  
 
Representation Aliases Modality Processing Uses Example 
Symbolic  
 Visual Properties 
(optional) 
 

































color (box, blue) 
 
on (can, box) 
 
Quantitative spatial 
 Visual Properties 
o General Shape 
(inferred from 
size dimension) 
 Spatial Properties 
(mandatory) 































   location <2,1,2> 
   orientation 0 
   height 5, radius 1 
 
box 
     location <0,0,0> 
    orientation -10  
    length 10 
    width 6  height 4 
 
Visual depictive 
 Visual Properties 
o Shape, Color 
o Explicit 
features 
o Explicit empty 
space 
 
 Spatial Properties 
































Figure 2-1: Imagery Representations 
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The quantitative spatial representation (second row of Figure 2-1) is also amodal, 
but is perceptual-based. That is, it is an interpretation of visual, auditory, proprioception, 
and kinesthesis senses based on a fixed frame of reference that asserts an object‘s 
location and orientation in space. The frame of reference can be relative to an agent‘s 
viewpoint (egocentric) or another object (allocentric). Computationally, the structure uses 
scalar values and vectors in a three-dimensional Euclidean space to represent information 
with symbols labeling the objects. The processes that infer information from this 
structure use sentential, mathematical equations.  
Spatial imagery uses the representation for spatial reasoning and simulating 
motion through linear transformations (i.e. translating, rotating, and scaling) or laws of 
dynamics. The second example in Figure 2-1 represents the metric location, orientation, 
and size dimensions of the can and the box. Location is a combination of direction and 
distance from a fixed frame of reference. One may infer rough estimates of size and 
topology based on the general convex shape, or dimensions, of the objects. 
In contrast to symbols or quantitative spatial representations, both of which are 
sentential structures, space, including empty space, is inherent in the visual depictive 
representation (third row of Figure 2-1). The depiction is from a privileged viewpoint, 
and the spatial structure of the patterns resembles the objects in a perceived or imagined 
scene (Finke, 1989). Computationally, it is an image data structure where the processing 
uses either mathematical manipulations (e.g. filters, rotation, and scaling) or algorithms 
that take advantage of the topological structure and color of the representation (Funt, 
1976; Furnas, 1990; Furnas et al., 2000).  
Visual imagery uses the depictive representation for extracting an object‘s visual 
features (e.g. lines, curves, enclosed spaces, corners) or for spatial reasoning where non-
convex shapes are inherent to the problem. It also facilitates the identification and 
location of empty space between objects, exits between scenes, and topology between 
objects. Similar to spatial imagery, visual imagery can use the depictive representation to 
simulate physical processes. For example, visual imagery processing can simulate 




Even though we only label the top structure in Figure 2-1 as a symbolic 
representation, each of the representations are symbols in the sense that each is a pattern 
denoting something where ―denotation is a mapping of patterns onto their meanings‖ 
(Simon, 1996). Although we typically think of symbols as linguistic patterns and 
reasoning as logic or mathematical equations, non-linguistic patterns, such as depictions, 
are also symbols, but the reasoning processes that infer information from it are not based 
on logic. In symbolic terms, the distinction between the representations is that some are 
pointer symbols (P-Symbols), such as what we call symbolic representations, and some 
are information symbols (I-Symbols), retinal input, for example, being an extreme case. 
Pointer symbols do not contain raw information, but rather serve as an abstraction of 
more detailed information. Information or perceptual symbols  (Barsalou, 1999), are 
carriers of information where the encoding pattern is primarily raw information such as in 
the depictive representation. Hybrids, such as the quantitative spatial representation, 
contain both P- and I-symbols.  
2.2 Functional and Computational Tradeoffs 
So why does a cognitive system use these three representations during thought 
processing? In short, each structure has functional and computational tradeoffs. From a 
functional perspective, there are tradeoffs between the representations that a specific task 
often highlights even when the environment remains constant. For example, given 
appropriate inference rules and the symbolic representation in Figure 2-1, one can infer 
that there is a yellow object (can) on a blue object (box). However, one cannot infer that 
the top of the can is a circle. One can infer visual properties from a symbolic 
representation only when the property is encoded explicitly as a symbol or when task 
knowledge supports the inference (e.g. if two lines intersect then there is a vertex). 
Consider another example from Ullman (1996). Figure 2-2 shows two enclosed 
regions. Assume that the region in Figure 2-2a is a quantitative spatial representation 
rather than the image shown for presentation purposes. That is, assume the region is a set 
of x, y points with indices specifying the connections, or line-segments, between the 
points. One way to determine if the dots in the figure lie inside or outside the enclosed 
region is to imagine a ray (again as a quantitative representation) from the point to 
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―infinity‖ and then count the number of intersections between the ray and the line-
segments making up the region. If the count is odd, then the point is inside the region; 
otherwise, it is outside the region.  
 
 
(a)  (b)  
Figure 2-2: Example of the Capability and Limitation of Representations 
 
Now consider the situation in Figure 2-2b where the environment is the same, but 
the task is to determine whether the two points lie in the same region. Using the same 
ray-based methodology will not provide the desired information as the number of 
intersections only tell you whether the point is in a region or not. It does not tell you what 
region (if there is more than one region). Rather than using rays to determine the region, 
assume now that the figure is a visual depictive representation (as presented). Start at one 
of the points and imagine ―coloring‖ all the white area red until you reach a black 
boundary. If after coloring, red pixels surround the other point, then the two points are in 
the same region. Such a coloring or activation scheme is similar to the depictive 
algorithms we use in our architecture. In this example, the environment remains the same, 
but the task changes requiring a different representation to achieve the desired functional 
capability.  
From a computational perspective, the tradeoff is between scope (what it can 
represent) and processing cost (Newell, 1990; Simon, 1996) or alternatively, what 
Norman (2000) categorizes as discretion and assimilability. Symbolic representations are 
high in terms of discretion as they convey only the intended information required for 
general reasoning, nothing more or less. They purposefully leave certain aspects of the 
description indeterminate. The predicate description, ―on(can, box),‖ is sufficient for 
general inferences used in logical reasoning. That is, you can assert very general 
statements such as ―if the can is on the box then grasp it.‖ In terms of capacity alone, 
symbolic representations transmit much less information than visual depictions. The 
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symbolic representation in the right-hand column of Figure 2-1 is roughly 2
9
 (512) bits 
while the picture of the can on the box is 2
19 
(512K) bits—three orders of magnitude 
more.
 
Symbols may then provide a much more compact structure allowing us to retain 
context while reasoning and bring in details as required. 
Symbols can also represent uncertainty such as ―the can is on the box or on the 
floor,‖ and negation as in the statement ―if the can is not in the hand but is on the box or 
on the floor then grasp it.‖ The quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations 
have to commit to a particular configuration and so cannot convey these general 
statements. Over specification is a disadvantage for perceptual representations as any 
learning may apply only to the particular situation. It is difficult to generalize and transfer 
to other tasks. A simple example illustrates this point. Assume an agent learns by 
imagining an ‗A‘ that does not have any curves. Now it can assert that the particular ‗A‘ 
it imagines does not have a curve, but it cannot assert that all ‗A‘s‘ do not have curves 
(e.g. consider a cursive letter, A ). 
At the other extreme, depictive representations are low in terms of discretion (i.e. 
they provide many details), but for visual and spatial properties are computationally 
easier to assimilate. For example, from the picture in Figure 2-1, information such as the 
top of the can looks like a circle and covers about an eighth of the box is directly 
accessible. What we lose in representational scope, or expressiveness, we often gain in 
fewer processing cycles as we can exploit the space and color in the image to infer the 
visual and spatial properties. 
In terms of discretion and assimilation, the quantitative spatial representation falls 
in between the symbolic and depictive representations. It provides more details than the 
symbolic representation (i.e. direction, distance, orientation, size, and general topology) 
but less information (i.e. specific shape and color) than the depictive structure. A strip 
map of the New York City subway system is a good example. It leaves out the details of 
every turn and provides you with the general topological structure, direction, and distance 
information. In the middle, quantitative spatial example from Figure 2-1, you can infer 
the direction and distance between the center of the can and the center of the box, the 
location where the bottom of the can touches the box, and the relative size between the 
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two objects. The depiction also provides this information but at the cost of requiring 
greater capacity.  
There are two other computational reasons why the quantitative spatial 
representation is useful. First, there are some general spatial reasoning tasks where 
reverting from symbolic to metric information is necessary to infer new information 
(Edwards & Moulin, 1998; Forbus, Tomai, & Usher, 2003; Mukerjee, 1998). Forbus, 
Neilsen, and Faltings (1991) coin this lack of a general, purely qualitative representation 
of spatial properties as the poverty conjecture. Second, Marr (1982) stresses that bottom-
up visual processing uses incremental, increasingly abstract levels of representations.  
This rationale is also pertinent to imagery but in the ―opposite‖ direction. Visual imagery 
cannot generate a depictive representation directly from qualitative symbols without first 
specifying metric properties, such as the location, orientation, and size of objects as the 
generation process requires this information to project the shapes to a depiction. 
The power of imagery processing emerges from the ability to combine the 
symbolic, quantitative, and depictive representations, taking advantage of the 
representation that provides a computational advantage or a specific functional capability. 
The support for this ability in a general, cognitive architecture is a major contribution of 
this research. One of the difficulties, however, is deciding when to use the appropriate 
representation. Although we provide hints throughout this thesis of where each 
representation is useful, we do not offer a conclusive theory. Therefore, our theory states 
that an agent, through procedural knowledge, decides which representation to use based 
on its current state and its estimate of the total cost of using the representation (to include 
transforming to that representation, using it, and then transforming back) is less than an 
alternative. 
One of the main criticisms of theories advocating the use of multiple 
representations is exactly this issue. As Simon (1996) articulates:  
 
"Transformation from one symbolic representation to another, in order to find one 
that is computationally efficient in dealing with a particular class of problems, is 




The mental imagery debate highlights this criticism, so we will look at the issue from this 
perspective and articulate our reasons for incorporating both spatial and visual 
representations into the resulting architecture. 
2.3 Mental Imagery Debate 
Although to the casual observer the mental imagery debate may seem ludicrous (of 
course we have ―mental images‖), it is actually quite complicated once one investigates 
the details. Few deny that when we engage in imagery we seem to be forming pictures in 
our heads. The question is, are we really? 
Philosophy and psychology have a long history of mental imagery theories (Tye, 
1991). Past theories have cast the role of mental imagery in thought processing at both 
ends of a spectrum. At one end, philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes, and Hobbes, 
advocated visualization as the focal point of thought. They believed mental images were 
models of the external world. Introspection, or the process of explaining your internal 
thought processes, was the dominant method in the formulation of these ideas. In the 
early twentieth century the behaviorist movement, led by Watson (1913), rejected 
introspection as a valid methodology, arguing that imagery is simply a dramatization of 
what is actually occurring in a person‘s mind. He concluded that introspection is not 
evidence of mental structures and processes.  
As cognitive psychology emerged in the 1960s, some began to argue that there 
must be mental representations used in imagery to explain the results of so many 
experiments. Hebb (1968) asserted that descriptions of someone‘s imagery experience is 
not necessarily introspection. As an example, he used the case of amputees, who after 
removal of an extremity, report pain and sensation in their ―phantom limb.‖ This 
reporting of sensation is not introspection, he argued, but an imagined experience where 
the perception originates in a higher brain process rather than from the extremity. Hebb 
described imagery as the activation of cell-assemblies previously formed during 
perception. According to Hebb, vivid imagery is the activation of the lower order cell 
assemblies while higher order cell assemblies are the basis for ―less specific‖ imagery. 
The separation between vivid and ―less specific‖ imagery is analogous to our theory of 
visual depictive and quantitative spatial representations. 
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This change in attitude concerning the relevancy of reported imagery experiences 
coupled with behavioral experiments that were more scientific, solidified imagery‘s role 
in cognition. The major question that remains, and what psychologists and neuroscientists 
have debated for over three decades is the representation of these internal images. The 
debate focuses primarily on visual imagery although the discussion of spatial imagery has 
recently emerged as the theorists refine their theories. Kosslyn is the protagonist for the 
depictive theorists who embrace the notion that visual images are quasi-pictorial, have an 
inherent underlying spatio-analogical representation, and share similar mechanisms with 
vision (Kosslyn, 1980; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). At the other end of the 
representational spectrum, there are those, such as Pylyshyn (1973; Pylyshyn, 2002), who 
argue that there has not been enough evidence to reject what he calls the ―null 
hypothesis.‖ That is, visual imagery uses the same propositional (i.e. symbolic) 
representations and processes as general, higher-level reasoning. The only difference, he 
contends, is that the content includes visual and spatial information such as shape, color, 
direction, and distance. Throughout the debate, cognitive scientists such as Anderson 
(1978) also raise the key point that a representation is dependent on the computational 
processing. Any theory must articulate how the representation facilitates the processing 
and what the tradeoffs are in terms of functional capability and computational efficiency.  
The modern debate began after Shepard and Metzler (1971) published their 
seminal work on mental rotations.  Their experiments showed subjects pairs of three-
dimensional, non-standard objects and asked them to determine if the objects were the 
same shape (Figure 2-3). Some pairs were identical but with one of the objects rotated at 
a different angle than another. Other pairs were mirrored reflections of one another so 
could not be matched by rotating. After being shown a pair of objects, subjects responded 
as to whether they thought the objects were the same. Shepard and Metzler found that 
response times were linear with the rotation angle. Furthermore, the subject‘s post-
experiment reports claimed that in order to make the comparison they had to ―mentally 
rotate‖ one of the objects. These two pieces of evidence lead Shepard and Metzler to 
hypothesize that there is some sort of an imagined mental rotation process in three-
dimensional space. Some psychologists began describing the phenomena using a 
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―picture‖ metaphor to describe the representation and a ―mind‘s eye‖ as the process that 
―looks at‖ the ―picture‖ to infer information. 
 
Figure 2-3: Examples Shepard and Metzler Used to Show “Mental Rotation” 
 
Leveraging Newell and Simon‘s (1972) ideas that human problem solving uses 
symbolic computations,  Pylyshyn, wrote a strong argument against the ―picture‖ 
metaphor for mental imagery. He suggested that imagery, like other thought processes, is 
amodal and symbolic. In the same vein as Watson (1913), he questioned experiments 
relying on introspection stating that the images in our head are epiphenomenal.  He also 
questioned the notion of a ―mind‘s eye‖ arguing that it is really a question of infinite 
regress. That is, if there is a ―mind‘s eye‖ then does that imply there is a ―brain‖ for the 
―mind‘s eye?‖ 
Kosslyn and Pomerantz (1977) countered Pylyshyn‘s arguments using empirical 
evidence and theoretical comparisons between their depictive account of visual imagery 
and a propositional account.  For example, in one of the experiments subjects were 
presented with a map of a fictional island and seven objects (lake, well, beach, etc.) 
located at various places on a map (Figure 2-4). They asked subjects to study the map, 
close their eyes, mentally picture it, and compare their visual image with the map. Once 
the subject had the map adequately memorized, they were instructed to close their eyes 
and imagine one of the locations (e.g. ―well‖). Kosslyn and Pomerantz then named 
another object (e.g. ―tree‖), and the subjects were instructed to ―scan‖ to the named 
object. Kosslyn and Pomerantz measured response times and found that the time to scan 
between pairs of objects was linear with respect to the distance between objects. They 
concluded that a visual image preserves distance and space. Symbolic accounts, Kosslyn 
and Pomerantz argued, cannot adequately explain these findings. 
Later, Kosslyn shifted the basis of his argument for depictive representations from 
behavioral experiments to neuroimaging evidence (Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn, Thompson, 
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& Ganis, 2006).  In monkeys it is known that the primary visual cortex
2
 (Figure 2-5) 
roughly preserves the spatial structure of the image on the retina (Tootell et al., 1982).  
That is, space on the cortex represents space in the world. Kosslyn and others asserted 
that if the visual cortex shows similar activation patterns during visual perception and 
visual imagery, then there is a strong indication that visual imagery, similar to vision, is 
using the topographically mapped or depictive, areas of the brain. 
 
Figure 2-4: Fictional Island Map  
 
 
Figure 2-5: Visual Cortex 
 
The typical methodology used during these neuroimaging experiments consisted 
of two groups of subjects. One group would perform a task using vision, and the second 
group would perform the same task using imagery. During evaluation, response times and 
brain activity was measured using positron emission tomography (PET) or functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
3
 For example, Kosslyn et al. (1993) had subjects 
either view (vision group) or imagine (imagery group) a letter in a grid (Figure 2-6). An 
‗x‘ then appeared on the grid and subjects had to indicate (by pushing a button) whether 
                                                 
2
Also known as the striate cortex, V1, or Brodmann area 17. It is the first area of the brain to receive 
information from the retina. 
3
Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) are medical 
imaging techniques used to measure neural activity in the brain. 
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the ‗x‘ fell on or off the letter. They also had a baseline group (sensory/motor group) who 
simply pushed a button when the ‗x‘ disappeared from the grid to rule out any activation 
effects caused by sensing and responding. The results showed greater activation of visual 
cortex during the visual imagery task than during the visual perception task. They also 
found more activation in other brain areas
4
 indicating that there were additional 
mechanisms involved in generating the image. 
 
Figure 2-6: X On/Off Letter Experiment.  
Subjects either saw a letter in a grid (visual perception task), visualized the letter in the grid 
(imagery task), or waited for the „X‟ mark to be removed (sensory/motor task).   
 
During this time Pylyshyn (Pylyshyn, 1981, 2002) was also active in the debate 
asserting that tacit knowledge and not architectural constraints (in the sense of another 
representation) explained depictive theorists behavioral experiments. For example, he 
argued that the reason response times for scanning between various imagined objects on 
the island map were linear with respect to distance was not because the imagery medium 
uses space to represent, but rather because the participants were instructed to ―scan‖ 
between pairs of objects. To test his theory, Pylyshyn ran a similar ―island map‖ 
experiment. First, he instructed subjects to memorize a map and refer to their mental 
image of the map. Next, they were instructed to close their eyes and imagine one of the 
locations. Pylyshyn then named another object on the map and instructed the subjects to 
determine the compass direction (NE, N, NW, W, SW, S, SW, and E) from the second 
object to the first object. The task instructions did not provide an indication as to how the 
subjects were to determine the direction (i.e. there was no instructions to ―scan‖). 
                                                 
4
Specifically Broadmann area 44, 45, and 46. Area 46 is functionally part of a group known as the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and hypothesized to be responsible for executive functions. 
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Pylyshyn‘s results showed no correlation between response time and distance between 
the objects.  
Pylyshyn argued that if the task demands (i.e. ―scan‖) alter the behavioral pattern 
(in this case the response time), then knowledge explains the results, not the underlying 
architecture. He calls this phenomena cognitive penetrability. When we are told to ―scan‖ 
our image, he argued, it takes a certain amount of time until we arrive at the next object 
because knowledge of how long it takes to scan a specified distance controls, or mentally 
simulates, our scan rate. The intrinsic properties of the architecture are not involved, only 
knowledge.   
Furthermore, Pylyshyn claimed that there was not enough evidence to show 
conclusively that a human‘s visual cortex is a topographically mapped representation 
during imagery. He claimed that most imagery studies only showed activation in the 
latter posterior cortex areas (such as the parietal cortex and inferior temporal lobe) rather 
than in the visual cortex. He claimed that for the few imagery studies showing activation 
on the visual cortex, none presented conclusive evidence of a topographically mapping. 
Although Pylyshyn conceded that reasoning using imagery is different from logical 
reasoning, he concluded that ―spatial displays‖ (i.e. visual depictive representations) are 
inadequate for the representation of knowledge. 
2.4 Discussion 
Figure 2-7 summarizes the positions between the two camps. As the last column 
indicates, the theorists explain the experimental results as being either architectural 
mechanisms or knowledge. In order to design a general, computational system 
incorporating imagery capabilities, one must make a commitment as to whether imagery 
processing requires specific architectural mechanisms or can be realized with general, 
symbolic computations and knowledge. Again, our hypothesis is that spatial and visual 
imagery use at least three distinct architectural representations. We back this assertion 
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Figure 2-7: Summary of Mental Imagery Debate 
 
First, Kosslyn and others propose a cohesive and consistent theory. Propositional 
theorists do not offer any compelling, competing theories to embrace their viewpoint and 
cannot always explain the major phenomena (e.g. rotation) without resorting to ad hoc 
arguments. Even they agree that some of their theories require excessive computations 
(Pylyshyn, 2002).  Even though the propositional theorists disagree with the neurological 
evidence, they do not provide alternative explanations as to why the visual cortex is 
activated during some imagery experiments. If visual imagery is truly using only higher, 
amodal symbols, then why is there any activity in the visual cortex? 
Second, we agree with Pylyshyn‘s argument that tacit knowledge explains some 
imagery results as behavior emerges from a combination of the environment, knowledge, 
and the architecture. However, we disagree that this explanation implicates propositions 
as the exclusive structure for imagery processing. In addition to the ―island map‖ 
experiment, there have been many other behavioral experiments providing evidence that 
visual imagery representations use space. These experiments include image 
transformations, image size, and visual angle (Kosslyn, 1980). As further evidence 
neuropsychologists, such as Farah, Soso, and Dasheiff (1992) have shown that there is a 
visual field of view in both perception and imagery when, for medical reasons, they had 
to remove a patient‘s occipital lobe from one cerebral hemisphere. After removal, they 
found that the horizontal visual angle was reduced in half for both perception and visual 
imagery. However, the vertical visual angle remained intact. Tacit knowledge alone 
cannot explain this result.  
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Third, one of the shortcomings in the mental imagery debate, and possibly a cause 
of confusion in the interpretation of whether knowledge, architecture, or a combination 
explains an experimental result, is that the focus of the theorists‘ arguments is on visual 
imagery. Spatial imagery receives less attention yet there appears to be distinct brain 
structures, such as the parietal cortex, that are active during such tasks (Mellet et al., 
2000). As Grush (2004) articulates, a reason for the confusion is that spatial imagery does 
not fit either the propositional or depictive metaphors. As with propositions, spatial 
imagery representations are sentential and consist of objects with properties such as 
direction, distance, size, and motion. However, transformations between states does not 
follow logic or entailment but rather mathematical (e.g. translation, rotation, scaling) or 
dynamic (e.g. force, torque) manipulations. On the other hand, it is not a depiction either, 
such as an image or topographically organized visual cortex. The distinction between the 
two representations is difficult to appreciate because one can reinterpret the spatial 
representation into a depictive format. For example, a line can be represented in its 
algebraic, sentential format (y = x) or a depictive format (Figure 2-8).  
 
 
Figure 2-8: The Depictive Format of the Line, y=x 
 
We argue that the difference in the results between Pylyshyn‘s and Kosslyn‘s 
island map experiments are attributed to the type of imagery task (spatial versus visual). 
Pylyshyn‘s version of the island map experiment is clearly a spatial reasoning task as the 
subjects were to determine the absolute, cardinal direction between two objects. Our 
theory offers the following explanation. As the subjects were memorizing the map, they 
encoded the qualitative directions between the pairs of objects (e.g., the well is left-of the 
tree, see Figure 2-4) and used this information to infer the cardinal direction. Note that 
encoding these local spatial relationships facilitates rebuilding a depictive representation, 
but it is not required to complete this task. 
In Kosslyn‘s version of the experiment, the task was to ―scan‖ between the two 
objects. Therefore, even if the subjects had tacit knowledge that it takes longer to scan 
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between objects further apart, the subjects have to account for the distance between the 
objects. As it is unclear whether this is a spatial and/or visual task (individual preferences 
may be a factor in this determination), our theory offers two explanations. Either the 
subject, using a previously encoded or measured distance, builds a quantitative spatial 
representation and ―simulates‖ scanning between the two objects, or the subject generates 
a depictive representation and scans between the two objects by imagining a ―path.‖ In 
either case, perceptual-based representations and processes are in use. 
Our final thoughts are that depictive theorists, such as Kosslyn, have not denied 
that there are symbolic computations involved in imagery processing. On the contrary, he 
specifies how symbolic, associative memories are required to build or generate an image. 
Past research with Soar has focused almost exclusively on symbolic computations. 
However, as Newell (1990) stated in Unified Theory of Cognition, imagery may be a 
component with a different representation existing outside of central cognition. We have 
pushed Soar to its limits using symbolic computations. With mental imagery as our 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the use of multiple representations is a core 
constraint of our theory. In this chapter, we discuss the remaining core constraints 
influencing the architectural design space. Our theoretical commitments closely follow 
the evidence provided by the depictive imagery theorists, specifically Kosslyn (1980; 
Kosslyn, 1994; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006).  
Figure 3-1 categorizes our design space constraints into three areas: 
behavioral/biological, functional, and computational. We derive behavioral and 
biological constraints from a literature review of the theory and mental imagery 
experiments measuring behavioral or neural responses through neuroimaging techniques 
(i.e. PET, fMRI). Appendix A summarizes the notable experiments influencing our 
theory. Functional constraints emerge from the behavioral and biological constraints so 
there is some overlap. As we are extending the Soar cognitive architecture (Laird, 2008), 
we derive the last three computational constraints from Soar‘s computational model 
(Newell, 1990). The integration of the functional constraints with a cognitive architecture 
and the computational support for efficient processing of the representations are the 
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Figure 3-1: Design Space Constraints 
3.1 Behavioral and Biological Constraints 
There are many studies showing that vision and imagery share similar characteristics to 
include visual and spatial structure, resolution limits, field of view, laws of motion 
dynamics, motion aftereffects, short-term and long-term memories, and interference 
patterns (Farah, Soso, & Dasheiff, 1992; Finke, 1989; Gilden, Blake, & Hurst, 1995; 
Kosslyn, 1980; Palmer, 1999; Peronnet, Farah, & Gonon, 1988). Finke (1989) calls this 
the perceptual equivalence principle.  
 
―Imagery is functionally equivalent to perception to the extent that similar 
mechanisms in the visual system are activated when objects or events are 
imagined as when the same objects or events are actually perceived.‖ 
 
The primary difference between vision and imagery is the source of information 
(i.e. retinal input versus memory activation) and the initiation of the processing (i.e. top-
down versus bottom-up).
5
 Imagery may build spatial and visual representations entirely 
from the combination of activated object and spatial memories or by augmenting a 
perceived scene with objects and their spatial configurations from these memories. Thus, 
the interpretation of an imagined representation can occur in the presence or absence of 
perceived stimulus. This design space constraint requires that spatial and visual imagery 
share components associated with vision rather than having their own, separate 
mechanisms. 
                                                 
5
 However, most present theories of visual perception include substantial, ―top-down‖ processing that 
employs knowledge about objects to facilitate segmentation, recognition, and classification. Spatial and 
visual imagery are considered part of this top-down processing. 
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Neurological evidence shows imagery‘s integration with vision begins at the 
visual cortex. The visual cortex is the region of the occipital lobe (Figure 3-2a) that 
processes visual information received directly from the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN). 
The LGN, in turn, receives information from the retina. From a biological perspective, 
the visual cortex is the ―lowest‖ area of the brain where imagery experiments have shown 




(a) Human brain lobes (b) Ventral (“what”) and dorsal (“where”) 
pathways 
Figure 3-2: Shared Biological Mechanisms between Imagery and Vision 
 
Two pathways emanate from the visual cortex (Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982). 
The ventral, or ―what‖ pathway, extends from the visual cortex to the inferior temporal 
lobe while the dorsal, or ―where‖ pathway, runs from the visual cortex to the posterior 
parietal lobe (Figure 3-2b). The ventral pathway includes processes that extract an 
object‘s visual features and attempt to recognize the object by matching the features to an 
object in a long-term memory (Kosslyn, 1994; Palmer, 1999; Ullman, 1996). This long-
term object memory, assumed to be in the inferior temporal lobe, encodes the shape and 
color of objects. Some researchers advocate a 3D model (Finke, 1989; Marr, 1982; 
Pinker, 1988). Others suggest a population code (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). 
We are non-committal in this regard, as it remains unclear from our research how 
information in this memory is encoded.  
What is clear is that the system is able to reacquire shape and color. The shape 
may be a prototypical representation of the object (e.g. a prototypical chair), or in some 
cases, where one is exposed to the object through multiple repetitions, a very specific 
       Ventral 











shape that represents the exact object (e.g. the chair in my dining room) (Weaver, 1993). 
Although the shape and color representation in this memory is unique, our theory does 
not address it as a separate representation as it is not directly used in reasoning (i.e. there 
are no processes that directly manipulate it). Rather, the representation is instantiated 
during imagery to support constructing the quantitative spatial or generating the visual 
depictive structure. 
As the processes along the ventral pathway are extracting visual object features, 
the dorsal pathway processes are extracting spatial properties from the visual cortex, such 
as an object‘s location, orientation and size, and transmitting this information to a short-
term spatial memory in the parietal lobe (Kosslyn, 1994; Palmer, 1999). This short-term 
spatial memory is associated with quantitative spatial representation. During perception, 
it is an egocentric representation (i.e. relative to the head direction), and during imagery, 
the representation can be either from an egocentric or allocentric viewpoint. Long-term 
memory for spatial representations are encoded as allocentric representations in the 
medial temporal lobe (Byrne, Becker, & Burgess, 2007). 
One of the problems with the ―what‖ and ―where‖ analogy is that there appears to 
be little understanding on how perceived objects are reconciled between the two 
pathways. That is, how do ventral path processes associate objects they are recognizing 
with objects from which the dorsal path processes are deriving spatial properties? 
Pylyshyn (2001) offers some insight here. In addition to a set of ―what‖ and ―where‖ 
processes, there seems to be a ―which‖ process responsible for indexing and tracking 
objects in the perceived scene even though their location and properties change. Pylyshyn 
calls his theory, visual indexing. As an analogy he compares it to a demonstrative in 
natural language, such as ―That is red,‖ where ―that‖ is the visual index we picked out 
from our visual field.  
In Pylyshyn‘s theory, there is a preprocessing phase where a process selects and 
indexes a few objects (4-5) in the scene. This phase is distinct and precedes object and 
spatial recognition. How the preprocessing selects the salient objects is beyond the scope 
of Pylyshyn‘s theory, but Itti (2000), Marr (1982), and Ullman (1996) suggest that 
contour, color, motion, and orientation patterns from the depictive representation 
contribute to the determination of salient objects. Pylyshn states that only indexed visual 
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objects enter subsequent processing and argues that such an indexing scheme facilitates 
recognition and tracking the objects. This ―binding‖ issue also has ramifications for 
imagery. That is, in order to inspect the features of a specific object or a spatial 
relationship between two objects there has to be an index, or referent, to the object(s) in 
question.  
Once we have adequately understood the visual and spatial memories and 
processes perception uses, we can begin to understand how imagery leverages these 
mechanisms. A commonly demonstrated phenomenon in behavioral imagery experiments 
is that the time to generate an image is linearly dependent on the number of parts, or 
objects, in the representation. The construction of mental images arises from the 
amalgamation of metric shape and descriptive, symbolic knowledge. The ease of 
visualizing an object is dependent on the number of parts composing the object and how 
the parts are arranged in the symbolic description (Finke, 1989; Kosslyn, 1980, 1994; 
Kosslyn et al., 1983; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). 
Another common behavioral phenomena, made famous by Shepard‘s and 
Metzler‘s (1971) ―mental rotation‖ experiment, is the ability to imagine the 
transformation of objects in a scene.  One can change either their viewpoint from 
egocentric to allocentric or translate, rotate, or resize imagined objects. Finke (1989) calls 
this the transformational equivalence principle.  
 
“Imagined transformations and physical transformations exhibit 
corresponding dynamic characteristics and are governed by the same laws 
of motion.‖  
3.2 Functional Constraints 
The functional constraints emerge from the behavioral constraints. The architecture must 
account for how imagery processing constructs, transforms, generates, inspects, and 
maintains the spatial and visual representations. These functional constraints must show 
through the architecture in the following ways. First, the descriptive representations of 
the objects, or parts, must be organized in a compositional manner. Objects may be 
composed of other objects (―has-a‖ relationship), which in turn may be composed of 
more primitive objects. For example, a village is composed of buildings and roads. 
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Buildings in turn are composed of many rooms, which are composed of chairs, tables, 
beds, etc. Local spatial relationships between objects and their parts, such as the chair‘s 
arm is above and to the right of the seat, are similarly organized. This organization occurs 
when the information is stored during perception rather than when it is retrieved from 
memory and is a result of the temporal or spatial sequence from which it was originally 
perceived in the environment (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982). 
Second, imagery is an incremental addition or deletion of objects or shapes. It 
may involve a novel combination of objects (e.g. an elephant on top of a house), a 
previously seen object or scene (e.g. my living room), or novel patterns (e.g. imagining a 
path on a map) (Kosslyn, 1994). Object information, such as its shape and color originate 
from the long-term object memory. Spatial properties, specifying the location and 
orientation between objects, are activated from a declarative long-term memory and can 
be qualitative (i.e. left-of, above, disconnected) or quantitative. If in a qualitative format, 
the system must interpret the qualitative representation and convert it to a quantitative 
representation. In such cases the specification may be under constrained (e.g. imagine 
―A‖ to the left of ―B‖) and open to multiple interpretations. In these cases, task 
knowledge or default heuristics, such as the notion of an influence area (Kettani & 
Moulin, 1999) can define the distance between objects. 
The third way the architecture must reflect these functional constraints is to 
support the transformation, or manipulation, of a quantitative spatial or visual depictive 
representation. The quantitative spatial representation and associated processes must 
provide the ability to modify the viewpoint or change the location, orientation, or size of 
one or more objects in the scene. Manipulating visual depictive representations may be 
with mathematical processing (e.g. rotation, scaling, and filters) or algorithms that take 
explicit advantage of the topological structure and color.  
The fourth functional constraint, generation of a visual depictive representation, 
requires the architecture to provide mechanisms to render a scene from a privileged 
viewpoint. Again, rendering must be efficient and support the acquisition of an image. In 
Chapter 6 we will discuss how the transformation and generation constraints together 
influence our choice to use a scene graph for the quantitative spatial representation. 
 
 30 
The ability to ―visualize,‖ or inspect, a quantitative spatial or visual depictive 
representation to infer spatial or visual properties reflects the primary purpose for spatial 
and visual imagery. Imagery does not have its own set of inspectors, or feature and 
spatial detectors. It simply relies on those mechanisms it shares with vision. Therefore, 
after the system constructs and, if necessary, transforms and generates the image, the 
flow of information proceeds as in bottom-up perception. 
Finally, since visual imagery and visual perception coexist, sharing the same 
region of the visual cortex, the architecture must support maintenance of the visual 
depictive representation. Our resulting architecture does not support image maintenance 
in the sense that the visual depictive representation must continually be ―refreshed‖ or it 
begins to fade (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). However, we do include 
architectural mechanisms that inhibit additional incoming stimuli from disrupting the 
focused representation. Otherwise, perception always trumps imagery, never allowing it 
to finish. 
3.3 Computational Constraints  
A cognitive architecture is the fixed set of memories and processes underlying an agent 
(Newell, 1990). The motivation behind a cognitive architecture is that with the addition 
of knowledge, it can support intelligent behavior across a wide variety of tasks and 
environments. The architecture must support knowledge acquisition through perception 
and learning and provide mechanisms to encode, store, retrieve, and process the 
knowledge to enable planning, coordinating, and executing actions in the world. 
Cognitive architectures have traditionally represented knowledge as symbolic 
(e.g., rules, semantic nets, frames) structures. Perceptual-based representations have 
received less attention as a form of knowledge representation. One of our motivations, 
reflected by our first two computational constraints (Figure 3-1), is the possibility that an 
agent can achieve a computational gain using perceptual-based representations while 
maintaining clear separation between knowledge and the architecture.
6
 As we will 
                                                 
6
 In a depictive representation, some of the ―knowledge" is tacitly in the architecture -- the grid geometry 
embeds knowledge of the plane that would have to be explicitly encoded in a purely symbolic system. That 
is one of the strengths of the depictive representation. 
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demonstrate through our architecture description and evaluation, specialized, 
architectural components processing these representations can achieve an order of 
magnitude (or more) gain over symbolic processing without trading off generality. 
Supporting reactive and deliberate behavior, our third computational constraint, 
is a hallmark of Soar and one that we wish to maintain with the addition of spatial and 
visual imagery. That is, the computations that the imagery subsystem performs must meet 
practical computational requirements. The computational cost of a single ―step‖ of 
building, transforming, generating, or inspecting a spatial or visual representation should 
work within the time constraints of one Soar decision cycle that is hypothesized to be 50 
milliseconds in humans. Otherwise, the system is not responsive to changes in the 
environment. Note that this constraint is different from the first computational constraint 
(support efficient processing of the representation). A specialized perceptual process 
could be more efficient relative to performing the same operation with symbolic 
computations, but not responsive. For example, one of our implemented feature detectors 
for identifying curves in a depictive image is much more efficient than trying to detect 
curves using symbolic computations (in fact, we are not sure if it is even possible). 
However, it requires too many computational cycles (~6 seconds real CPU time) to be 
considered reactive to the environment. This shortfall may be a result of the wrong choice 
of an algorithm, poor implementation, or non-parallel hardware, but as it is currently 
implemented, it is not reactive and thus violates this constraint.  
The final computational constraint (Figure 3-1), the problem space computational 
model (PSCM), provides the control constraint necessary for imagery processing. PSCM 
is a paradigm for realizing intelligent behavior and is the basis for Soar (Newell et al., 
1991).  A problem space consists of a set of states and a set of operators. An agent, by 
iteratively selecting and applying operators, effectively conducts a search through its 
problem space. During each cycle, the agent executes a knowledge search to bring all the 
relevant knowledge to bear in deciding what operator to choose next. 
In this computational model, imagery is a special problem space using specialized 
mechanisms for general spatial and visual processing. The architecture maintains control 





with operators for constructing, transforming, generating, and inspecting a quantitative 
spatial or visual depictive representation. During each imagery cycle, the agent conducts 
a knowledge search of its memories to build a quantitative spatial representation, 
generate a visual depictive representation, or transform or inspect either representation to 
facilitate further reasoning. The imagery process is conditional and iterative. The agent 
may add more detail to its representation(s) and inspect it to refine the search. 
3.4 Theory Summary 
Figure 3-3 summarizes the theory. What Newell describes as central cognition 
encodes knowledge in the form of amodal, symbolic representations (Newell, 1990).  
Some of the knowledge is a representation of objects in the world or visual objects. 
During perception or memory retrieval, the architecture creates visual symbols 
representing these visual objects. The visual symbols denote either a prototypical object 
(e.g. a chair), a specific instance of an object (e.g. the chair in my dining room), or 
multiple objects (e.g. my dining room).  
Imagery is the combination of the imagery problem space and the specialized 
imagery subsystem. The agent initiates the imagery problem space when there is an 
impasse in problem solving and wants to resolve the impasse using spatial or visual 
imagery. Task operators direct the imagery problem space that in turn controls and 
communicates with the imagery subsystem through its operators (construct, transform, 
generate, inspect).  
The construct operator triggers the construction of a quantitative spatial 
representation. The imagery subsystem builds the structure by combining the general, 
metric shape of objects from a long-term object memory with qualitative or quantitative 
spatial information from a symbolic memory and encodes the resulting representation in a 
spatial short-term memory (STM). The transform operator controls the transformation of 
the spatial representation by manipulating its viewpoint or specific objects within it. An 
imagery generate operator creates a visual depictive representation in a visual STM by 
combining the quantitative spatial representation with each object‘s specific shape and 
color from the object LTM and renders it from a specified viewpoint. A transform 
operator manipulates the depictive representation by activating specific regions. During 
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inspection, perceptual visual and spatial processes perform reasoning by searching the 
visual STM or spatial STM for visual and/or spatial properties. The results of the 
inspection are transmitted to central cognition where the imagery problem space 
operators build the internal symbolic memories. Central cognition uses the inspection 
results to continue progress through the current task‘s problem space.   
 
 
Figure 3-3: Summary of Spatial and Visual Imagery Theory 
 
Note that although we have assigned the symbolic representation to central 
cognition‘s associative memories, the quantitative spatial representation to the spatial 
STM, and the visual depictive representation to the visual STM, this is not to claim that 
each memory contains that type of representation exclusively. Symbolic memories in 
central cognition may have quantitative representations; the spatial and visual memories 
may contain symbols, and so forth. What we do claim, however, is that each memory has 
specialized processing mechanisms for their primary representation, and these 
mechanisms are what distinguishes the memories. Therefore, although a symbolic 
computation in central cognition may be able to process a quantitative or depictive 
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theory or resulting architecture, what it does indicate is that there is some redundancy so 
if one component is resource-constrained or incapacitated, alternate memories and 
processes can assist. 
In summary, decision-making proceeds by combining perceptual representations 
with task specific knowledge to construct an imagined scene. Analysis emerges through 
the manipulation of both sentential and depictive representations. Retrieval or inspection 
of the resulting representations provides new information that the agent uses to reason 
and produce action in the environment. We will reiterate how these design space 
constraints influence the architectural design in Chapter 6. First, however, we turn to 












4.1 Cognitive Architectures 
Although cognitive science and artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have made 
enormous progress in peripheral disciplines, there has not been a previous effort to 
support spatial and visual imagery processing within a cognitive architecture. Until 
recently, architectures such as Soar (Laird, 2008) and ACT-R (Anderson et al., 2004) 
focused on higher-level cognition, or what Newell calls central cognition (Newell, 1990) 
and typically ignored perceptual and motor mechanisms.  There is strong evidence, 
however, that the environment plays a key role in cognitive processing and the perceptual 
and motor systems serve as the link that integrates the environment to higher-level 
cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982) .  
From its inception, the EPIC architecture (Kieras & Meyer, 1997) emphasized the 
perceptual and motor systems. However, rather than specifying and implementing the 
low-level details of perception and motor processing, (e.g. edge detection, joint 
coordinates), EPIC focuses on temporal constraints between perception, motor, and 
cognitive components to account for human dual-task performance. Perception provides 
symbolic input to cognition and cognition sends symbolic output to the motor system. 
There are no quantitative or depictive representations involved in the reasoning. 
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Following EPIC‘s lead, Soar and ACT-R extended their architecture to include 
integrated perceptual and motor systems. EPIC-Soar (Chong & Laird, 1997) integrated 
EPIC‘s perceptual and motor processor modules with Soar to evaluate the performance 
and acquisition of executive process knowledge that is required to support the execution 
of two concurrent tasks (i.e. dual-task). The architecture was similar to our approach in 
the sense that EPIC provided perceptual input to Soar, and Soar sent motor commands to 
EPIC. However, the EPIC-Soar hybrid architecture was two independent processes and 
not integrated where one component can take advantage of another‘s mechanisms. 
The current version of Soar takes a more functional approach, using an external 
module that translates an environment‘s perceptual information into a symbolic 
representation Soar can use for reasoning. Likewise, a module external to Soar, 
transforms the symbols Soar sends from its working memory into a format that produces 
behavior in the environment. Using these perception and motor modules, Soar has 
demonstrated success in modeling human behavior in dynamic environments to include 
military simulations with pilots flying fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft and soldiers 
conducting Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) (Jones et al., 1999; Tambe et 
al., 1995; Wray et al., 2005). Again, however, these modules do not perform any type of 
cognitive functions. 
Similar to EPIC, ACT-R‘s perception and motor modules focus more on the 
timing and content of modalities rather than the representational format and low-level 
processing capability (Anderson et al., 2004).  In the case of perception, productions 
request the visual module for information based on constraints. For example, a 
production may request the ―red‖ object or the object that is located ―on-top‖ of the 
current scene. One of ACT-R‘s important extensions to EPIC‘s model of the visual 
system includes breaking visual perception into two modules each with a short-term 
memory (buffers in ACT-R terminology). The visual-object, or ―what,‖ module holds the 
symbolic features of the object currently being attended to by the visual-location, or 
―where,‖ module. The visual-location module maintains the location of all the objects in 
the current scene. However, there is not long-term perceptual memory enabling the 
persistence of an object‘s shape or color and no short-term memories for manipulating 
perceptual representations and drawing inferences from them.  
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Gunzelmann and Lyon (2007) have recently proposed an extension to ACT-R that 
includes a module specialized for spatial information processing. The proposed module 
contains processes to perform both qualitative and quantitative, mathematical 
comparisons of spatial relationships between objects, such as direction and distance. 
They recommend that the spatial module have connections to the visual and motor 
modules (contrary to ACT-R theory of no direct connections between modules) for the 
purpose of extracting spatial properties from perceptual input and executing motor 
control. Their proposal appears to be similar to our theory of spatial imagery and 
corresponding implementation. Their proposal does not include plans for incorporating 
depictive representations and processing. 
Wintermute‘s and Laird‘s (2007) Soar Spatial Reasoning (SRS) system focuses 
on how the architecture projects qualitative predicates into a quantitative spatial 
representation, providing a more detailed implementation of the capability than our 
current system provides. Kurup and Chandrasekaran (2007) have also argued for multi-
modal architectures and augment Soar with their diagrammatic reasoning system. We 
will discuss the similarities and differences between our approaches shortly.  
There have been several other efforts to extend the perception and motor 
capabilities of each of these architectures (Hill, 1999; Hill, Han, & Van Lent, 2002; St. 
Amant et al., 2005).  Each contribution effectively pushes the architecture closer to the 
environment. The problem with these approaches, however, is that they assume the 
cognitive system abandons the perceptual representations rather than using them to 
participate in problem solving. Discarding these representations adversely affects the 
system‘s ability to perform visual and spatial reasoning and requires ad-hoc, bolted-on 
components that are tailored for specific domains (Best, Lebiere, & Scarpinatto, 2002; 
Wray et al., 2005). What we are missing from these architectures is the ability to 
amalgamate the cognitive and perceptual representations in a general-purpose way and 
then use the resulting information for reasoning.  
4.2 AI Systems 
There have been several AI diagrammatic reasoning systems built that use both symbolic 
and quantitative representations. Gelernter‘s (1959) geometry theorem proving machine 
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is perhaps the earliest. Kurup‘s and Chandrasekaran‘s (2007) biSoar (discussed below) is 
the most recent and is the closest parallel with our work. With the exception of Funt‘s, 
(1976) WHISPER system, there have been few systems that reason with depictive 
representations. Funt argued that people solve problems on four levels, and AI was 
ignoring the last level. The levels were (1) the goal-oriented approach where the system 
searches for a solution; (2) the mathematical level where sentential equations enable 
progress; (3) the relational level where a complete structure of the explored search space 
is used for reasoning; and (4) the image level where representations were analogues of 
the situation. Funt argued that depictive representations overcame the ―frame problem‖ 
because objects move together so the system does not have to use computational cycles to 
infer new features and relationships. Empty space and new shape just emerge. Despite 
Funt‘s seemingly convincing arguments, the mainstream AI community has continued to 
ignore the use of depictive representations as a form of knowledge representation and 
reasoning. 
The specific problem WHISPER solved was determining the stability of a stack of 
arbitrarily shaped rigid bodies. WHISPER consisted of symbolic qualitative physics rules 
(―if a block is on a slant, it will slide‖), an image of the situation, encoded as a two-
dimensional array, and basic algorithms for modifying the image. The rules directed a 
simulated parallel processing ―retina‖ capable of extracting basic, domain independent 
features (e.g. object contact, object symmetry, finding the center area of an object). Each 
unit in the retina was constrained to communicate only with its immediate neighbors and 
a ―retinal supervisor‖ that consolidated each unit‘s inspection results for a particular 
query. The local communication constraints between retinal units resulted in algorithms 
similar in spirit to Furnas‘ (1990; Furnas, 1991; Furnas et al., 2000) pixel rewrite system 
that we use as motivation for some of our depictive processing. 
Marr (1982) addressed many of the underlying issues of how the visual system 
recognizes object features in a scene with his seminal work in computational vision   His 
work influences our design space in two important ways. First, we apply his notion that 
visual processing produces incremental, increasingly abstract levels of representations 
(i.e. the pixel image, raw primal sketch, 2 ½ D sketch, 3D model, symbols). In a similar 
manner, but in the opposite direction, imagery starts with the symbolic representation, 
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combines it with stored perceptual memories to produce increasingly concrete 
representations. Marr stressed how certain formats made certain types of information 
explicit and accessible. From the perspective of top-down cognitive processing, we can 
also make this argument,—which is a primary reason for pursuing quantitative spatial 
and visual depictive representations in problem solving. If certain representations are 
useful for extracting features such as surface contours, object orientations, or spatial 
relationships in bottom up visual perception, then these representations are also useful in 
top-down processing when the information is not explicitly encoded as symbols. This 
principle is in accordance with Newell‘s theory that intelligent systems should bring all 
knowledge to bear in solving a problem (Newell, 1990). 
Second, Marr‘s theories concluded that visual perception stores an object‘s 3D 
model, so it can recreate its shape if required. An important part of our architectural 
assumptions is that we assume the system does not just throw this shape information 
away after it recognizes the object. At a minimum, it must be encoded for subsequent 
recognition. In the case of spatial and visual imagery, it is activated to support further 
reasoning. 
Tolman (1948) articulated how rats represented spatial knowledge, or cognitive 
maps, to assist them in finding food in a maze. The cognitive map metaphor, or the 
representation of large-scale space, provide a psychological theory of how we acquire an 
object‘s location, orientation, and size relative to other objects in the currently perceived 
scene (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982).  The theory also specifies how we connect individual 
scenes together. Cognitive map theory says that as you explore the world, you begin 
building up representations of the relationships between static objects or landmarks in the 
environment and the relationships between objects in individual scenes. Cognitive maps 
provide important concepts for spatial imagery because they provide a starting point as to 
how spatial knowledge is organized. Spatial imagery can rebuild scenes by composing 
objects together using the same local spatial relationships derived from cognitive maps. 
This provides a methodology for reconstructing representations of previously seen 
objects to infer new global spatial relationships. Cognitive map theory also advocates the 
idea that there is a viewpoint associated with the stored spatial relationships. Some have 
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hypothesized that these maps are stored from a first-person, egocentric viewpoint with 
gateways, or exits, separating the scenes (Chown, Kaplan, & Kortenkamp, 1995).   
Cognitive map theory differs from spatial and visual imagery in that it does not 
address how specific knowledge about an object (i.e. shape) is stored or later retrieved. 
The theory also does not address how task knowledge, information from other modalities, 
or dynamic objects are combined to form new spatial representations. For example, using 
cognitive map theory, you can recall the main intersection in the center of a small town. 
Your scene may contain the roads, buildings, and traffic signs but does not include 
dynamic objects, such as cars or people walking. The scene is ―remembered‖ from one 
particular vantage point. Spatial imagery enables one to imagine the scene, add dynamic 
objects to it, transform either the viewpoint or specific objects, and then inspect the scene 
for specific knowledge. 
Kuipers, leveraging the cognitive map metaphor, developed the Spatial Semantic 
Hierarchy (SSH) with the goal of explaining how a robot learns the spatial structure of 
the environment. Each hierarchical layer has qualitative and quantitative representations 
with global knowledge of the environment increasing as you move up the hierarchy from 
very specific control laws to topological maps of places, paths, and regions. At the 
highest level, or what Kuipers calls the global metrical map, SSH combines the 
qualitative (symbolic) topological relationships with the local, two-dimensional geometry 
to form a structure with one global, allocentric frame of reference. Whereas Kuipers 
focuses on how spatial structures are acquired, we concentrate on how the spatial 
structures are used in general problem solving. 
The closest parallel to our work, is that of Kurup (2008) and Chandrasekaran 
(Kurup & Chandrasekaran, 2007). Their system, biSoar, combines the Soar cognitive 
architecture with their diagrammatic reasoning system (DRS) and reasons using both 
symbolic and diagrammatic representations. Similar to imagery construction, 
transformation, and inspection, their system has a set of action routines to add 
diagrammatic elements and perceptual routines to extract spatial relationships from the 
diagram.  
There are a few key theoretical and implementation differences between our 
approaches, perhaps because they have focused more on diagrammatic reasoning and we 
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have considered the psychological and neurological constraints of imagery. First, they 
propose a single, working memory containing both symbolic and diagrammatic 
representations while we advocate separate symbolic and perceptual memories where the 
symbolic, procedural memory does not have direct access to perceptual-based 
representations. We base our decision on evidence that modality-specific representations 
(i.e. spatial, visual, auditory) are distinct posterior neural systems (see (Jonides et al., 
2008) for a review of working memory theories). From a computational standpoint, a 
primary reason for having a multi-representational system is to gain a computational 
advantage using processes that are specific to the representation. By embedding the 
perceptual representation into a symbolic computational system, you lose this efficiency 
without mechanisms to distinguish the two. Although the two implementations are 
similar (i.e. their diagrammatic reasoning system is outside of Soar), Kurup and 
Chandrasekaran base their theory on the notion that by having a single, multimodal 
working memory, automatic learning of both symbolic and diagrammatic representations 
can occur using Soar‘s chunking mechanism. We currently do not have such a theory of 
how results from imagery processing are learned (except, perhaps as an encoded 
episode), and are not clear as to how such a theory would be realized from a practical 
standpoint.  
Second, their diagrammatic reasoning theory specifies the type of objects (point, 
curve, and region) a diagram can contain while we leave the type of object open-ended to 
any shape and color the agent experiences in the world, imagines by composing known 
objects, or emerges from the manipulation of a depiction (i.e. a new shape). Our approach 
leaves the complexity, detail, and richness of an imagined scene much more open where, 
in addition to specifying distance, direction, and topology our representations and 
processes also consider the orientation (i.e. front), specific shape, and color of an object. 
 Finally, they are noncommittal as to whether diagrams are quantitative, algebraic 
equations or depictive, image representations. Their current implementation uses 
sentential, metric structures. For example, points are two-dimensional, Cartesian 
coordinates, lines are composed from two points, a curve is a sequence of straight lines, 
and a region is a closed curve. We make a distinction between the two representations, as 
there are different types of reasoning that can be performed on each (e.g. extracting visual 
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features from a depictive representation). In the end, however, we are both motivated by 
how a task-independent architecture uses amodal symbolic and perceptual representations 
in reasoning. 
4.3 Computational Models 
Previous efforts to build computational models of either spatial or visual imagery have 
not included the constraints of a general cognitive architecture. Kosslyn (1980) composed 
a detailed computational model of visual, depictive imagery. Although the model 
clarified his theories, Kosslyn did not build it with the intent of incorporating it into a 
cognitive architecture.  
Baylor (1971) implemented a computational model of the block visualization 
task.
7
 What is interesting about his approach is that he divided the knowledge into two 
problem spaces. The symbolic space manipulated generic information about blocks, and 
the image space (implemented with symbolic representations) had specific operators that 
manipulated visual information. This problem space division is similar to our 
computational theory. 
Moran built a computational model of spatial imagery using a production system 
(Moran, 1973).  The task he chose to model began with the agent at a specific location. 
The agent is then issued a series of directions (e.g. move north one-step, turn east, move 
forward one-step, etc.) and is to ―report‖ its final location and direction. Moran raised 
some valid points such as how these representations are constructed and controlled. 
However, we disagree with his hypothesis that imagery is entirely symbolic in nature. 
Since the task was spatial, rather than visual, depictive representations were not required. 
Moran argued that pictorial representations are uneconomical, as they require a large 
amount of information to be stored. We agree that recording every scene would quickly 
exceed our memory capacity. That is why an object long-term memory only stores 
compact shape and color representations. It is the task of imagery to recreate the picture. 
                                                 
7
The task requires a subject to start by visualizing a three-inch cube and imagine one of its side‘s red. Next, 
the experimenter instructs the subject to imagine two sides blue. The blue sides are adjacent to the red side 
but opposite each other. Finally, the subject imagines breaking the cube into one-inch cubes and deciding 
how many of the resulting cubes have exactly one red and one blue face.   
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Glasgow and Papadias (1992) built a molecular scene analysis application using 
mental imagery as motivation. Their system uses three separate representations 
(descriptive, spatial, visual) and the visual representation (occupancy array) is similar to 
our depictive representation with the exception that they only render convex shapes. 
Their long-term memory, where they store descriptive representations is similar to our 
symbolic representations in Soar. There are, however, three major differences. First, they 
built a specific application while we are taking a more general approach. While Glasgow 
and Papadias took significant strides to incorporate key findings in mental imagery, they 
did not design it with the overarching constraint of a cognitive architecture. Second, they 
represent spatial information using symbolic arrays rather than a quantitative format. 
Finally, they make no commitment as to how the visual representation is constructed, 
where the shape information is stored, or how more than one object is arranged in the 
visual representation. 
Tabachneck-Schijf‘s et al. (1997) CaMeRa model uses multiple representations 
and simulates the cognitive and visual perceptual processes of an economics expert 
teaching the laws of supply and demand. Their system includes both visual short-term 
and long-term memories that complement verbal memories. Visual STM includes a 
quantitative (node-link structure) and a depictive (bitmap) representation that is similar in 
design, although not in implementation, to our representations. The architecture‘s overall 
generality is unclear although it appears to be their intention. Their shape representation 
is limited to algebraic shapes (i.e. points and lines) and their spatial structure only models 
an object‘s location while ignoring orientation and size.  
Barkowsky‘s (2002) MIRAGE application relies on mental imagery evidence to 
reason about space in a geographic context. It focuses primarily on how mental images 
are constructed from qualitative geographic spatial relationships. Barkowsky (in press) 
proposes that any model of mental imagery must include the following: 
 
(1) Hybrid representational formats to include propositional and visual structures 
involving shape. 
(2) Coupling between imagery and visual perception.  
(3) Construction of images from pieces of knowledge. 
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(4) Processing with or without external stimuli. 
(5) Multi-directional distributed processing and control. 
 
Our architecture addresses (1) – (4). Our control structure initiates imagery 
processes in a top-down manner while perceptual mechanisms process results in a 
bottom-up fashion. In Soar, the contents of working memory determine which memories 
and processes are active without any centralized control (5). In addition to Barkowsky‘s 
list, we also propose that the architecture must support transformation and generation of a 












When does an agent use spatial and visual imagery? How does it know which 
representation to use? This chapter begins by summarizing characteristics of the tasks and 
environments where spatial and visual imagery is useful. The characteristics include a 
discussion and examples of general tasks and specific sub-tasks requiring spatial or visual 
imagery. We then provide three concrete examples by introducing the tasks and 
environments we use to evaluate the architecture. The first two tasks are primarily 
internal problem-solving tasks where there is limited interaction with an external 
environment. The final task extends the first two tasks to a dynamic and continuous 
environment where the agent must interpret and act upon information from multiple 
sources and perception and imagery must interact and share the same resources. 
5.1 Characteristics of Tasks and Environments 
In general, spatial and visual imagery is useful in tasks requiring the inference of spatial 
relationships (direction, distance, orientation, topology, size) between two or more 
objects or detection of an individual object‘s spatial (e.g. width, height, orientation) or 
visual (e.g. shape, color) properties. In both cases, imagery is useful because the spatial 
or visual information required to make a decision is not directly accessible from either 
perceptual input or memory retrieval. These situations include circumstances where 
vision would normally perform the analysis, but the relevant objects or spatial 
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configurations are hypothetical, missing details, or not present. However, by combining 
the information into a quantitative spatial or visual depictive representation, one can infer 
the relevant spatial or visual detail. The external environment may have many spatial and 
visual characteristics or none at all, but the task is such that imagining the situation helps 
clarify its spatial and/or visual properties. 
As an example, consider a young child playing hide-and-go-seek with a parent 
inside their home. The parent, playing the role of the ―hider‖ may provide audio clues to 
assist the child‘s search. The child, having inadequate perceptual input (he or she does 
not see the parent), may use spatial imagery to retrieve a stored representation of the  
spatial layout of each room and combine it with the parent‘s audio signal to guide the 
search. As the child ―seeks,‖ she may use visual imagery to focus in on specific locations 
where the parent might ―fit.‖ In this example, both the environment (rooms in house) and 
the task (hide-and-go-seek) have many spatial and visual characteristics. The rooms have 
direction, distance, and topological relationships, hiding places have size, and the task 
requires filling in the missing spatial and visual details (e.g. what direction should I move 
to next? Will daddy fit in the closet? In the cupboard?)  
On the other hand, the immediate environment may not always include spatial or 
visual features. Consider when you read a story or someone is giving you verbal 
directions. In these examples, you may create an imagined scene to achieve a better 
understanding of the spatial and visual properties of the task. However, the surrounding 
characteristics of the environment are irrelevant. Even if the environment includes many 
spatial and visual features, imagery may not be useful if the task is repetitive and highly 
learned (e.g. driving to work). 
We suggest there are four general tasks where using imagery is useful to infer 
spatial and visual properties. 
 
 Filling in missing details of a situation 
 Recognizing novel shapes and spatial properties if not present visually 
 Analyzing or rehearsing an outcome of an action before executing the 
action 




The previous two examples (hide-and-go-seek, imagine a scene from a story) are 
instances of the first two tasks where perception provides none or only part of the spatial 
and visual properties required for reasoning. Our three experimental domains described 
below are also instances of these first two tasks. The third general task uses imagery as a 
simulator to analyze or rehearse the possible outcomes of future actions where simulating 
actions involve moving imagined objects or looking at the scene from a different 
perspective. We explore this general task in our third experiment. The last general task 
also uses imagery as a simulator, but rather than simulating potential future states, 
reasoning simulates a previous state or event to inform a future decision. This form of 
reasoning requires the retrieval of previous experiences from an episodic memory. We do 
not evaluate this task but will address it as part of our future work. 
Each of these general tasks will include specific spatial and visual subtasks, some 
of which we describe next. Schultheis et al. (2007) have suggested the following criteria 
to distinguish between tasks and environments requiring a spatial or visual representation. 
The greater the number of criteria is an indicator that a visual depictive representation is 
more likely required rather than a quantitative spatial representation. Although they 
propose that these representations fall on a continuous spectrum, we ignore that for now 
as our theory states that the agent must make a commitment to one or another 
representation. The criteria are (with our slight modification):  
 
(1) Number of different types of spatial relationships (direction, distance, 
orientation, topology, size) 
(2) Number of spatial relationships 
(3) Specificity of the shape 
(4) Specificity of the color 
 
The following are the specific spatial and visual subtasks, one or more of which, 
support a general task. We provide a figure to illustrate some of these subtasks. Before 




(a) Infer global spatial relationships (i.e. direction, distance, orientation, topology, 
size) or visual properties (i.e. new shapes or color) derived from the combination 
of objects and their perceived or retrieved local spatial relationships.  
 
Example 1 (Figure 5-1a, NOTE: ―you‖ are the ―X‖): Target A is 500m to your left 
front. Target B is 250 meters to your right. What is the direction between Target 
A and Target B? What is the distance between Target A and Target B? In this 
example, there are two different types of spatial relationships (direction and 
distance) and three spatial relationships (X-A, X-B, A-B). Shape and color are not 
required so a spatial representation is sufficient for this example. 
 
Example 2 (Figure 5-1b): What is the angle between a ray from you to target A 
and a ray between you and target B? In addition to the direction and distance 
relationships, you now have an orientation to consider. This task is again spatial, 
but with an increase in the type and number of spatial relationships moves it 


























Example 3 (Figure 5-1c): Add a triangle with a vertex at your location and a base 
to your direct front. The interior angle of the vertex is 60 degrees and the height 
of the triangle is 750 meters. Is target A inside the triangle? Target B? Again, we 
have increased both the type of spatial relationships (triangle size and topology—
inside/outside) and the number of spatial relationships. 
 
Example 4 (Figure 5-1d): Superimpose what you currently have imagined onto 
the background in Figure 5-1d. Ignoring the triangle, are A and B in the same 
topological space (i.e. can you get from A to B without crossing a gray area)? The 
background contains non-convex shapes and more spatial relationships to 
consider. Visual imagery and a depictive representation are likely to be necessary 
for this task. 
 
Example 5: Are there any parts of a head of Iceberg lettuce that are a darker green 
than any parts of a Christmas tree? [Answer: yes – if the tree has some light green 
ornaments on it.] In this example, you have to combine the two objects in a visual 
depictive representation to make the specific color comparison. 
 
(b) Infer results after a transformation.  
 
Example 6 (Figure 5-1c Notice we are back to figure ―c‖): Rotate the triangle 
counterclockwise 45 degrees. Is target A inside it? Now rotate the triangle 
clockwise 90 degrees. Is target B inside it? Without specific shape, the spatial 
representation is sufficient. 
 
Example 7 (Figure 5-1d): Starting from the triangle‘s original orientation (i.e. 
north), rotate the triangle clockwise 90 degrees. Is there an enclosed gray region 
between you and target B? Similar to example 4, the task might benefit 
 
 50 
significantly from visual imagery because of the specific shape and multiple types 
and number of spatial relationships.  
 
(c) Retrieve the spatial or visual properties from an exemplar. 
 
Example 8 (Figure 5-1d): Imagine a path from A to B avoiding all enclosed 
regions. Is there a location where the path turns approximately 90 degrees? 
Retrieving spatial or visual properties of an exemplar requires visual imagery as 
the exemplar‘s specific shape and, possibly color, are involved. In this example, 
the imagined path is a specific exemplar. 
 
Example 9: In what hand does the Statue of Liberty hold the torch? A specific 
instance of a visual object (i.e. Statue of Liberty) likely necessitates a visual 
depictive representation. 
 
(d) Retrieve a prototypical object’s spatial or visual properties when the property 
was not explicitly encoded 
 
Example 10: Does the letter ‗A‘ have an enclosed space? The letter ‗B‘? ‗X‘?  In 
these examples, the prototypical letter may have an explicit symbolic description 
(e.g. the letter ‗X‘ is two intersecting lines), but not enough information to 
perform the reasoning in the question. Since specific shape is involved, a visual 
depictive representation is likely necessary for the task. 
 
In summary, the previous discussion highlights the general tasks where imagery is 
useful for reasoning to include filling in missing spatial and visual details of a situation, 
recognizing novel visual features and spatial properties, analyzing or rehearsing the   
outcome of an action before executing it, and replaying a previous event to inform a 
future decision. One or more subtasks support these tasks and may require spatial or 
visual imagery depending on the number and types of spatial relationships and the 
specificity of the shape and color. The agent decides what representation is suitable for 
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the task. Subtasks include, but are not limited to, inferring global spatial relationships or 
visual features from perceived or retrieved local spatial relationships, inferring new 
spatial and visual properties after a transform, and retrieving a spatial or visual property 
from an exemplar or a prototypical object where the feature was not explicitly encoded. 
The environment may or may not play a role in determining the characteristics of the 
tasks. We now summarize our three experimental domains as concrete examples. We will 
refer to these domains when we discuss the architecture in the next chapter and revisit the 
tasks in more detail when we evaluate the architecture in Chapter 7. 
5.2 Geometry Gymnastics 
The geometry problem derives from Larkin‘s and Simon‘s (1987) work demonstrating 
the computational advantage of diagrams. In one of the problems they investigate, the 
agent must locate visual properties (e.g. vertices, line segments, triangles) and infer 
relationships (e.g. angles) that initial task knowledge does not specify. The problem, 
shown in Figure 5-2, consists of four lines (A, B, C, D). Line A is parallel to line B and 
line C intersects line A. Line D bisects the line segment formed by the intersection of line 
C with lines A and B. The goal is to show that the two triangles formed are congruent. To 
prove congruency, the model must employ a basic geometry rule, such as the angle-side-
angle (ASA) rule. The ASA rule states if two angles and the included side of a triangle 
are congruent to two angles and the included side of another triangle, then the two 
triangles are congruent. In Figure 5-2, the model must show E1=E2, e1=e2, and c=b.  
 
 













The environment is irrelevant in this task, as it only requires internal problem 
solving. The general imagery tasks are to fill in the spatial and visual details and 
recognize novel features and spatial relationships by combining objects (i.e. lines) based 
on their local spatial (i.e. direction, distance, orientation) relationships. Another way to 
look at the problem statement is that line B is in front of line A. Line C is in between line 
A and line B and oriented counterclockwise some random orientation between 30 and 60 
degrees from line A. Line D is also in between line A and line B oriented clockwise from 
line A. Because the number and type of spatial relationships are more than a few but 
specific shape and color are not required, this task only requires spatial imagery. In the 
results chapter we will discuss the comparison between an exclusive symbolic and a 
combined symbolic/quantitative spatial implementation. 
5.3 Alphabet Soup 
An experiment from Thompson et al. (in press) motivates the second domain. In 
their experiment, the subject hears a letter from the English alphabet, and the investigator 
asks the subject to visualize the letter in its uppercase format (Figure 5-3). Next, the 
subject hears a cue, such as ―curve,‖ ―enclosed-space,‖ or ―symmetry‖ and indicates (by 
pushing a button) whether the letter has the particular feature. For example, the letter ‗A‘ 
has an enclosed space and vertical symmetry while ‗U‘ has a curve and vertical 
symmetry. The Soar agent also ―hears‖ a question, visualizes the letter, searches for the 
desired feature, and then ―verbally‖ responds.  
While there are environmental cues in this domain (i.e. the agent ―hears‖ a 
question), like the geometry problem, it is primarily an internal problem-solving task. 
The general imagery task is to fill in the visual details by retrieving a specific feature 
from a prototypical, uppercase letter. As specific shape is necessary to infer the visual 
features, this task focuses on the depictive representation. Unlike the geometry domain, 
symbolic or quantitative representations may have significant challenges, both 






Figure 5-3: Alphabet Experiment 
5.4 Scouts Out 
This evaluation environment is motivated by the U.S. Army‘s work in developing 
robotic scouts to provide situational awareness for a mixed manned/unmanned military 
force (Jaczkowski, 2002).  Supporting intelligent tactical behavior, rather than serving as 
a sensor platform on wheels, is one of the goals for the robotic scouts. That is, in addition 
to autonomously maneuvering to a position and transmitting video data, we would like 
the scouts to coordinate and attempt to improve their positions based on sound tactical 
behavior.  
In support of this effort, we built a simulation to model a section of two scout 
vehicles that must cooperate to maintain visual contact with an approaching enemy‘s 
three-vehicle reconnaissance element (Figure 5-4a). One scout, the section lead, is a Soar 
agent. The other scout, the teammate, is scripted. The team‘s primary goal is to keep its 
commander informed of the opposing force‘s movements by periodically sending 
observation reports (through the lead) containing their best assessment of the enemy‘s 
location. The agent cannot observe its teammate because of terrain occlusions. However, 
the teammate periodically sends messages regarding its position. The teammate scans the 
area in front of it and sends reports to its lead when it observes enemy vehicles (Figure 
5-4b). The teammate also responds to orders from the lead to reorient its view. The agent 
can look at the environment or its map (Figure 5-4c-d) and can reorient its view. We 
assume the agent and its teammate can distinguish enemy vehicles from other objects. 
However, the agent has to decide whether a sighted or reported enemy is a new or 
previously identified entity. 
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To motivate the capabilities of multiple-representations, consider how the agent 
makes decisions in this domain. Typically, a scout leader follows these steps after initial 
visual contact (Army, 2002).  
 
(1) Deploy and report 
(2) Analyze the situation 
(3) Choose and execute a course of action 
 
Analyzing the situation involves reasoning about known friendly and enemy locations 
and orientations, terrain, and obstacles. If the scout lead does not know the locations of 
all expected enemy, then he might hypothesize where other enemy vehicles are and 
imagine their positions (Figure 5-4d). Based on the analysis, the scout leader then decides 
if he should reorient himself, his teammate, or both. 
 
  
(a) Actual Situation (b) Teammate‟s View 
  
(c) Agent‟s View (d) Agent‟s Perceived Map / Imagined Situation 




Analysis often involves visualizing the situation and mentally simulating 
alternatives. Military leaders rely on imagery to assist with decisions in the ―fog of war.‖ 
The U.S. Army‘s doctrine even goes so far to state: 
 
Visualize means to create and think in mental images. Human beings do 
not normally think in terms of data, or even knowledge; they generally 
think in terms of ideas or images—mental pictures of a given situation 
(Army, 2003).  
 
Using spatial and visual imagery, an agent can imagine each observed entity‘s 
map icon on its external map. If the agent is confident in the information, it can write it 
on the external map, in effect making it persist. As information changes the agent updates 
the map, keeping its perceived map of the situation up to date. Note that the agent may, 
but does not have to, keep the location and orientation in its head. It can simply ―look‖ at 
its external map and ―read‖ the information. In this sense, then the map serves as an 
external store. Using the external map as perceptual background, the agent can then 
imagine key terrain (enemy objectives), hypothesized enemy, possible enemy paths, its 
viewpoint, and its teammate‘s viewpoint. It can then imagine alternative course of action 
by simulating different viewpoints.  
This domain has environmentally rich spatial (e.g. relationships between entities, 
obstacles, terrain, etc.) and visual (e.g. terrain‘s topological shape and color) properties. 
In addition to the general imagery tasks of filling in the spatial and visual details and 
recognizing novel shapes by combining perceptual input with retrieved memories, 
imagery is used to analyze the outcome of an action before executing the action (e.g. 
imagining different viewpoints for the teammate and self). The sub-tasks cover both 
spatial and visual tasks with similarities to the examples provided in the beginning of this 
chapter. 
In summary, decision-making proceeds by combining perceptual representations 
with task specific and declarative knowledge to construct an imagined scene. Analysis 
emerges through the manipulation of symbolic, quantitative spatial, and visual depictive 
representations. Retrieval or inspection of the resulting representations then provides new 












The previous chapters present the background necessary to appreciate the architectural 
design decisions. Although we introduce the theory and design space constraints at once, 
our research strategy is an iterative process. First, we analyze specific behavioral 
phenomena supporting a desired functionality. In our case, it was how humans use mental 
imagery, or visualization techniques, to make decisions and solve problems. We then 
determine plausible computational approaches motivated by the behavioral and biological 
evidence. Next, we design and implement a complete (i.e. perception, cognition, action), 
although rudimentary software system. Finally, we evaluate the system starting with 
simple tasks and progress to more complex scenarios. The evaluation process drives our 
future direction and requirements for subsequent iterations. 
For example, we initially did not consider how perceptual mechanisms 
constrained imagery. As we investigated the literature, however, it became clear that 
imagery and visual processing are not disjoint components, but rather use and share 
similar structures and processes. As part of that oversight, we did not include the visual 
depictive representation, as it initially seemed odd to us that humans would resort to such 
a low-level representation for reasoning after perception performed so much work 
extracting abstract representations. It became evident, especially when we began 
evaluating the requirements for the alphabet experiment, that a depictive representation 
was not only useful, but appeared necessary to achieve the desired functionality. Finally, 
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when we evaluated the system in a more perceptually demanding environment (i.e. the 
Scout domain), where bottom-up, visual processing and imagery must cooperate and 
share resources, we had to look at issues such as the differences between perceived and 
imagined objects, synchronization of processes, race conditions between perception and 
imagery, and truth maintenance issues. While we do not claim to have implemented all 
functionality that humans show during spatial and visual imagery, the goal has been to 
design and implement a complete and general architectural framework with a few 
demonstrated capabilities that can motivate future work.  
Soar and the Spatial-Visual Imagery (SVI) module are the two major components 
in the architecture (Figure 6-1). Soar encompasses the symbolic representation and 
computations. SVI includes the quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations 
and processes. It encapsulates high-level visual perception, spatial, and visual imagery. 
Our modeling of visual perception, to include the separation between ―what‖ and 
―where‖ pathways, is theoretical and an approximation, but we include it for 
completeness. The architecture makes a distinction between memories (rectangles) and 
processes (rounded rectangles), and the terminology is either Kosslyn‘s et al. (2006) or 
our own.  
We present the architecture as follows. First, we provide an overview focusing 
primarily on the memories and corresponding data structures associated with Soar and 
SVI (Soar+SVI). Next, we suggest, primarily from a theoretical perspective, how 
perceptual visual processing emerges. We then describe our implementation of spatial 
and visual imagery processing. For more details, Appendix B illustrates some algorithms 
for manipulating and inspecting the visual depictive representation. Appendix C details 
the software engineering aspects and provides examples of the Soar symbolic structures 
used to represent and control imagery processing.  
6.1 Soar 
Soar (Laird, 2008; Lehman, Laird, & Rosenbloom, 2006) provides a fixed set of 
symbolic memories and processes (top of Figure 6-1). The symbolic memories include a 
declarative, short-term memory (STM), a procedural long-term memory (LTM), two 
long-term, declarative memories (episodic and semantic, not shown in Figure 6-1), and 
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two learning mechanisms (chunking and reinforcement learning). The short-term memory 
is a graph structure representing the agent‘s knowledge of its goals and current state. A 
symbolic structure in Soar may represent many things, including concepts (e.g., cheetahs 
run fast) or objects in the world. Within the Soar+SVI architecture, there are special 
annotated symbols that represent an object and its explicit spatial and visual properties. 
We call these symbols visual symbols. These symbols arise from perception, activation of 
a previously stored memory, or results from an imagery inspection. Visual symbols may 




Figure 6-1: Architecture Overview 
 
Soar‘s procedural long-term memory is a set of productions that control behavior. 
Each production has a set of left-hand side (LHS) conditions and right-hand side (RHS) 
actions. If a symbolic pattern in STM matches with the LHS of a production, then the 
production ―fires,‖ creating or removing symbolic structures in STM based on the RHS 
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actions of the production. During each phase of Soar‘s processing cycle (described next), 
all matching productions fire in parallel.  
Soar‘s processing cycle is based on the problem space computational model 
(PSCM) organizing an agent‘s knowledge into a set of states, and a set of operators, 
instantiations of which move the agent to different states. An agent, by iteratively 
selecting and applying operators, effectively conducts a search through its problem space. 
The processing or decision cycle (Figure 6-2) is hypothesized to be approximately 50 
milliseconds in humans, but is much faster in the actual implementation. 
The decision cycle begins with an input phase where an agent‘s current 
perceptions augment a fixed structure in STM called the input-link. The elaboration phase 
provides an opportunity, through the matching and firing of productions or retrieval from 
a declarative LTM, to elaborate all knowledge relevant to the current situation, propose 
potential operators, and create preferences for those operators. After the elaboration 
phase reaches quiescence, the operator selection, or decision phase, selects an operator 
from the set of proposed operators. The selection is based on the operators‘ preferences. 
If knowledge is inadequate to choose between the different operators, an impasse occurs 
and the architecture creates a subgoal enabling further reasoning.  
 
 
Figure 6-2: The Soar Decision Cycle 
 
After the decision phase, if there is a selected operator it applies, again through 
the firing of one or more productions, making persistent changes to short-term memory. 
These changes either update the agent‘s internal model or create motor commands on a 
fixed structure in short-term memory called the output-link. During the output phase, a 
process external to Soar reads the commands placed on Soar‘s output-link and produces 
action in the environment. In the Soar+SVI system, the SVI module filters all output-link 













SVI component handling the command. Otherwise, SVI passes it to the appropriate motor 
module. 
6.2 SVI 
SVI encapsulates the fixed memories and processes to support high-level visual 
perception, spatial imagery, and visual imagery (bottom of Figure 6-1). The memories 
include short-term memories for the quantitative spatial (Object Map) and visual 
depictive representations (Visual Buffer), a long-term memory (Visual LTM) that stores 
the shape and color of prototypical objects or specific instances that the agent has 
previously seen in the environment, and a short-term memory (Visual-Spatial STM) that 
binds the ―what‖ and ―where‖ pathways. 
6.2.1 Memories 
6.2.1.1 Visual Buffer 
The Visual Buffer (bottom of Figure 6-1) is a depictive, short-term memory activated 
from either bottom-up, visual-perception or top-down imagery processing. Space is 
inherent in the structure of the depictive representation and the encoding is of information 
rather than a denotation of information. The depiction as a whole represents shape, size, 
orientation, location, and color.  
Computationally, the Visual Buffer is a set of 2D image data structures where a 
single image, I, has a set of picture elements, or pixels, (x,y; I(x,y)). The first parameter, 
(x,y), is the pixel location and the second parameter, I(x,y), is the pixel value of I at 
location (x,y). There is always at least one image in the set, the base image or Visual 
Buffer layer (vb-layer) zero, representing the perceived scene from an egocentric 
viewpoint or an imagined scene from an imagined viewpoint. Visual perception or 
imagery may create additional, ephemeral images in the set that extract a subset of the 
base image (e.g. edges, marked regions). These subsequent image layers serve as an 
attention mechanism to support further computations. Algorithms, encoded in the ―What‖ 
or ―Where‖ inspectors (bottom of Figure 6-1) or the VBManipulator (shown later) 
process each image separately. The algorithms used to process the image(s) are algebraic 
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(e.g. edge detectors, filter masks, rotation, scaling), or ones that take advantage of the 
topological structure using pixel-level rewrites (Furnas, 1990, 1991; Furnas et al., 2000). 
For example, in the alphabet experiment, a Hough transform is used to detect 
curves on letters and pixel-level rewrites are used to infer enclosed spaces. Both 
techniques require the instantiation of additional image layers to support reasoning. In the 
scout domain, the system creates a separate image for each enemy and ―key terrain‖ 
toward which the agent hypothesizes the particular enemy is maneuvering. Figure 6-3 
shows the agent‘s combined perceived and imagined scene inside the Visual Buffer box. 
The middle image represents the agent‘s imagined representation of one enemy 
maneuvering toward a piece of terrain along with a distance field flood and the 
hypothesized path (shown in orange). The image serves as an attention mechanism in that 
the agent is focused on a particular enemy/key-terrain pair and the path between them. 
The third image in the figure‘s upper right corner represents the portion of that path the 
agent hypothesizes it can view based on its current location orientation, and imagined 
field of view. 
 
Figure 6-3: Visual Buffer is a “Set” of Images 
6.2.1.2 Object Map 
The Object Map (middle right of Figure 6-1) is a short-term memory that 
maintains the quantitative spatial representation of the objects in the currently perceived 
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or imagined scene. This representation fixes an object‘s location (direction and distance 
from a fixed frame of reference), orientation, and size in space and includes a viewpoint 
to facilitate the generation of a depictive image. The computational processes that infer 
knowledge from this representation are sentential, mathematical equations. It also serves 
as an intermediate format when moving from a symbolic to a depictive representation. 
The Object Map‘s structure is sufficient for reasoning about objects‘ relative direction, 
distance, orientation, size, and general topology. However, if reasoning of spatial 
properties involves a non-convex shape or the reasoning is about an object‘s visual 
features, a depictive representation in the Visual Buffer is required. 
A key design decision was determining the Object Map‘s data structure. The 
structure had to support the quantitative spatial representation for spatial reasoning tasks 
and the rendering of a rasterized image for the Visual Buffer‘s depictive representation. 
For spatial reasoning, we desired a structure supporting hierarchical, containment 
relationships (e.g., a line is part of a geometric figure, a gun is part of a tank) and spatial 
relationships (e.g. line-C is in between line-A and line-B, enemy A is 500 meters to my 
left front). Together, the hierarchical containment and spatial relationship properties 
support spatial reasoning between objects and an object‘s parts (e.g. what is the 
relationship between the front wheel of a car and the steering wheel? Between the 
steering wheel and the stop sign?). Rendering to a rasterized image requires the ability to 
combine specific shape (i.e. vertices and indices) and color, spatial relationships, and a 
privileged viewpoint so that the image can be generated from a specific perspective.  
We chose to implement the Object Map with a scene-graph data structure and a 
viewpoint, or camera (Eberly, 2005). Every node in the scene-graph is an object or group 
of objects representing a portion of convex space in the perceived or imagined scene with 
the root node representing the entire space (Figure 6-4). The leaf nodes of the graph 
contain an object‘s shape (i.e. three-dimensional mesh of vertices and indices) and color 
(i.e. a red, green, blue vector) to support rendering to an image. Intermediate nodes 
represent the composition of one or more objects. The structure is called a graph (rather 
than a tree) because multiple leaf nodes may share the vertices and color.  
As an SVI convention, the root node of the Object Map‘s scene graph represents 
the current scene (Figure 6-4). The root‘s first child contains the agent‘s spatial 
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information (location, orientation), the second child includes any perceived background 
information, such as terrain, and the third child contains all the salient or visual objects in 
the agent‘s scene. Figure 6-4 shows the number of visual objects to be N. From a 
psychological perspective, N is hypothesized to be four to five objects based on working 
memory capacity (Jonides et al., 2008; Pylyshyn, 2001). Note that there may be more 
objects in the environment, but N simply represents those objects that perception has 
determined ―salient‖ or imagery has added. Each visual object may be a single entity (i.e. 
a tank) or several entities (i.e. a group of tanks). 
 
 
Figure 6-4: Scene-Graph Data Structure 
 
SVI distinguishes between primitive and composite objects. Primitive objects, 
such as Visual-Object-1A‘s Node, have a single child encoding the vertices and color. 
Composite objects are composed of one or more primitive objects. The general shape, or 
―bounding volume,‖ of a primitive object is computed from its vertices. The general 
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scene-graph node, or composite object, captures the general, convex shape of an object it 
represents based on the combined general shape of its child objects.  
Every node in the scene graph encapsulates a local and world transformation 
where a transformation includes a 1x3 translation vector and a 3x3 rotation and scale 
matrix. A local transformation represents the direction, distance, orientation, and size of 
an object relative to its parent object. A world transformation is relative to some fixed, 
global frame of reference. For example, in Figure 6-4, Visual-Object-1‘s Node is 
composed of two parts, Visual-Object-1A and Visual-Object-1B. Visual-Object-1A‘s and 
Visual-Object-1B‘s local transformation represent the spatial relationship (i.e. direction, 
distance, orientation, size) between them relative to Visual-Object-1. The two parts‘ 
world transformation represents their global location, orientation, and size computed 
from Visual-Object-1‘s world transformation. That is, 
 
WorldVisual-Object-1A = WorldVisual-Object-1 * LocalVisual-Object-1A 
 
The general shape and transformations are computed recursively at run-time by 
traversing through the graph. Note that the ―world‖ transformation does not necessarily 
have to be ―global‖ coordinates. Rather, an alternative is to have the agent serve as the 
―world‖ origin and the transformations computed relative to this origin. Of course, in 
practice to compute an actual world location one would have to know the agent‘s 
location, perhaps through localization techniques or a global positioning system. 
6.2.1.3 Visual Long-Term Memory 
The remaining memories in SVI are not associated with a particular 
representation but are indirectly involved in reasoning. Visual long-term memory 
(VLTM) contains prototypical objects and specific instances encoded from previous 
experiences. VLTM is implemented as a hash table (Figure 6-5). A symbolic, visual-id, 
indexes each object. Each entry in the table is an object‘s scene-graph representation. The 
scene-graph in VLTM is distinct from the scene-graph in the Object Map as it is not an 
instance in the current perceived or imagined scene but rather a memory of a prototypical 
object‘s shape and color. Another distinguishing characteristic is that unlike an object 
instance in the Object Map, a VLTM object does not have a fixed frame of reference in 
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space relative to the agent (egocentric) or another object (allocentric). Rather the space 
representation in VLTM serves only to specify an object‘s configuration properties. To 
become an instance in the current scene, imagery activates this VLTM representation.  
 
 
Figure 6-5: Visual Long-Term Memory 
 
Similar to the Object Map, VLTM distinguishes between primitive and composite 
objects. For example, VLTM stores a tank from the Scout domain as shown in Figure 
6-5. The tank has a hull and a turret, the hull has road wheels and tracks. The advantage 
of this representation is its compactness. Only the leaf-node entries store the vertices and 
color of the primitive objects (i.e. road wheel). All other node entries are simply pointers 
and transformations describing the composition and relationships between the object‘s 
parts. Together the structure determines the object‘s shape. Details in the representation 
that are missing are just missing. Someone not familiar with a tank may think of it as a 
cylinder on top of a rectangle rather than containing all the features that a tank expert has. 
Thus, the primitive parts simply have fewer vertices and color details that the agent may 


























The VLTM structure enables an agent to imagine an object (i.e. tank) or an 
object‘s parts (i.e. a tank‘s gun tube or road wheel) by simply traversing the nodes 
indexed from the visual-id and instantiating (i.e. copying) each child node to the Object 
Map. The vertices and color are shared between the instantiated objects in the Object 
Map, and the objects in VLTM. The vertices are involved in computations when 
determining the object‘s general shape for spatial imagery (e.g. computing the convex 
hull) or generating the depictive image in the Visual Buffer for visual imagery. 
6.2.1.4 Visual-Spatial Short-term Memory 
Visual-Spatial short-term memory (VS-STM) is a shared memory that effectively 
binds the ―what‖ and ―where‖ pathways and serves as a temporary symbolic store 
between Soar and SVI (center of Figure 6-1). It is a hierarchical structure with the top-
level representing the sets of salient, visual objects, spatial properties, and visual features 
that apply to the current scene--either perceived or imagined. Each salient object in the 
visual object set may have subsequent levels in the hierarchy with its own feature, object, 
and spatial sets (Figure 6-6). Visual processing expands the top-level sets and subsequent 
layers as details in the scene are elaborated. During imagery, results of processing also 
expand these sets in response to specific operations. Each visual-object in VS-STM has a 
corresponding instance-id distinguishing it as a salient object in the scene. If the visual-
object is recognized it will also have a visual-id. Note that the Visual Object in VS-STM 
is a separate structure from the Visual-Object Node in the Object Map‘s scene graph 
(Figure 6-4). A VS-STM Visual Object has direct access to its corresponding scene graph 
node but contains information not represented in this node such as any visual or spatial 
properties elaborated during perception or imagery, whether it has been recognized (i.e. 
visual-id), and  a marking-color and vb-layer. Our description of visual perception 
(discussed next) will discuss the marking-color and vb-layer. This VS-STM Visual 




Figure 6-6: Visual-Spatial Short-Term Memory 
6.2.2 Processes 
6.2.2.1 Visual Perception 
Again, our theory of visual perception is theoretical, but we include it to emphasize 
imagery‘s integration with visual mechanisms. Our implementation does model the flow 
of information as described here. A Refresher process activates the Visual Buffer from 
retinal stimulus (bottom right of Figure 6-1). Upon activation, a two-pass operation is 
performed on the depiction. During the first step, a Saliency Inspector determines and 
marks the salient regions, or objects, in the current scene by creating a separate image, or 
vb-layer, for each object. Each image is ―colored‖ with a unique marking where the 
colored region corresponds to the salient object‘s contour and interior in the perceived 
image (Ullman, 1996). The Saliency Inspector creates a Visual Object structure in VS-
STM for each salient object and augments it with a unique instance-id, marking-color, 
and associated vb-layer (Figure 6-6). The instance-id is similar to Pylyshyn‘s (2001) 
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Figure 6-7: “Bottom-up” Visual Processing and Data Flow 
 
During the second pass, two parallel processes initiate a more detailed inspection 
of the depictive representation, focusing their attention on the marked objects in the 
images in the Visual Buffer layers (Figure 6-7). The What Inspectors are responsible for 
extracting object features to support recognition by matching the features with a shape 
and color representation in VLTM. If the object is recognized, its associated visual-id 
from VLTM is stored in VS-STM (Figure 6-6).  
Simultaneously, the Where Inspectors extract the egocentric direction and 
distance (i.e. location), orientation, and size of the objects from the Visual Buffer, build 
the Object Map‘s scene-graph, and update the VS-STM‘s current scene spatial set (Figure 
6-6). Initially, the ―Where Inspectors‖ encode the general shape of the object in the scene 
graph as a ―blob‖ based on the marked region in the Visual Buffer. If the visual object 
has been recognized by the ―What Inspectors‖ (i.e. it has a visual-id in VS-STM), the 
―Where Inspectors‖ associate the leaf nodes of the Object Map with their corresponding 






























A set of listeners along the ―what‖ and ―where‖ pathways (VLTM and Object 
Map Listeners respectively) monitor updates to VS-STM and consolidate the results for 
input to Soar (Figure 6-1 & Figure 6-7). Operators in Soar‘s procedural memory, 
executing in a separate control path, attend to the listeners‘ input and associate it with 
existing knowledge to identify the object. For example, a recognized tank object may be 
associated with the fact that it is an enemy vehicle. If the visual object arriving on Soar‘s 
input-link does not have an associated visual-id (i.e. it is not recognized), imagery 
processing may commence in Soar to assist in recognition of the object. Soar encodes the 
visual objects in the perceived scene along with their egocentric direction, distance, and 
orientation. Note that these ―automatically,‖ extracted spatial relationships are relative to 
the agent.
8
 They do not include the relationships between every pair of salient objects in 
the scene. This type of inference requires imagery. 
In practice, the simulation environment provides the Saliency Inspector a list of 
scene graph nodes representing the ―salient‖ objects that the agent can currently observe. 
The simulation makes the determination of what the agent can and cannot observe. The 
first scene graph node in this list is always the ―background‖ node, which may represent 
terrain and other ―non-salient‖ objects (i.e. trees, buildings), etc. The Saliency Inspector 
instantiates the Visual Object structure in VS-STM and provides the ―What‖ and 
―Where‖ Inspectors the list of scene graph nodes. The ―What Inspectors‖ recognition 
process is a simple ―string match‖ and the ―Where Inspectors‖ build the internal Object 
Map structure from the provided list of scene graph nodes. For debugging purposes, the 
Refresher renders the internal scene graph from the agent‘s current viewpoint. The 
remaining information flow proceeds as previously discussed. Although the 
implementation of bottom-up visual processing is ad-hoc for now, it forces us to consider 
how visual perception and imagery interact. 
6.2.2.2 Spatial and Visual Imagery 
Given the above discussion, we can now describe how the architecture supports spatial 
and visual imagery processing. We will provide an overview of the processing, discuss 
                                                 
8
There may be some non-egocentric relationships automatically extracted during bottom-up perception 
such as several objects falling in a line. 
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the spatial and visual knowledge representation in Soar, and then elaborate on how SVI 
processes each imagery operator (construct, transform, generate, and inspect). We will 
use examples from both our experimental domains and the following ―place-setting‖ task: 
 
A Soar agent is setting the table for dinner. Its current goal is to set one 
place setting. In order to accomplish the goal it has to set each individual 
object (napkin, fork, plate, etc). It prefers to set the center object (i.e. 
plate) first so it can place the other objects relative to the center.  
 
An agent uses imagery when, in the context of its current goal, a spatial 
relationship or visual feature is not directly accessible from symbolic knowledge. For 
example, in the ―place-setting‖ task the agent is trying to determine the center object; in 
the geometry problem, the agent is trying to find vertices, line segments, angles, and 
triangles; in the alphabet experiment, the agent is trying to determine if the letter has a 
specific feature; and in the Scout domain, the agent is trying to determine where to orient 
its team for adequate coverage of hypothesized enemy routes. 
An agent invokes imagery through the application of an operator (construct, 
transform, generate, and inspect) in Soar‘s procedural long-term memory (top right of 
Figure 6-1). We use Soar‘s subgoaling mechanism to implement these operators. 
Therefore, if the agent is in an imagery problem space and ―important‖ information 
arrives (e.g., the teammate in the Scout domain sends the agent a report), the system is 
responsive, interrupts imagery processing, attends to the incoming input, and incorporates 
the new information.  
Whether the task requires spatial or visual imagery, the system first must 
construct the quantitative spatial representation by accessing and combining spatial 
configurations from Soar‘s symbolic memory with general shape information in VLTM. 
If a depictive representation is required, imagery generates a visual depictive 
representation by combining the quantitative spatial representation from the Object Map 
with each object‘s specific shape and color from VLTM. The agent may transform or 
inspect the representation in the Object Map or Visual Buffer. As imagery proceeds, the 
symbolic results of manipulations and inspections are stored in the VS-STM and 
transmitted to Soar via the listeners. Although we discuss the imagery operators in a 
sequence, the processing is conditional and iterative.  
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6.2.2.2.1 Symbolic Representations 
A symbolic structure in Soar is associated with a visual symbol via a visual-object 
attribute. For example, an agent‘s symbolic, short-term memory represents the place 
setting as shown in Figure 6-8 (only three objects shown). Each entity (napkin, fork, 
place setting, plate) has a visual symbol associated with it (V23, V9, V7, and V12 
respectively). A visual symbol with a visual-id (napkin, fork, plate) has an underlying 
shape and color representation in Visual LTM. Alternatively, as in the case of the place 
setting, a visual symbol may have a has-a attribute and a spatial description specifying 
how it is composed of other visual symbols. Note that in addition to the visual symbols, 
the symbolic representation enables one to associate other, non-visual, symbols to each 
entity (e.g. a napkin is used to wipe your mouth, a plate holds food). A visual symbol 
may arise from memory retrieval, perceptual input, or after imagery instantiates an 
imagined object in the scene (which is the same as perceptual input from Soar‘s 
perspective). An instantiated visual symbol will have an instance-id corresponding to the 
instance-id in VS-STM (Figure 6-6) signaling that it is a salient object in the scene. 
 
 
Figure 6-8: Example Short-term Memory Symbolic Structure 
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The spatial structure describing the configuration of a visual symbol includes a 
base visual symbol and a relative visual symbol so that a predicate relationship is defined 
as <spatial-relationship> (<relative>, <base>) (e.g. above(fork, napkin), 
disconnected(fork, plate)).
9
 The spatial relationships may be qualitative or quantitative 
(Figure 6-9 and Figure 6-10). In the place setting example, the fork is above (direction) 
and externally connected (topology) to the napkin and left-of and disconnected from the 
plate. In the Scout domain, a map-icon may be located 500 meters southeast of the 
agent‘s map-icon and above and externally connected to the background (i.e. place it on 
top of the terrain). When there is a topological relationship, the direction specifies where 
the topological relationship applies (e.g., fork is externally connected to the napkin in the 
―above‖ direction). Task knowledge may rearrange the spatial relationships or even 
synthesize composite objects to enable the creation of novel representations (e.g. 
imagining an elephant on top of a house). 
 
Type Qualitative Quantitative 
Direction left-of, right-of, in-front-of, behind, 
above, below, between, 
center-of 
3D vector <x,y,z> 
Distance near, far scalar  
or 
3D vector (distance in each 
direction) 
Orientation north, northwest, west, southwest, 
south, southeast, east, northeast 
scalar 
or 
3D vector (orient towards 
location) 
Topology 
(see Figure 6-10) 
disconnected (DC), externally-
connected (EC), partially-overlaps 
(PO), tangential-proper-part (TPP), 
non-tangential-proper-part (NTPP) 
None 
Geometry parallel, perpendicular, intersect, 
line-segment, triangle, angle, 
congruent 
None 
Size smaller, larger, equal scalar (1D length) 
2D vector (length,width) 
3D vector (length,width,height) 
Symmetry horizontal-symmetry, asymmetry, 
vertical-symmetry 
 
Figure 6-9: Spatial Properties 
Bold font indicates that the property has been used in the experimental domains 
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Ternary spatial relationships (e.g. between) are also possible where there are two base objects (e.g. 




Figure 6-10: RCC-8 Topological Relationships 
(from (Cohn et al., 1997)) 
 
Type Qualitative Quantitative 
Shape point, vertex, line, line-segment, 
triangle, curve, curve-segment, 
enclosed-space 
3D vector <x,y,z> (set of 
points) 
Color red, green, blue, etc. 3D RGB vector <r,g,b> 
Figure 6-11: Visual Features 
Bold font indicates that the property has been used in the experimental domains 
 
Similar to VS-STM‘s visual object structure, the visual symbol in Soar‘s symbolic 
memory may have associated visual-features or spatial attributes encoded during 
perception, retrieved during an imagery inspection, or declared in a symbolic memory. 
For example, in the alphabet experiment, the initial, visual symbol for the letter ‗A‘ may 
be described as being composed of three line-segments with a specified spatial 
configuration (i.e. one line-segment has a counterclockwise orientation of 45 degrees, 
another line-segment is the same size as the first line-segment but rotated clockwise 45 
degrees, etc.). The agent, wanting to know if the letter A has an ―enclosed space‖, 
constructs the quantitative spatial representation in the Object Map and augments the 
letter A‘s visual symbol with an instance-id. After the visual depictive representation is 
generated and inspected for the enclosed space, the letter A‘s visual symbol is augmented 
with a shape visual-feature where the shape is an enclosed space. Figure 6-11 highlights 
the visual features SVI currently supports.  
SVI assigns a temporary emergent-id to shapes found during inspection so that if 
the agent desires more information regarding the feature, it can be retrieved from VS-
STM. For example, the agent may want to know the size (i.e. length) of the letter A‘s 
enclosed space and its direction and distance from the top of the ‗A‘. The emergent-id 
supports this capability, binding the symbolic shape representation in Soar to its 
underlying depictive representation in the Visual Buffer via VS-STM. In a similar 
NTPPI = Non- Tangential Proper Part Inverse 
TPP = Tangential Proper Part EQ     = Equal 
TPPI  = Tangential Proper Part Inverse 
EC  = Externally Connected NTPP = Non-Tangential Proper Part  
 
PO  = Partially Overlaps 
DC  = Disconnected 
 
 74 
manner, retrieved spatial properties that apply strictly to the letter ‗A‘s‘ visual symbol 
(rather than the entire scene) augment the visual symbol as a spatial attribute (e.g. the 
letter ‗A‘ enclosed space‘s center is above its horizontal line-segment).  
6.2.2.2.2 Construction 
Although the symbolic structure of the place setting in Figure 6-8 encapsulates a lot of 
information, it does not indicate the center object of the place setting or whether the fork 
is wider than the spoon—either directly or through logical inference. When there is a lack 
of spatial or visual knowledge relevant to the agent‘s current goal, an impasse occurs and 
Soar creates a special, imagery state where the agent directs the processing. The first step 
in imagery processing is to construct the desired scene. The imagery construct operator 
has two sub-commands, compose, and add. The compose command is useful when the 
agent is imagining a scene by initially composing two objects retrieved from memory and 
adding them to a ―blank‖ scene. For example, the agent begins imagining the place 
setting by composing the fork and napkin. The add command is useful when adding an 
object to an existing perceived or imagined scene (e.g. add a knife to the right-of and 
disconnected from the plate, add a hypothesized enemy icon to the map relative to the 
existing enemy map-icon).  
Functional processes within SVI respond to the specific imagery command. In the 
case of construction, the Constructor receives the operator‘s symbolic information, 
interprets it, and builds the quantitative spatial representation in the Object Map by 
combining each object‘s general shape information from Visual LTM with spatial 
knowledge from Soar (Figure 6-12). The symbolic information includes the visual-id and 
spatial properties of the object(s) being composed or added. The visual-id enables the 
constructor to access the object(s) general shape, or scene-graph, and instantiate it by 
copying the structure.
10
 The spatial properties description includes a relative-visual-id 
and a base-visual-id or a base-instance-id.
11
 The relative-visual-id is the visual-id of the 
relative object in the spatial relationship (e.g. left-of (relative-object, base-object)). If 
composing objects, then the base-visual-id identifies the base object in the spatial 
                                                 
10
The color and specific shape representation (vertices) are not copied. VLTM and the Object Map share 
these structures and they are activated when generating a visual depiction. 
11
There is also a base-instance-id-tert for ternary spatial relationships (e.g. between). 
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relationship because the object has not yet been instantiated. Otherwise, a base-instance-
id, which is the instance-id of a visual object already in the Object Map, identifies the 
base object.  
Spatial properties may include any of the following: direction, distance, 
orientation, size, topology, and geometry (Figure 6-9). If the spatial properties are 
qualitative (e.g. left-of, northwest, externally connected), the Constructor converts the 
symbol to a metric representation. For example, left-of becomes a vector (<-1, 0, 0>) and 
northwest a scalar, absolute orientation (135 degrees). Topological information is 
computed from the appropriate object‘s bounding box or convex hull in the direction 
specified by the direction relationship (i.e. fork is externally connected in the ―above‖ 
direction). If direction is missing then the default behavior is to create the topological 
relationship in a random direction. Note that this is only a ―rough‖ topological 
interpretation and in order to determine a more accurate topological relationship requires 
constructing the ―rough‖ topology, generating a depiction, inspecting it, projecting the 
coordinates from 2D to 3D space, and making translation adjustments. We have not 
implemented this functionality. 
 
 
Figure 6-12: Imagery Construction 
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As an example of building a quantitative representation from qualitative symbols, 
consider the place setting where the agent first composes the knife and the plate by 
locating the knife to the right of the plate. If the construction operator does not include 
any distance constraints, as in this scenario, then the Constructor considers the general 
shape of the objects and uses a heuristic based on an object‘s area of influence (Kettani & 
Moulin, 1999). Locating the knife right of the plate without any distance constraints 
implies placing the knife next to the plate (externally connected) and then adding ―a 
little‖ empty space based on the length of the objects‘ convex hull in the direction of the 
placement (right-of). In order for the Constructor to orient a visual object, the system has 
to assume that each object stored in VLTM has a front and a canonical orientation. SVI 
assumes that each object stored in VLTM is oriented ―north‖ (e.g., the prongs of a fork 
face north). 
After the Constructor finishes composing or adding the visual object(s) to the 
Object Map, feedback to Soar proceeds in a similar fashion as automatic, bottom-up 
visual processing. The Constructor creates a visual object symbolic structure in VS-STM 
for each imagined object and augments it with an instance-id, thus fulfilling the role of 
the Saliency Inspector and ―What Inspectors.‖ Since the object(s) added to the Object 
Map has already been ―recognized‖ (that is the agent knows the object(s) it is 
imagining
12
), this processing is all that is necessary. In the case of the where pathway, the 
Constructor automatically invokes the ―Where Inspectors‖ to inspect the Object Map 
(rather than the Visual Buffer) for the recently added visual object(s) direction, distance, 
orientation, and size information relative to the current viewpoint. As in bottom-up 
processing, the ―Where Inspectors‖ add this information to the spatial set of the current 
scene (Figure 6-6). The VLTM Listeners and Object Map Listeners consolidate the 
results for input to Soar on the subsequent input cycle (Figure 6-7). 
In addition to constructing objects retrieved from Visual LTM, the Constructor 
can also imagine or ―draw‖ simple shapes such as those listed in Figure 6-11. This 
functionality is useful when the agent wants to imagine a shape it has never seen before 
                                                 
12
Although the agent ―recognizes‖ the objects added to the scene, it does not immediately recognize the 
resulting, composite object(s). The inspection process has to be invoked to facilitate recognition. For 
example, imagine a ‗D‘ rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise on top of a ‗J‘; the ‗D‘ and ‗J‘ are 
immediately ―recognized‖, but an inspection process must recognize the ―umbrella‖. 
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(e.g. a view frustum). Alternatively, the shape may be the result from an inspection of the 
Visual Buffer that the agent wants to make a first class visual object. Making the shape a 
first class object facilitates spatial reasoning (e.g. determining the direction between the 
centers of the enclosed space and the letter A). In these cases, rather than sending a 
visual-id, Soar sends the vertices and indices describing the shape or its emergent-id to 
the Constructor.  
6.2.2.2.3 Generation 
If a depictive representation is required, the generate operator initiates processing (Figure 
6-13). The Refresher interprets the command and combines specific shape and color from 
Visual LTM with the Object Map‘s quantitative spatial representation to generate the 
visual depictive representation in the Visual Buffer. Generation may render all or some of 
the visual objects and, as previously discussed, create more than one image, or vb-layer, 
as a form of cognitive focus (see section 6.2.1.1). The agent may optionally specify a 
―generation color‖ for a visual-object to distinguish it as a unique object in the image. 
After the image is generated, the Refresher updates the current scene‘s visual object set in 
VS-STM with the generated vb-layer and its associated visual objects along with their 
optional generation color. This information is transmitted to Soar via the Visual LTM 
Listener during the next input-cycle. 
 
 




The transform operator manipulates the Object Map‘s quantitative or a Visual Buffer‘s 
depictive representation through their respective Manipulator processes (Figure 6-14). 
Manipulation of the Object Map includes transforming (i.e. translation, rotation, scaling) 
a specified object in the scene or changing the viewpoint. The modification of the 
viewpoint enables the agent to change its perceptually based egocentric view to an 
imagined allocentric view in order to infer new spatial relationships. For visual imagery, 
viewpoint manipulations can serve as an attention mechanism where, prior to generating 
an image in the Visual Buffer, the system can transform the viewpoint to another 
perspective, focus the viewpoint in or out, or shift it in any direction. These 
transformations effectively focus attention on specific areas of the Object Map so that 
when the Refresher renders the scene to the Visual Buffer the generated pixels are 
representative of that viewpoint. Although we have implemented this viewpoint 
transformation, we have only used it for changing an agent‘s ―frontal‖ view to a top-
down ―map‖ view and for debugging. 
 
Figure 6-14: Imagery Transformation 
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In the case of transforming a visual object node in the Object Map, the transform 
operator sends the instance-id and desired transformation to the Object Map Manipulator. 
The Object Map Manipulator accesses the visual object‘s scene graph node by looking up 
its instance-id in VS-STM (Figure 6-6). It then modifies the local transformation of the 
node (Figure 6-4) and recursively traverses children of the node to update their world 
transformations (i.e. if you transform a car you want all of its parts to move with it). For 
example, in the scout domain, the agent modifies the orientation of the teammate‘s and its 
own imagined views to determine if they provide better coverage of possible enemy 
routes. As the agent receives reports from its teammate or visually observes changes in an 
entity‘s location or orientation it transforms the associated map-icon. When the agent or 
its teammate loses visual contact with an enemy, it can imagine simulated movement 
based on task knowledge of an enemy vehicle‘s velocity. Note that the ―simulation‖ in 
this case is a one-step process. Future work will discuss transformations that use motion 
models of a particular entity (such as a tank) to simulate movement over time. 
After the Object Map Manipulator finishes transforming a visual object, feedback 
to Soar proceeds in a similar fashion as described for the Constructor. The Object Map 
Manipulator automatically invokes the ―Where Inspectors‖ to inspect the Object Map for 
the modified visual object. The inspectors update the spatial information in the current 
scene‘s spatial set (Figure 6-6), and the Object Map Listeners consolidate the results for 
input to Soar (Figure 6-7). 
For Visual Buffer manipulations, the VBManipulator receives a vb-layer identifier 
and either a transformation command or a set of depictive rules from the transform 
operator and manipulates the image(s) corresponding to the vb-layer(s) identifier (Figure 
6-14). Image transformations include standard image processing techniques (e.g. rotation, 
scaling, and kernel filters). Depictive manipulations are based on the pixel-level rewrite 
system (Furnas, 1990, 1991; Furnas et al., 2000) and discussed in depth, to include 
examples from the Alphabet experiment and Scout domain, in Appendix B. We briefly 
summarize the details here. 
Unlike sentential, mathematical-based processing such as Gaussian filters or the 
Hough transform (Appendix B), pixel-level rewrites take advantage of the topological 
structure and color of a depictive representation. Similar to a production system, there are 
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a set of rules with a left-hand side (LHS) and a right-hand side (RHS), but rather than 
predicate symbols, the LHS conditions and RHS actions are visual depictive 
representations that operate on a shared image. The color and shape of each LHS 
depiction, determines a match rather than the syntactic structure of the symbols.  
Figure 6-15 illustrates an example of two depictive rules. The top rule is a 1x2 
rule stating, ―if there is a black pixel adjacent to a gray pixel then change the gray pixel to 
a white pixel.‖ Similarly, the bottom rule is a 2x2 rule that says, ―if there is a black pixel 
diagonally adjacent to a gray pixel then change the gray pixel to a white pixel.‖ The 
asterisks represent wildcard values, and a rule may specify alternate rotation orientations 
(90, 180, 270 degrees) for matching. While there are rule matches, the processing iterates 
over the image. When a rule matches a region of the image, the RHS action rewrites the 
appropriate pixel(s). Each rule has a priority associated with it to facilitate sequencing, so 
if two or more rules match, then the rule with the highest priority fires. Although the 
matching and modifications are local in nature, the cumulative effects have global 
consequences. 
 
Figure 6-15: Example Pixel-level Rewrite Rules 
 
We made three primary extensions to the pixel rewrite system to support 
processing in the Soar+SVI architecture. First, the depictive rules are encoded in Soar‘s 
production memory as a set of transform operator elaborations.
13
 If the operator is 
selected, the rules are added to Soar‘s output-link and sent to the VBManipulator. The 
VBManipulator receives the rules and executes the pattern matching over the image 
specified by the operator‘s vb-layer(s).  
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Second, we have a notion of a rule-set and make a distinction between three types 
of depictive rules: threshold, pattern, and mark. A rule-set contains a set of rules of the 
same type (threshold, pattern, or mark). Similar to rules, a rule-set has an associated 
priority to enable sequencing among rule-sets. Processing of threshold rules makes one 
pass through the image, and, for each pixel, changes the value based on an exact match, a 
minimum, a maximum, or a range of pixel values. In the Scout domain, we found this 
rule type useful for marking known obstacles such as buildings and ―no-go‖ terrain. The 
functionality of the pattern rule is exactly as the pixel-rewrite system where the 
processing iterates over the image matching and firing rules until there are no more rule 
matches. An agent uses this type of rule for determining enclosed spaces in the alphabet 
experiment and creating a distance field flood in the Scout domain.  
We chose to distinguish the mark rule type as a signal to the VBManipulator that 
it should create a shape object for the marked region in VS-STM. Prior to processing the 
mark rules, the VBManipulator instantiates a shape object and adds it to the current 
scene‘s Visual Feature Set (or the appropriate Visual Object) in VS-STM (Figure 6-6). 
The shape object includes an emergent-id, the marking color, and the set of points 
marked during the processing. The subsequent Soar input cycle creates a symbolic shape 
structure in Soar‘s STM and records the emergent-id. The points remain associated with 
the shape in VS-STM to support inspection (e.g. what is the length of the shape?) and 
possibly construction (e.g. add the shape as a first-class visual object to the Object Map). 
Although we could achieve the same functionality with the pattern rule type, we 
also chose to distinguish the mark rule type for efficiency purposes.
14
 The 
VBManipulator processes mark rules in a similar fashion as the pattern rules, but the 
processing starts at a location specified in the transform operator and proceeds in the 
―active‖ direction based on the rule‘s RHS. Mark rules are either 1x2 or 2x2 diagonal 
rules where the RHS pixel rewrite is always the center pixel and the other active (non-
wildcard) cell determines the next processing direction. If a rule has more than one active 
match (i.e. by a rotation of the LHS), then the VBManipulator records other matching 
pixel locations by pushing them on a stack. After the VBManipulator exhausts processing 
in the chosen direction, the pixel locations on the stack are popped and, if not already 
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 processed. We found the mark set of rules useful for recording the 
hypothesized enemy paths in the Scout domain and propose that this form of processing 
is useful for marking salient objects by the Saliency Inspector during bottom up visual 
processing. 
The final extension we made to incorporate the pixel-rewrite system is to create 
an attention window (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006) in order to keep the image size 
manageable for computational efficiency. One of our computational constraints discussed 
in Chapter 3 is that the processing of the representation must be efficient so that the agent 
remains reactive to changes in the environment. In our implementation, the attention 
window is a fixed, m x m region, where m is a multiple of two. The size of the attention 
window and its shift direction is task knowledge transmitted from Soar to the 
VBManipulator every decision cycle in which the manipulation is active. Note that this is 
a shift of the cognitive focus and not a shift of the agent‘s ―eyes.‖ 
6.2.2.2.5 Inspection 
After the system has constructed, transformed, and, if necessary, generated the 
depictive representation, conditions are set for the inspection process (Figure 6-16). 
Inspection may focus on the Object Map (spatial imagery) or the Visual Buffer (visual 
imagery), and the appropriate ―What‖ or ―Where‖ inspectors process the representations 
based on the query parameters. The inspect operator provides the symbolic query. For 
example, ―what is the center object of the place setting?‖, ―what is the orientation angle 
between line-A and line-B?‖, ―does the letter ‗O‘ have a curve?‖, or ―how much of the 
teammate‘s view covers enemy-1‘s hypothesized path?‖  
An Inspector process (not shown in Figure 6-16) intercepts the command from 
Soar and dispatches the appropriate What or Where inspector based on the query type. 
The query types are the same as the spatial and visual properties listed in Figure 6-9 - 
Figure 6-11. Each query type has an associated inspector. For example, the ―Where 
Inspectors‖ include a DirectionDistanceInspector, OrientationInspector, 
TopologyInspector, GeometryInspector, etc. and the ―What Inspectors‖ include a 
LineInspector, CurveInspector, ShapeInspector, etc. Each inspector maintains a reference 
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For example, when processing a closed region, the processing returns to the starting/ending point.  
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to the master Inspector so if a query involves multiple parts (e.g. direction and topology) 
the initial inspector handling the query can invoke another inspector as necessary. Each 
inspector also maintains a reference to the Visual Buffer Manipulator in the case a 
transformation of the Visual Buffer (e.g. detecting enclosed spaces) facilitates the 
inspection. As with bottom-up visual processing, the results of the inspection(s) are 
stored in the appropriate visual feature or spatial set in VS-STM, and the listener 
processes consolidate the results for Soar‘s symbolic memories. 
 
Figure 6-16: Imagery Inspection 
 
Spatial imagery entails queries of visual objects in the Object Map or comparisons 
between emergent shapes in VS-STM with visual-objects. ―Where Inspectors‖ receive at 
a minimum a relative-instance-id and possibly a base-instance-id
16
(Figure 6-16). When 
there is only a relative-instance-id and the spatial query is specified in qualitative terms, 
the inspector‘s behavior is to return all the visual-objects in the current scene meeting the 
constraints of the query (e.g. center-of (place setting), intersect (line-A), externally-
connected (napkin), southeast (agent-map-icon)). In the case where both the relative- and 
                                                 
16
Again, ternary spatial queries (e.g. between) include an additional base-instance-id. 
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base-instance-ids are provided, the inspection is an assertion of the truth (e.g. in-front-of 
(triangle, line-A), northeast (enemy-2-map-icon, agent-map-icon)). An agent signals a 
request for quantitative results by including an empty vector or scalar attribute (e.g. 
orientation (fork, scalar), intersection (line-A, line-C, vector), direction (enemy-1-map-
icon,key-terrain-A,vector)). For geometric and topological relationships, binary queries 
may optionally specify the creation of an emergent shape object that satisfies the 
geometry or topological relationship (e.g. intersect (Line-A, Line-B, create-vertex)).  
Visual imagery requires inspection of the Visual Buffer for spatial or visual 
properties. The appropriate inspector receives a vb-layer(s), a relative–instance-id (visual 
object), or relative-emergent-id (retrieved shape) and possibly a base-instance-id or 
base–emergent-id (Figure 6-16). The vb-layer(s) specifies the set of images involved in 
the inspection process for shape features. The instance- or emergent-ids give the 
inspector direct access to the visual-object or retrieved shape objects stored in VS-STM. 
As previously discussed, these symbolic structures may contain the object‘s marking or 
generation color and associated vb-layer(s) in which the object appears. The inspector 
uses this information to perform the desired inspection. For example, in the Scout 
domain, the visual depictive representation of the teammate‘s view is in one image, and 
each imagined path (three, one for each enemy/key-terrain pair) is in a separate image. 
Each image has an associated vb-layer identifier, each marked path has an associated 
emergent-id, and the teammate‘s view has an instance-id as it is an imagined visual-
object. 
Visual imagery inspections for visual-features (Figure 6-11) are implemented in 
qualitative, unary terms only (e.g. curve(letter-A), enclosed-space (letter-C)). If the 
appropriate inspector finds the feature, it creates an emergent shape object and stores it in 
the appropriate visual-feature set in VS-STM. The Visual LTM listener transmits the 
emergent-id of the shape to Soar. Inspection of spatial properties in the Visual Buffer are 
similar to spatial queries involving visual objects in the Object Map as the query may be 
qualitative or quantitative, and the number of instance- or emergent-ids in the query 
parameters determine the type of results the inspector returns. As with spatial imagery, 
unary queries return all visual objects (instance-ids) or shapes (emergent-ids) in the vb-
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layer(s) image satisfying the constraints. Binary or tertiary qualitative queries return a 
truth assertion.  
Similar to spatial imagery, for geometric and topological relationships, binary 
queries may optionally specify the creation of an emergent shape object that satisfies the 
geometry or topological relationship. For example, in the Scout domain the agent may 
ask the inspector to determine the subset of a hypothesized enemy path shape that 
satisfies the non-tangential-proper-part topological relationship with the teammate‘s view 
frustum (e.g. non-tangential-proper-part (path-1, teammate-view, create-shape)). For 
quantitative queries (e.g. size-of (path-1,scalar)), the inspector determines the specified 
scalar or vector value in the two-dimensional image space and converts the metric 
information into a three-dimensional space based on the current location and direction of 
the viewpoint. This conversion insures that the reasoning from Soar‘s perspective is 
based on the Object Map‘s three-dimensional Euclidean space. 
6.2.2.3 Synchronization of Perception, Imagery, and Cognition 
As discussed in section 6.2.2.1, bottom-up perceptual processing proceeds along two 
simultaneous pathways while operators in Soar‘s procedural memory, executing in a third 
processing path, attend to the listeners‘ input (Figure 6-7). Imagery processing initially 
deviates from these processing paths in that it originates from the application of an 
imagery operator in Soar and flows to the corresponding imagery process. This 
processing diverges into five possible paths to include construction, manipulation, 
generation, and inspection (two parallel paths). Figure 6-17 shows four paths emanating 
from Soar‘s output as we have combined the construct/manipulate path and, as in bottom-
up visual processing, the ―What‖ and ―Where‖ inspectors could process in parallel. The 
imagery process performs its function (i.e. construction, transformation, generation, 
inspection), and returns to the Soar decision cycle path where consolidated input from 
SVI‘s listeners is processed. Although the processing path is different from bottom-up, 
visual processing, the information (i.e. data) flows along the same paths. For example, 
after processing constructs or manipulates a representation, the information (e.g. the 
instance-id of the imagined/transformed visual object, automatically extracted spatial 
relationships from the current viewpoint) resulting from this construction/manipulation 
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are extracted by the inspectors, stored in VS-STM, and consolidated by the listeners for 
input to Soar. During imagery inspection, as in bottom-up perception, the inspectors 
extract information from the quantitative or depictive representation and encode it in VS-
STM. The listeners consolidate the results from VS-STM for input to Soar. 
 
 
Figure 6-17: “Top-down” Imagery Processing and Data Flow 
 
This top-down imagery processing propagates temporal and spatial constraints on 
the overall system. Imagery may inhibit incoming sensory input (bottom of Figure 6-17) 
and synchronize (i.e. ―lock‖) the memories to avoid race conditions. That is, sensory 
information from the environment continues to arrive, but in order to give imagery an 
opportunity to process the spatial and visual representations, there may be an ephemeral 
inhibition of sensations. Of course, such inhibitions cause the system to miss incoming 
information so there must be some sort of an ―override‖ to interrupt imagery and attend 
to the incoming sensory input. Although we do not have an adequate model of how such 

























―important‖ information. For example, in the Scout domain ―important‖ information is a 
moving object in the perceived scene or a message arriving from the agent‘s teammate. 
An orthogonal issue relevant to the processing flow of imagery and inhibition of 
sensory input is the system‘s overall truth maintenance mechanisms. That is, the 
architecture must address how the information states between sensory input, imagery, and 
cognition remain consistent. For example, if there are two salient, visual objects in the 
perceived or imagined scene, then that information must be reflected in at least one of the 
Visual Buffer‘s images, in the Object Map, in VS-STM, and on Soar‘s symbolic, input-
link. Similarly, if a previously imagined object is no longer in the current scene because 
the agent is ―perceiving‖ again, then the visual symbol instance in Soar‘s short-term 
memory must be tagged and eventually removed so that future reasoning does not assume 
the object is still in the scene.
17
 In most cases, the VLTM and Object Map Listeners will 
handle the updating of symbols on Soar‘s input-link, but if the agent creates any internal 
symbolic state in Soar, it has the responsibility through procedural knowledge to enforce 
consistency.  
From an architectural perspective, after imagery finishes processing, or when an 
―important‖ perception interrupts it, any temporary imagery state stored in the short-term 
memories is removed. For example, in the Scout domain if an observation report from the 
agent‘s teammate arrives while the agent is imagining a hypothesized enemy path, the 
architecture removes (1) the symbolic state created in Soar‘s imagery problem space,
18
 
(2) any imagined visual objects in the Object Map, (3) temporary images created in the 
Visual Buffer, and (3) any state containing imagined objects in VS-STM. It then updates 
those short-term spatial and visual memories based on the current visual perception. The 
effect then is that any state imagery creates is monotonic with respect to any pre-existing 
state. The agent, through procedural task knowledge, must decide what information to 
make persistent in one of Soar‘s symbolic memories and is responsible for enforcing 
consistency based on the spatial and visual information arriving on Soar‘s input-link.  
                                                 
17
Future work discusses the exploration of ―object permanence‖ or the memory of a visible object that 
disappears (through motion). 
18




In summary, the architecture consists of two major components, Soar and SVI. 
Each contains a set of fixed memories and processes with Soar encompassing the 
symbolic representation and SVI including the quantitative spatial and visual depictive 
representations. A symbolic VS-STM binds the two processing pathways and serves as a 
temporary symbolic store. Imagery processing leverages the mechanisms high-level 
vision inherently provides and includes functions for constructing a quantitative spatial 
representation, generating a visual depictive representation, and transforming or 













This chapter presents the objective evaluation and continues the subjective evaluation of 
the architecture in three different domains. The objective evaluation is in support of our 
research goal to understand the computational capabilities of spatial and visual imagery. 
It focuses on three metrics: efficiency, functional capability, and problem-solving quality. 
As there are no existing cognitive architectures with an imagery component and 
corresponding experiments to compare our system against, the objective evaluation 
includes, where possible, comparisons between Soar agents with and without the Spatial-
Visual Imagery (SVI) component. This approach supports our research goal by providing 
quantitative evidence that the capability and computational gain an agent achieves is a 
result of spatial and visual imagery mechanisms and not task knowledge. 
The architectural description in the previous chapter is the start of our subjective 
evaluation. In this chapter, we will expand on that discussion as it relates to the 
computational constraints introduced in Chapter 3 (Figure 3-1). Although our primary 
goal focuses on functionality, we briefly touch on behavioral constraints when we present 
results from the Alphabet experiment. These results make comparisons with human data 
and highlight shortcomings in the architecture. These shortcomings include our 
uncertainty of the visual processing algorithms that humans use to recognize features, and 
the architecture‘s lack of an ―image maintenance‖ mechanism that regenerates the image 
when it decays (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006).  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We begin by presenting the 
evaluation criteria. We then provide, for each experimental domain, additional 
implementation details, relevant results for applicable criteria, and our subjective 
assessment. We present each experiment in chronological order corresponding to the 
evolution of the architecture. As such, the first two experiments do not always have a 
one-to-one mapping with the current architecture as we apply the lessons learned from 
earlier experiments to improve the architecture. We conclude the chapter with the major 
lessons learned. 
7.1 Evaluation Criteria 
This quote from Pylyshn (2002) serves as inspiration as to what we are attempting to 
achieve. 
 
"The search for a system of representation that retains some of the attractive 
features of pictures and yet can serve as the basis for reasoning has been the holy 
grail of many research programs, both in cognitive science and in artificial 
intelligence.‖ 
 
Figure 7-1 illustrates our evaluation criteria. There are four dimensions. The first 
dimension is the behavioral, biological, functional, and computational constraints 
influencing the architectural design space that we must continuously consider. The x-axis 
represents computational gains, the y-axis represents additional functional capability, and 
the z-axis is an indicator of the problem-solving quality. In the foreground of these 
evaluation dimensions is an assessment of the task and environments where spatial and 
visual imagery is useful (Chapter 5).  
As the architectural design considers the behavioral, biological, and functional 
constraints, our evaluation in this chapter focuses on the computational constraints as 
they relate to the other three dimensions. Specifically, we are concerned with the relative 
efficiency of a representation for a given task when compared to using another 
representation for the same task. We also want to analyze subjectively whether we can 
assign credit for the resulting efficiency to the architecture. Finally, even though the 
resulting representation may provide computational efficiency, we want to evaluate its 




Figure 7-1: Evaluation Metrics 
 
We evaluate computational efficiency by comparing either different designs or 
different agents with and without SVI. Agents using SVI are denoted Soar+SVI (Soar 
―plus‖ SVI) while agents not using SVI are denoted Soar-SVI (Soar ―minus‖ SVI). The 
comparisons include the amount of processing (in CPU time) and the amount of task 
knowledge in terms of Soar productions. In order to nullify any system or simulation 
variability, each result represents an average of 30 trials. Where appropriate, we also 
discuss opportunities for improved efficiency and generality.  
We measure functional capability with subjective observations derived from 
implementation of the task. Objective measurements of functionality compare an agent 
with and without imagery. Problem-solving quality measures whether the agent‘s overall 
performance improves with imagery processing. We evaluate this metric in the Scout 
domain. Finally, where appropriate, we highlight the tradeoffs in terms of design 
complexity, generality, and psychological validity.  
7.2 Geometry Gymnastics 
The first domain derives from Larkin and Simon‘s (1987) work demonstrating a 
computational advantage of a diagram. In this problem, the agent must locate objects 
(e.g. vertices, line segments, triangles) and infer relationships (e.g. angles, congruency) 





















stresses the construction and inspection of a quantitative spatial representation. As either 
symbolic or metric representations are sufficient, we can compare agents and determine 
computational and functional differences. The task does not require a visual depiction as 
initial knowledge specifies the objects (i.e. lines) from which other features can be 
directly inferred.  
 
Figure 7-2: Geometry Problem 
 
To review, the agent‘s goal is to prove two triangles formed by a given 
specification are congruent (Figure 7-2). The agent‘s initial knowledge is that there are 
four lines (A, B, C, and D). Line A is parallel to line B, line C intersects line A, and line 
D intersects line C at the midpoint of the line segment formed by the intersection of line 
C with line A and line B. To prove the two triangles are congruent, the agent employs the 
angle-side-angle (ASA) rule. The rule states that if two angles and the included side of 
one triangle are congruent to two angles and the included side of another triangle, the 
triangles are congruent. In Figure 7-2, if the agent shows E1=E2, c=b, and e1=e2, then it 
proves the triangles are congruent. 
To solve the problem with strictly symbolic representations (Soar-SVI), an 
agent‘s task knowledge must include rules for creating the different features (e.g. 
vertices, line segments, triangles) and spatial properties (e.g. angles, congruent). We 
implement the construction of these properties using Soar operators. Figure 7-3a provides 
an example of some of these operators. During each decision cycle, the Soar-SVI agent 
progresses towards its goal by creating the features required to solve the problem. For 
example, operator three creates a line-segment given that there are two vertices on the 

















(a) Soar-SVI (b) Soar+SVI 
Figure 7-3: Example Geometry Problem Operators (Pseudocode) 
 
The Soar agent using SVI (Soar+SVI) constructs and inspects the quantitative 
spatial representation with operators that invoke imagery (Figure 7-3b). When fully 
implemented the Soar-SVI agent requires 54 task productions, and the Soar+SVI agent 
requires 28 total task productions (not including imagery operators). Since the visual 
objects in this example are lines, there are two different ways we can model the agent 
(1) If two lines (L-1,L-2) are parallel, and 
L-1 intersects line, L-3, then L-2 
intersects L-3 
(2) If two lines (L-1, L-2) intersect, create a 
vertex, v-1, recording the two lines 
associated with the vertex. 
(3) If there is a vertex, v-1, on line, L-1, 
and another vertex, v-2 on line, L-1, 
then create a line-segment, ls-1, and 
record the two vertices associated with 
it. 
(4) If there are three line segments (ls-1,ls-
2,ls-3) and ls-1shares a vertex, v-1, with 
ls-2, and ls-2 shares a vertex, v-2, with 
ls-3, and ls-3 shares a vertex, v-3, with 
ls-1 and v-1 != v-2 != v-3 then create a 
triangle, t-1, and record the line-
segments that make up each side 
(5) If there is a vertex, v-1, create 4 angles, 
1 per region. Region 1, 2, 3, 4  (see 
Figure 7-4) 
(6) If there are two vertices, v-1,v-2, and v-
and v-1 is associated with line L-1 and 
L-2 and v-2 is associated with line L-1 
and L-3, and L-2 is parallel to L-3 and 
v-1 has an angle, a-1 in region 1 and v-2 
has an angle, a-2  in region 3 then  a-1 
is congruent to a-2 (Alternate interior 
angles congruent)  
(7) If there is a vertex, v-,1 with angles a-1, 
a-2, and a-1 is in region 1 and a-2 is in 
region 3 then a-1 is congruent to a-2 
(Vertical angles congruent)  
(8) etc. 
(9) Prove congruent with ASA rule 
 
54 Total Task Productions 
(1) If two lines (L-1,L-2) are parallel then 
Compose( L-1, L-2, geometry, parallel) 
(2) If scene has two parallel lines(L-1,L-2) 
and another line, L-3 intersects L-1 then 
Add (L-3,L-1,L-2,direction.in-
between,orientation.scalar 
random(30,60), size(L-1,2))  
(3) If scene has lines, L-1, L-2, and L-3, and 
line, L-4, intersects line L-3, then 
Add(L-4, L-3 orientation 
(random(30,60),size(L-3,1))) 
(4) If scene has four lines, L-1,L-2,L-3,L-4, 
then Inspect(intersect(scene, create-
vertex)) 
(5) If scene has vertices then  
Inspect (line-segment (scene), create-
line-segment) 
 Inspect (triangle (scene), create-triangle)  
(6) If triangle, t-1 with  line-segment, ls-1 
then Inspect(angle(center-of(t-1, ls-
1),scalar) 
(7) If vertex, v-1, on line L-1 and L-2 with 
orientation angles to triangle, t-1, center  
a-1 and a-2 respectively then create 
angle in region sign(a-1)/sign(a-2) 
(8) Alternate interior angles congruent 
(9) Vertical angles congruent  
(10) Prove congruent with ASA rule 
 
28 Total Task Productions 
 
This number does not include imagery 
operators (construct, transform, 





imagining the lines. One way is to have the agent simply ―draw‖ each line by sending 
SVI a pair of vertices for each line. This model assumes that the agent has task 
knowledge defining the spatial arrangement of vertices for parallel lines, intersecting 
lines, etc.   
Another more general way and what we chose to model here, is to assume that the 
agent has a prototypical representation of a line in VLTM. Recall that each visual object 
stored in VLTM has a ―front‖ and canonical orientation. In this domain, we assume that a 
line‘s canonical orientation is due ―east‖ (i.e. an infinite ray extending east). The 
Soar+SVI agent‘s first operator (Figure 7-3b) states that if there are two lines with a 
parallel relationship, then imagine composing them in a parallel manner. Note that since 
both of the lines face ―east,‖ this is the same as saying compose the two objects with the 
relative visual object left-of (or right-of) the base visual object. The objects‘ area of 
influence, which is slightly larger than the length of their bounds, is the default distance 
between the two objects (i.e. lines).  
Continuing in a similar manner, operators two and three add lines C and D to the 
spatial representation. The second operator says to add line C in between line A and line 
B, oriented some random direction between 30 and 60 degrees and with a size twice as 
large as line A. The orientation and size specifications are required to form the 
intersection specified by the task instructions. Note that when line D is added to the 
spatial representation, it is added relative to line C meaning the origins of each line will 
be the same—thus the bisect relationship constraint is met. Line D‘s orientation is 
relative to line C‘s orientation so the end effect is that Line D is orientated between 60 
and 120 degrees relative to line A.  
Once construction is complete, the agent simply has to inspect the representation 
(taking advantage of the metric representation and analytical geometry) for the 
information it is seeking. In this problem, it requires the intersection points, or vertices 
between the lines (Figure 7-3b operators 4 and 5). Once it knows the vertices, it can infer 
the line-segments (through SVI) by determining the pairs of vertices that fall on the same 
line (again through analytical geometry), and find the triangles from the set of vertices 
and line segments (edges). This knowledge, together with the information of which side 
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the triangle‘s center is relative to each line (explained next), is sufficient to prove the 
congruency of the triangles with the angle-side-angle rule.  
7.2.1 Functional Capability 
One of the significant results from this experiment is that spatial imagery provides the 
agent with a ―sense of direction‖ enabling it to reduce its search space. The Soar-SVI 
agent cannot determine from the qualitative symbolic knowledge alone, where the center 
of each triangle is relative to each vertex because it does not have metric information or a 
notion of space. Therefore, it has to create four angles for every vertex, labeling them as 
the angle belonging to region 1, 2, 3, or 4 (Figure 7-3a production 5 and Figure 7-4). This 
leads to an explosion in the problem space as, in addition to the extra memory structures 
required for each angle, the agent has to reason about several congruency relationships 
between angles that are not inherent to the triangles (e.g. Figure 7-3a productions 6 and 
7). In fact, to solve the problem, the Soar-SVI agent must have specific task knowledge to 
apply the angle-side-angle rule (e.g. if there is a vertex representing the intersection of 
line A with line C, then the angle belonging to the triangle is in region 4).   
 
 
Figure 7-4: “Sense of Direction” 
 
The Soar+SVI agent, however, can take advantage of the canonical direction of 
each line and the metric information of the spatial representation to determine the angle 
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orientation angle between each triangle‘s line segment and its center of gravity (COG) to 
determine if the triangle is on the positive or negative side of the line segment (Figure 
7-3b production 6 and Figure 7-4). SVI computes the COG as an average of the triangle‘s 
vertices. To determine the angle between the line segment and the COG, and the angle‘s 
corresponding direction (positive/counterclockwise or negative/clockwise) requires two 
computations:  
 
𝜃𝑑 =  cos
−1 𝑑 𝑙𝑠  ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝐺 =  𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑂𝐺  (1) 
𝜃𝑛  =  cos
−1 𝑛 𝑙𝑠  ∙ 𝐶𝑂𝐺 =  𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑂𝐺      (2) 
𝜃𝑑  𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 =   
0 < 𝜃𝑛  ≤ 90                 +/𝐶𝐶𝑊
90 <  𝜃𝑛  ≤ 180         −/𝐶𝑊
  
 
The first computation determines the angle between the line-segment and COG while the 
second computation infers the direction of this angle. If the resulting value of the second 
computation is between 0 and 90 degrees, then the triangle is on the positive side of the 
line segment (i.e. the line segment must be rotated in a counterclockwise direction to 
―hit‖ the COG). Otherwise, the triangle‘s COG is on the negative side of the line 
segment. With this information, the agent can infer the angle associated with each vertex. 
For example, in Figure 7-4, the triangle is on the positive side of line A and the negative 
side of line C. Therefore, the angle associated with vertex, vAC, is in region four (+/-). 
With this sense of direction, the agent only creates symbols for angles associated with 
each triangle.  
7.2.2 Computational Advantage 
The functional advantage gained from the ―sense of direction‖ directly influences the 
computational gain the agent achieves. The Soar+SVI agent requires less real and 
simulated computational time than Soar-SVI (Figure 7-5). The primary reason is the 
number of angles the Soar-SVI agent creates and the subsequent comparisons for 
congruency. For example, Soar-SVI creates 5 vertices x 4 angles = 20 angles compared to 
Soar+SVI‘s 6 angles (three per triangle). Subsequently Soar-SVI annotates congruency 
relationships for 24 vertical angles (i.e. 5 vertices x 4 vertical angles plus 2 pairs of 
vertices with 2 congruent alternate interior angles). This number does not reflect the 
additional congruency relationships that the agent has to consider between pairs of 
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unnecessary angles (Figure 7-3a operators 6 and 7). In addition to the performance gain, 
the Soar+SVI model also requires less task knowledge as it only requires 28 productions 
compared to Soar-SVI‘s 54 productions. The Soar-SVI agent requires knowledge about 
geometric structures inherent to SVI‘s spatial imagery processing. Functionally, this 
suggests that SVI decreases the amount of knowledge required to learn such a task.   
 
Figure 7-5: Empirical Time for Each Agent 
Simulated time is decision cycles x 50 ms 
 
To measure whether the architecture supports reactive and deliberate behavior 
(i.e. is responsive to the environment), we estimate the amount of time an average 
imagery operation requires normalized to a hypothesized decision cycle time of 50 
milliseconds. We calculate the average imagery time as follows. First, the average 
decision cycle time is computed from Soar‘s total CPU time divided by the total number 
of decision cycles.
19
 The average amount of time spent in SVI per imagery operation (i.e. 
construction and inspection in this domain) is normalized to the hypothesized decision 
cycle time where normalized time = (average-real-time-in-SVI-per-imagery-operation x 
50) / average-decision-cycle-time. Note that each imagery operation encompasses all of 
the analytical geometry computations (e.g. calculating the rotation direction between a 
line segment and the COG of a triangle) required for that particular operation (i.e. 
                                                 
19
 A decision cycle is one iteration through Soar‘s processing loop (see Figure 6-2) 
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construction and inspection). In this task, the average normalized time spent in SVI for an 
imagery operation was less than one-half of a millisecond, suggesting that spatial 
imagery processing is reactive, as it requires less than one percent of a single decision 
cycle (i.e. 0.5 ms / 50 ms = 0.01).  
7.2.3 Geometry Problem Assessment 
Although the model is not psychologically plausible as we expect humans would ―write‖ 
the imagined structure to an external diagram, it does demonstrate imagery‘s 
computational advantages and added functionality. The quality of the resulting solution is 
the same whether the agent solves the problem with Soar-SVI and additional task 
knowledge or Soar+SVI. The architecture enables this behavior while maintaining 
responsiveness. It achieves these results because spatial imagery processing uses 
mathematical reasoning specialized for the quantitative spatial representation. 
There are tradeoffs, however. The resulting architecture is more complex and no 
longer includes one amodal representation. As a result, the agent must determine what the 
appropriate representation is for a given task or subtask. Although we model this problem 
as a spatial imagery task, individual differences may influence whether one uses visual 
imagery to solve the problem. For example, in order to find the vertices the agent may 
employ visual imagery by generating an image for each visual object (i.e. line) and 
coloring each object the same (e.g. white). It can then identify the vertices with depictive 
rules marking each pixel with a unique color when there are overlapping pixels in two or 
more layers. (e.g. if there is a white pixel in Layer 1 and a white pixel at the same 
location in Layer 2, 3, or 4 then mark a vertex). The tradeoff is that there are more 
imagery operations involved (generation and transformation of the visual depiction), but 
the processing is perhaps more general as it does not have knowledge that it is marking a 




Achieving such a level of generality is a continuous struggle when considering the 
integration of new representations, as one, amodal representation is more parsimonious.
20
 
Consider the geometry experiment. For imagery construction, there is a distinct 
separation between knowledge and architecture. The agent has a finite set of ways to add 
visual objects to the spatial representation, and as long as it knows how to use them (e.g. 
the need to ―rotate‖ line C to have it intersect with line A), then it achieves the desired 
effects without the architecture having to encode any special task knowledge. The 
architecture does not know that the visual objects it is composing are lines.  
However, the inspection process does not provide as clear of separation as the 
processing immediately exploits the knowledge that the visual objects are lines.
21
 The 
fundamental issue is not whether the architecture should exploit the dimensionality (i.e. 
one-dimensional line, two-dimensional polygon, etc.) of a visual object, as we assume 
that at some architectural level there are low-level primitives for processing geometric 
representations of lines and their relationships. Rather the issue is whether these 
geometric properties (intersect, parallel, vertices, line-segments) belong to the set of 
spatial property primitives (direction, distance, orientation, size, and topology) 
communicated between the symbolic and quantitative spatial representations. 
The alternative is to recast geometric types as a combination of other spatial 
properties. For example, we previously described how constructing two parallel lines can 
be rephrased as ―left-of/right-of‖ (direction) and disconnected (topology). Similarly, for 
inspection, geometric intersection may be interpreted as the topological property of 
―partially overlaps.‖ The underlying architecture must then have mechanisms to 
determine whether the visual objects are one-, two-, or three-dimensional representations, 
perhaps by determining the dimensionality of their convex hulls and invoking the 
appropriate processing. The resulting shape returned to Soar, rather than being labeled a 
vertex, would simply be labeled a general shape with one point. The agent can then infer, 
perhaps through semantic knowledge, that a shape with one point represents a vertex. 
                                                 
20
Unless the architecture has to support vision as well in which case reuse of visual perceptual mechanisms, 
as we demonstrate in this dissertation, may be more parsimonious than mimicking imagery-type operations 
with the laborious churning of symbolic processing. 
21
The current implementation of the primitive visual objects, or scene graph leaf nodes, labels the nodes as 
―mesh‖ (i.e. vertices and indices), ―line‖ (i.e. two vertices and one edge), or ―point‖. Separate processing 
paths for each type of primitive object are then possible. 
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These are the types of issues we propose investigating for future work to include the 
integration between imagery processing and long-term semantic and episodic memories.  
7.3 Alphabet Soup 
In the geometry experiment, we explore spatial imagery and show that for tasks involving 
more than a few spatial properties, using a symbolic representation and logical reasoning 
is sufficient but not as computationally efficient as using the quantitative spatial 
representation and mathematical processing. In this experiment, our desire is to explore 
tasks where the use of visual imagery and depictive representations is more efficient and 
likely necessary to infer the desired information.  
The domain derives from Thompson et al. (in press). In this experiment, the 
subject hears a letter from the English alphabet and is instructed to visualize it in its 
uppercase format. Next, the subject hears a cue, such as ―curve,‖ ―enclosed space,‖ 
―horizontal symmetry,‖ or ―vertical symmetry‖ and indicates, as quickly as possible, 
whether the letter has the particular feature (Figure 7-6). Response times are measured. 
For example, the letter ‗A‘ has an enclosed space and vertical symmetry while ‗U‘ has a 
curve. We outline further experimental details in Appendix A. 
 
Figure 7-6: Alphabet Features Experiment 
 
We chose this task because, unlike the geometry problem, reasoning with 
symbolic or quantitative spatial representations may not be able to infer the required 
information without explicitly encoding every feature or task knowledge to support the 
inference (e.g. if three non-collinear lines then there is an enclosed space). Since an 
object can have an infinite amount of features, that approach is not scalable from either a 
psychological or a computational perspective. The task also includes an external 
environment (i.e. the person asking the question) emphasizing the interaction of imagery 
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Similar to the human experiment, the Soar+SVI agent ―hears‖ a question, 
visualizes the letter, searches for the desired feature, and then ―verbally‖ responds. The 
simulation models the audio input as a sequence of two symbols (e.g. ―A curve‖) and the 
verbal output as a simple ―yes‖/‖no‖ symbolic response. The agent‘s initial, declarative 
knowledge is a symbolic structure containing the 26 capital letter entities. Each letter 
symbol has the ―name‖ of the letter (e.g. ―A‖) for identifying it with the ―audio‖ input 
and the visual object symbol for the letter to support imagery. The agent‘s symbolic 
knowledge does not have any specific letter features.  
After hearing the question and searching its symbolic memory for the desired 
feature, the agent realizes it cannot infer the answer directly and constructs the 
quantitative spatial representation from the visual object of the letter. It then generates the 
visual depiction for the letter, invokes SVI to inspect the Visual Buffer for the desired 
feature, and ―verbally‖ responds after receiving the results. The simulation records the 
time from when the agent receives the question to when it provides an answer. 
The architecture detects curves using a Hough transform and enclosed spaces 
using depictive manipulations encoded in the architecture. Appendix B describes these 
algorithms in more detail. SVI‘s inspector determines symmetry by first generating a 
second image of the visual object for the letter and transforming (i.e. rotating) it around 
the given axis of symmetry. It then marks (with a different color) the pixels on the rotated 
image that overlap (i.e. have the same color pixel) with the original image. If the number 
of remaining pixels of the original color is below some threshold, then the inspector 
considers the letter symmetrical around the given axis of symmetry.  
7.3.1 Alphabet Results 
The requirement for generating and transforming depictive representations to infer 
features forced us to reconsider our original theory and design that did not include a 
visual depictive representation. Our previous discussion of the theory and architecture 
reflects this subjective assessment. A notable observation from this assessment is that 
there is a difference between the types of algorithms capable of processing a depictive 
representation. Some are mathematical-based while others take advantage of the color, 
topological space, and locality of neighboring pixels. That is, even though the 
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representation is depictive, the processing may be sentential or depictive. Many accounts 
of visual imagery processing do not clarify this distinction, and, as Anderson (1978) 
argues, every computational account of imagery must not only discuss the representation 
but also the types of processing.  
As an example, the Hough algorithm maps edge pixels from an image space to a 
parameter space and uses a ―voting‖ algorithm to determine the parameters of a curve. 
Although the algorithm has interesting perceptual characteristics (e.g. edge detection), it 
relies on sentential, algebraic computations. On the other hand, algorithms such as  pixel-
level rewrites (Furnas, 1990, 1991; Furnas et al., 2000), which we employ for detecting 
enclosed spaces, are depictive computations as they manipulate the representation based 
on the spatial configurations and color of neighboring pixels.  
The second observation from this experiment is that the gain in computational 
efficiency, functional capability, and quality of the problem solving is obvious. We 
cannot achieve this capability or solve these types of reasoning problems, at least in a 
practical sense, with symbolic or quantitative computations.
22
 Therefore, a comparison of 
computational efficiency between agents with and without imagery is immaterial. As an 
alternative, we compare the Soar+SVI agent‘s performance with human data. We make 
no claim that the algorithms are similar to how humans recognize these features, but we 
use the data to highlight shortcomings with the architecture.   
Figure 7-7 shows the comparison for each feature (horizontal and vertical 
symmetry are combined). We sort the letters for which we have human data
23
 along the 
x-axis from left to right according to human response time. The y-axis represents the 
response time in milliseconds. We scale the Soar+SVI agent response times for curves 
(1/10) and symmetry (2x) to fit within the human bounds. Although there is no 
correlation between the Soar+SVI agent and the human response times for individual 
letters, both humans and Soar+SVI show variability in the time to detect curves and 
enclosed spaces between various letters (Figure 7-7a&b). In the case of symmetry, 
however, Soar+SVI shows little variability while humans show a lot (Figure 7-7c).  
                                                 
22
As we explore in the Scout domain, there may be ways to have a symbolic processor, such as Soar, 
process low-level pixel data. However, as we will demonstrate, it is computationally expensive. Symbolic 
representations and computations do not facilitate efficient manipulation of depictions. 
23
 We would like to thank (Thompson et al., in press) for the data and collaboration on this experiment. 
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A possible reason why Soar+SVI is consistent in recognizing symmetry while 
humans are not, is that the architecture does not account for the human phenomena of 
having to continually ―refresh‖ the visual depictive representation as it fades due to 
perceptual interference (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). Additionally, the agent 
determines symmetry by transforming the original depiction around the axis of symmetry 
and comparing it with the original orientation. Rather than performing this operation in a 
single step, we hypothesize that humans must continuously rotate and regenerate the 
letter where the time to rotate the object is linear to the rotational angle (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971). The results demonstrate that even if the overall architecture is correct 
(our hypothesis), the details of modeling human behavior is in low-level visual 
processing. 
These details become more evident when we measure the responsiveness of the 
architecture. Figure 7-8 illustrates the average amount of time for one imagery operation 
(construction, transformation, generation, inspection) normalized to the hypothesized 
decision cycle time in humans (log 50 ~ 1.7). Most of the reflected time is for inspection 
of the particular visual feature (i.e. visual imagery). Response times for determining 
enclosed spaces and curves are respectively one and two orders of a magnitude higher 
from what we consider supporting responsive behavior (i.e. ~50 ms). There are a couple 
of reasons for this seeming discrepancy. First, we assume that low-level visual processing 
exploits parallelism that we do not reflect in our architecture. Parallel hardware and 
algorithms may help, but a more fundamental issue may be that the architecture is 
attempting to process too much of the image in a single decision cycle. We attempt to 
address this issue with the incorporation of an attention window and evaluate it in the 
Scout domain. Second, it may be that visual imagery simply takes more processing time 
than spatial imagery using traditional computer hardware. Comparing the normalized 





(a)Human 98:,610:  ,Soar
178:,611:   
(b) Human 65:,604:  , Soar 65:,605:   
 
(c) Human 104:,778:  Soar 12:,643:   




Figure 7-8: Time Required for an Imagery Operation in the Alphabet Experiment 
Time is an average of all imagery operations normalized to the decision cycle time (50 ms). 
7.3.2 Alphabet Experiment Assessment 
The results show that visual imagery provides a functional advantage over symbolic 
processing when recognizing visual features. However, visual imagery appears to be less 
reactive then spatial imagery, at least in light of our current implementation. Since 
perceptual input in this task does not ―interrupt‖ the agent (i.e. the agent has as much time 
as required to answer the questions), it can imagine the situation for as long as it desires. 
However, in a task requiring reactive behavior, as in the Scout domain, the architecture 
must support the interruption of imagery processing when ―important‖ perceptual input is 
competing for cognitive and visual resources. 
Similar to the Geometry experiment, the Alphabet experiment demonstrates a 
clear separation between knowledge and the architecture for imagery construction and 
generation. Knowledge directs the processing of these functions and the architecture does 
not know if it is constructing or generating a letter from the English alphabet, the Chinese 
alphabet, or another visual object. It only knows that it is activating objects from VLTM 
based on a given spatial configuration.  
Questions linger, however, regarding the knowledge transparency for the 
inspection processes. As with the geometry problem, our assumption remains that at 








curves, corners, enclosed spaces, etc., as visual processing requires these detectors to 
automatically perform their role during bottom-up processing. The algorithms and 
depictive manipulation rules for detecting these features are ―hardwired‖ into the 
architecture (or acquired early on in development). 
However, consider alternative recognition schemes for symmetry. Perhaps it is a 
property that is not ―hardwired.‖ Rather the recognition emerges from the combination of 
symbolic and perceptual representations where the agent‘s procedural and declarative 
knowledge plays more of a role (i.e. algorithms of a more richly hybrid sort). Within the 
context of Soar+SVI the processing may be realized when an agent‘s procedural 
knowledge determines it wants to recognize symmetry and generates two images of the 
letter transforming the second image around the given axis. Then, rather than having an 
architecturally embedded algorithm deciding if an object is symmetrical, an imagery 
command sends depictive rules to SVI. SVI marks the non-overlapping pixels in 
accordance with the rules and returns the resulting symbolic representation of the 
shape(s). Based on the number of points in the shape, the agent‘s procedural knowledge 
decides whether the object is symmetrical. Not only is this type of recognition for 
symmetry possibly relevant for imagery, but it is also relevant during perception where 
the inspection for it initiates after bottom-up processing fails to recognize an object from 
more primitive features.   
From a psychological perspective, the top-down explanation of how one may 
recognize symmetry clarifies to some extent why humans take longer, on average, to 
detect symmetry than to detect curves or enclosed spaces (Figure 7-7). Functionally, the 
advantage of this type of processing is that it facilitates learning as the procedural 
knowledge of how to recognize symmetry is available to Soar‘s learning mechanisms. 
This observation helped inform our decision to encode the knowledge embedded in 
depictive rules, at least for ―non-primitive‖ manipulations, within Soar‘s symbolic 
memories and send them to SVI‘s Visual Buffer Manipulator for processing. The Scout 
domain explores this design in more detail.  
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7.4 Scouts Out 
Our experimental results from the previous two domains are limited to solving internally 
represented problems. Although the Alphabet experiment includes perceptual input, it is 
not of the visual modality so the architecture does not have to consider issues such as the 
difference between perceived and imagined objects and the resource constraints between 
shared perception and imagery memories. Furthermore, the high-level goal of the 
previous two tasks was to answer a single question whereas more complex problem 
solving requires internally answering multiple questions where the information 
supporting the answer originates from multiple sources—both internal and external. 
In the Scout domain, we extend our results to a rich, dynamic environment where 
perception and imagery operate simultaneously. The agent must interpret and act upon 
information from multiple sources. By combining perceptual representations with task 
specific, procedural and declarative knowledge, an imagined situation supports higher-
level decisions. Analysis emerges through the manipulation of symbolic, quantitative 
spatial, and visual depictive representations and provides the agent with the knowledge 
necessary for reasoning and producing action in the environment. 
7.4.1 Simulation Environment 
To review, there are two scouts in the simulation (Figure 7-9a). One scout is a 
Soar+SVI/-SVI agent and the team‘s lead. The other scout, the teammate, is a scripted 
entity. The opposing force is a scripted, three-vehicle enemy reconnaissance unit that is 
attempting to determine possible routes and friendly locations in support of a follow-on 
attack by a larger force (the follow on attack is not modeled). The scout team‘s goal is to 
acquire and maintain visual contact with the approaching enemy to determine their 
maneuver intentions. Paramount in achieving this goal is keeping their commander 
informed of the opposing force‘s movements by periodically sending observation reports 
(through the lead) of their best assessment of the enemy‘s location. The commander uses 





(a) Actual Situation (b) Teammate‟s View 
  
(c) Agent‟s View (d) Agent‟s Perceived Map / Imagined Situation 
Figure 7-9: Scout Domain (Scenario-1) 
The agent‟s imagined situation in (d) is based on its current perceived/hypothesized knowledge. It 
has not yet received the teammate‟s report of the second enemy vehicle (Enemy Scout-1). 
 
Both the agent and its teammate scan the area in front of them and send reports 
when they observe enemy vehicles (Figure 7-9b&c). Because of terrain occlusions, the 
agent cannot observe its teammate but instead maintains situational awareness through 
the teammate‘s periodic messages that identify its position. Both the agent and the 
teammate can reorient their views, but the teammate performs this action only when the 
lead directs it. The agent can look at the scene or its map (Figure 7-9c&d), but not both 
simultaneously. We assume that the agent and its teammate can distinguish enemy 
vehicles from other objects. However, the agent has to decide whether a sighted or 
reported enemy is a new or previously identified entity. 
The simulation architecture consists of five major components (Figure 7-10): a 





 We will discuss each of these components to provide an understanding 
of the modeling fidelity between the agent and the environment. The World 
Representation is a Wild Magic (Eberly, 2005) scene graph and includes the terrain and  
each object in the world (e.g. tanks, buildings, etc). Its purpose is twofold. First, from a 
simulation perspective it maintains the location and orientation state of each actor and 
provides a graphical representation of the simulation for debugging purposes. Second, the 
Agent Proxy provides the agent, as perceptual input, the portion of the world that is 
visible to the agent. We will discuss this implementation detail shortly.  
A Simulation Actor represents a unique entity in the simulation such as the agent, 
the teammate, the enemy, and buildings. Each simulation actor includes a set of basic 
behaviors (i.e. move, turn, send a message, etc.) and maintains a reference to its scene 
graph object representing its 3D model, where it is located, and its orientation. During 
initialization, the simulation creates the world and the actors from a configuration file. 
The file contains actor attributes such as their name, 3D model, initial location and 
orientation, movement velocity and angular velocity. For enemy actors, the simulation 
also loads the enemy ―plan‖ to include a set of waypoints, possible paths between 
waypoints, and a few ―decision points‖ where the enemy commander has the latitude 
(based on randomness) to split its force or modify the path of a subordinate. A tactical 
expert creates the enemy plan from an off-line analysis.  
The Simulation Engine is a discrete event simulation (DES) using the SimKit 
framework (Buss, 2002). At the most basic level, a discrete event simulation consists of a 
clock, an event list, and set of possible events that the system schedules for execution by 
placing them on the event list. During each ―tick‖ (t) of the clock, the simulation engine 
removes all events on the event list whose scheduled execution time is less than or equal 
to the current simulation time and processes their actions. After the simulation processes 
those actions, it increments its clock and the processing iterates. The general algorithm is 
the following:  
                                                 
24
During the discussion of the simulation when we refer to Soar+SVI, we also imply Soar-SVI as having he 




The actions of an event change the state of the system and may schedule another event 
for future processing. From the perspective of the simulation, then any action that occurs 
in the world is the result of a scheduled event. The advantage of this approach is that the 
system can enforce temporal constraints on actions. 
 
 
Figure 7-10: Simulation Architecture 
 
For example, the simulation models the initiation of a tactical maneuver when one 
actor sends a message to another actor asking it to commence movement (e.g. reorient, 
start-move). Each actor can send a message to another actor by scheduling a ―send 
1. Create and initialize actors and world 
2. Set simulation time to 0 
3. Schedule the default (―Run‖) event 
4. While there are events on the event list 
a. While there are events on the event 
list with an execution time <= 
simulation time 
i. Execute the next event 
b. Increment the simulation time 
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message‖ event. The temporal delay between when the actor schedules an event and 
when it executes can be immediate (i.e. t + 0) or sometime in the future, t + ∆, where ∆ is 
a constant or generated random number based on a given statistical distribution. When 
the ―send message‖ event executes, the simulation changes the state of the message from 
―waiting‖ to ―in transit‖ and schedules a ―receive message‖ event. At some point in the 
future, the simulation engine processes the ―receive message‖ event by marking it as 
―received‖ and delivering it to the appropriate actor for further processing. The actor 
―reading‖ the message may, based on its information, schedule another event. For 
example, when the teammate receives a message from the agent to re-orient, the 
teammate schedules a ―turn‖ event. Likewise, when an enemy actor receives a message 
from the enemy commander to move to a checkpoint, the subordinate enemy actor 
schedules a ―move‖ event changing its status from stationary to moving. Note that this 
state change does not reorient or move the actor‘s scene graph object. The dynamic 
change occurs through another event that we explain next. 
To model animation, the simulation schedules a special ―update world‖ event that, 
after processing, reschedules itself for the next simulation tick so that it continuously 
processes (Buss & Sánchez, 2005). The simulation schedules this event with the lowest 
priority so that it executes only after all other events scheduled for that time have an 
opportunity to run. The basic algorithm for the update world event is the following: 
 
1. For each actor 
a. If motion status is turning or moving, update scene graph object‘s 
location and orientation based on the actor‘s movement/angular 
velocity (Newtonian physics) 
b. If one or more ―opponents‖ are visible and actor has not sent a report 
in ―awhile‖, then schedule event to send message to leader (NOTE: 
does NOT apply for the agent actor).  
c. Record status (for logging / debugging) 
2. Referee 
a. Determine what objects each actor can observe (detection algorithm) 
b. Tell each actor what they can observe  
3. Notify Simulation Clients 
a. Simulation user interface (for rendering the scene) 
b. Agent Proxy (to provide perceptual input to Soar+SVI) 
4. Schedule another update world event with the lowest priority for time t + 1 
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The update world event gives each simulation actor an opportunity to update its dynamic 
state, such as location and orientation and report status changes if it has not done so in 
awhile.
25
 The event processing then referees the current situation by determining what 
objects are visible to each actor using the following detection algorithm: 
 
The occlusion detector uses a ray-tracing algorithm and checks three different points on 
the object (top and two sides). The detection algorithm assumes the object is visible if 
two of the three points are visible (i.e. intersects the ray). Finally, the update world event 
notifies clients, such as the simulation‘s user interface and the Agent Proxy that the event 
is complete so they can process. This step is where the Soar+SVI agent receives its 
perceptual input from the Agent Proxy. 
The Agent Proxy serves as an interface between Soar+SVI and the simulation 
(Figure 7-10). After the update world event notifies the Agent Proxy that it can process 
perceptions, the proxy sends the agent its current perceptions through SVI. The 
perceptions include audio (i.e. messages), motion status, simulation time, and visual. For 
this domain, SVI has components to process the audio, motion, and time input from the 
Agent Proxy. These components simply pass the input on to Soar by creating symbolic 
structures on Soar‘s input-link.  
The visual input is a copy of the individual scene graph nodes from the World 
Representation that the detection algorithm determines the agent can observe. The Agent 
Proxy provides this list of nodes to SVI‘s Saliency Inspector. The first node in this list is 
always the ―background‖ node, which includes the terrain. As discussed in Chapter 6, the 
Saliency Inspector instantiates the structure of the current scene in VS-STM and provides 
                                                 
25
Defined as the opposing entity moving more than 500 meters from last reported location or 60 simulation 
ticks. 
1. For each actor that can ―see‖ (i.e. not buildings) 
a. Determine the objects in the actor‘s view frustum and 
sort closest to furthest 
b. For each object in view frustum 
i. If on periphery (camera plane), remove object 
ii. If a closer object in view occludes it (ray 
tracing), then remove object 
iii. If terrain occludes object (ray tracing), remove it 
c. Give actor its list of remaining visible objects. 
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the ―What‖ and ―Where‖ Inspectors this list of scene graph nodes. The ―What Inspectors‖ 
recognize the objects with a simple ―string match‖ and the ―Where Inspectors‖ build the 
internal Object Map scene graph from the provided list of nodes. For debugging 
purposes, the Refresher renders the scene graph from the agent‘s current viewpoint. The 
remaining processing proceeds as discussed in the architectural description.  
Although we do not literally model the two ―what‖ and ―where‖ control paths (see 
Figure 6-7), we do model the separation of control between cognition and perception with 
two separate threads. The Agent Proxy‘s thread processes the perceptual input, up to the 
point where SVI creates the structures in the Object Map and VS-STM (i.e. the ―what‖ 
and ―where‖ processing). Simultaneously, another processing thread is executing Soar‘s 




Recall that the visual perceptual processing in SVI automatically creates symbolic 
structures for Soar to include the recognized objects in the scene and their direction, 
distance, and relative size from the agent‘s egocentric perspective. In order to determine 
the object‘s orientation in this domain, the agent has to observe the entity move and then 
infer its orientation, or direction of travel, by taking into account its current and previous 
locations. One important point is that when the agent is looking at the scene, the scene 
graph nodes represent objects in the environment. When the agent is looking at the map, 
the terrain nodes represent the map and the salient, visual objects are the map-icons that 
the agent has previously ―written‖ on the map. In this case, rather than providing Soar the 
egocentric direction and distance of the map icons from the agent‘s eyes and then forcing 
it to ―read‖ the map to infer absolute locations, we simply provide the absolute locations 
and orientations. The agent‘s procedural knowledge must interpret the incoming direction 
and distance accordingly, based on whether it is looking at the scene or the map. 
When Soar sends commands to SVI, they may be imagery commands or 
instructions to create action in the environment. As with the extra perceptual components 
(i.e. audio, motion) in this domain, SVI also has some motor components that receive 
commands from Soar and communicate the instructions to the Agent Proxy. These motor 
commands include changing the agent‘s view from looking at the scene to looking at the 
                                                 
26
Unless running on multi-core machine, the threads are interleaved. 
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map (or vice versa), writing an object on the map, orienting in a given direction, or 
sending a message. The Agent Proxy interprets these commands and schedules the events 
through the agent‘s Simulation Actor. When the simulation processes the event, it 
produces the corresponding action in the environment by updating the internal state of the 
agent‘s Simulation Actor. The agent perceives the action‘s results via the Agent Proxy. 
Again, note that these events take time to process based on the modeling of their 
temporal constraints. Therefore, when the agent issues a command to write an object on 
the map or look at the scene, Soar will execute a few decision cycles before it perceives 
the change based on the action. This modeling produces some interesting behavior. For 
example, to write an object on the map the agent must first imagine it by constructing the 
quantitative spatial representation of the map icon. The agent can then issue a write 
command to simulate writing the icon on the external map, in effect making it persist. 
However, while writing the map-icon, the agent may be interrupted (e.g. the teammate 
sends a message), forcing it to attend to the perceptual input. Because ―important‖ 
perceptual processing inhibits imagery, the imagined map-icon ―disappears‖ before the 
agent has had an opportunity to finish writing it. The agent has to re-imagine and rewrite 
the object. The architecture‘s truth maintenance mechanisms must consider these types of 
perception and imagery interactions, for example by removing the imagined visual-object 
structure of the map-icon from Soar‘s short-term memory and removing any stale state in 
SVI referring to its visual-object. The agent‘s procedural knowledge must also wait until 
its symbolic perceptions inform it that it is perceiving, rather than imagining, the map-
icon and not assume that just because it sent the command the action occurred. 
7.4.2 Task Decomposition 
The primary goals of a scout team are to acquire and maintain visual contact with the 
approaching enemy and report all information rapidly so that the commander can make 
his assessment. After establishing visual contact, a scout‘s actions include the following 
steps (Army, 2002).  
 
(1) Deploy and report 
(2) Analyze the situation 




Analyzing the situation involves reasoning about known friendly and enemy locations 
and orientations, terrain, and obstacles. If the scout lead does not know the locations of 
all expected enemy, then he might hypothesize the location of other enemy entities and 
template their positions. Based on the analysis, the scout lead then decides if he should 
reorient himself, his teammate, or both.  
Figure 7-11 illustrates the Soar+SVI agent‘s task decomposition to perform this 
mission. The left-to-right ordering implies some task sequence although this is not a hard 
rule, as the reasoning is conditional, iterative, and sometimes interleaved. Tasks in bold, 
italic font use imagery operations to assist in the reasoning. Figure 7-11a shows the top-
level tasks. During a reconnaissance mission, the scout agent is continuously observing 
the situation, analyzing its possible courses of action, and deciding and acting on a course 
of action. Observing (Figure 7-11b) includes scanning the area attempting to establish 
visual contact with the approaching enemy. Once the agent or its teammate makes 
contact, the agent must identify whether the entity it is observing, or the teammate is 
reporting, is a new enemy or a previously identified enemy. We assume that the agent can 
distinguish between two different entities that it observes. For enemy vehicles that the 
teammate reports, however, the agent uses the quantitative spatial representation to 
determine if the distance between the reported location and a previously identified enemy 
is within a certain threshold (e.g. 150 meters). If the constraint is true, the agent assumes 
that the teammate is observing the same entity the agent is observing. After identifying 
the entity, the agent records the observation and sends a report to the commander. If the 
agent is confident in the observation it writes it on the map by first imagining the map 
icon (construct) and then issuing a ―write‖ command.  
Analyzing the situation (Figure 7-11c) begins by first determining if the agent has 
an observation for all expected enemy (i.e. three), and, if not, hypothesizing (i.e. 
template) the unknown enemy locations. The hypothesis involves retrieving semantic 
knowledge of a typical enemy reconnaissance element (e.g. three vehicles, one vehicle 
forward, two vehicles behind at a given distance and orientation) and imagining their 
locations (Figure 7-9d). The agent may also employ its knowledge of a typical enemy 
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vehicle‘s velocity to simulate movement when the last known location of an enemy is 




(a) Top-level Task (b) Observe Sub-Goal 
 
 
(c) Analyze Sub-Goal (d) Analyze-Position Sub-Goal 
Figure 7-11: Scout Domain Task Decomposition 
 
To analyze each enemy‘s avenue of approach or path, the agent must first make 
an assumption as to their next destination. An enemy can be terrain-oriented or force-
oriented. For this scenario, the agent assumes the enemy is terrain-oriented. One way the 


















































 use spatial imagery to infer the direction, orientation, and 
distance from the enemy vehicle to the key terrain. With this information, the agent may 
employ a heuristic, such as preferring the minimum distance and change in orientation, 
which forms a hypothesis as to the individual enemy‘s next destination. The agent repeats 
this reasoning for each known or hypothesized enemy. 
After hypothesizing each enemy‘s destination, the agent uses visual imagery to 
imagine known obstacle barriers and restricted or ―slow-go‖ terrain (e.g. vehicles cannot 
drive through buildings, vehicles have problems with steep terrain, enemy scouts will 
attempt to avoid open spaces, etc.). It then marks a path by transforming the visual 
depictive representation. The agent‘s knowledge provides imagery with the enemy 
vehicle (source) and key terrain (sink) visual objects, the attention window parameters, 
and the set of rules for the depictive manipulations. Imagery then performs the 
manipulations, marking the path. The general procedure is the following (Appendix B 
provides more details): 
1. Mark all known obstacles and ―slow-go‖ terrain with a color (yellow) by applying 
a set of threshold values.
28
 Mark all other pixels gray. 
2. Grow an iso-distance contour field avoiding any previously marked barriers 
(Figure 7-12a). 
3. Walk the contour field from source to sink, marking the path along the way. 
(Figure 7-12b).  
 
  
(a) Distance field 
flood 
(b) Mark Path 
Figure 7-12: Imagining an Enemy Path  
Finally, the agent analyzes its position (Figure 7-11d) by imagining its 
teammate‘s view and its own view by first constructing and generating the views. 
                                                 
27
Key terrain is any location where control by either friendly or enemy forces offers a significant advantage 
because it provides good observation of converging paths, is a logistical hub, has psychological 
implications, etc. 
28




Generation takes into account some terrain occlusions (e.g. that a hill blocks the view). 
The agent determines the amount of coverage by inspecting the Visual Buffer images for 
the size (i.e. length) of each hypothesized path that is a topological proper part of each 
view (Figure 7-13). Soar‘s procedural knowledge then estimates the amount of coverage 
a particular view has on a path by dividing the covered portion of the path by the total 
path length. If there are paths with coverage below a certain threshold (i.e. 0.25), the 
agent attempts to improve coverage by simulating reorientations of its teammate, itself, or 
both. Again, the agent uses a combination of imagery and task heuristics embedded in 
procedural knowledge to determine who to reorient, what direction to reorient them, and 
how far to simulate the orientation. To execute the simulation, the agent issues imagery 
commands to transform and regenerate the views. It then re-inspects the visual depictive 
representations in the Visual Buffer to determine the resulting coverage. Based on its 
analysis, the agent makes a decision (Figure 7-11a) and issues a motor command to 
reorient itself and/or send a message to its teammate directing it to re-orient. The agent 
starts observing the scene again and the ―observe, analyze, decide, and act‖ process 
continues. 
 
Figure 7-13: Agent Imagining Its Coverage of One Enemy‟s Hypothesized Path 
Agent also imagines coverage for other paths and its teammate‟s coverage of each path 
 
As a summary of the agent‘s analysis and subsequent decision, Figure 7-14 shows 
a trace from one of the runs. Bold font indicates our own remarks to clarify the trace. 
Note that the agent‘s reasoning is non-trivial and that its functionality and problem-
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solving quality emerges from the combination of symbolic, quantitative spatial, and 




Agent decides to see if it can obtain better coverage on path P51 by reorienting its teammate. 
 
Reinspecting path-coverage by attempting to improve Scout-2's view to cover path P51 
 
Analysis results after simulating the reorientation of its teammate and subsequent inspection of 
path coverage. Teammate can adequately cover path P51 while also improving coverage on its 
current primary path, P49. 
  
Scout-2's path analysis path: P49 cf: 0.730275 distance: 1373.78 orientation distance: 18.8389 
Scout-2's path analysis path: P51 cf: 0.313793 distance: 772.466 orientation distance: 0. 
Scout-2's path analysis path: P53 cf: 0.182153 distance: 1337.91 orientation distance: 25.5324 
Analysis results after simulating the reorientation and inspecting for path coverage. 
 
Scout-1's path analysis path: P49 cf: 0.591979 distance: 1277.63 orientation distance: 3.5553 
Scout-1's path analysis path: P51 cf: 0.340073 distance: 590.454 orientation distance: 0.0989148 
Scout-1's path analysis path: P53 cf: 0. distance: 851.323 orientation distance: 56.6101 
 
Agent sees that after simulating the reorientation it has better coverage of path P51. However, 
it decides to reject the COA because its takes it off its primary path, P53. That is, its coverage 
factor of path, P53 has dropped below 0.25 and in the previous, initial analysis,  the agent‟s 
orientation distance to path P53 is 3.6 degrees (i.e. it has to orient 3.6 degrees to be oriented 
exactly on the path‟s center) whereas Scout-2‟s orientation distance to P53 is 63.7 degrees. This 
is an indicator that Scout-1 currently has primary coverage on path P53. Note, that rejecting 
this COA does not reject the possibility of reorienting both the agent and the teammate where 
each would assume responsibility for a new primary path. 
 
Rejecting COA because takes Scout-1 off  its primary path: P53 
Results from the analysis of Scout-1‟s (Agent) and Scout-2‟s (Teammate) current path 
coverage. 
cf = coverage factor (length of path covered by view / total length of path) 
distance = distance from entity‟s location to path center in meters 
orientation distance = how far entity has to orient (in degrees) to be in line with path center 
  
Scout-1's path analysis path: P49 cf: 0. distance: 1277.63 orientation distance: 49.4096 
Scout-1's path analysis path: P51 cf: 0.0663824 distance: 590.454 orientation distance: 53.0644 
Scout-1's path analysis path: P53 cf: 0.460498 distance: 851.323 orientation distance: 3.64507 
 
Scout-2's path analysis path: P49 cf: 0.676294 distance: 1373.78 orientation distance: 19.3111 
Scout-2's path analysis path: P51 cf: 0.126035 distance: 772.466 orientation distance: 38.1506 
Scout-2's path analysis path: P53 cf: 0. distance: 1337.91 orientation distance: 63.6824  
 
Agent decides to simulate reorienting itself (Scout-1) to cover path P51. The reason it chose P51 
over P49 is because Scout-2 already has adequate coverage on path P49 
  






Figure 7-14: Execution Trace of Scout Agent‟s Analysis and Subsequent Decision 
 
At this point, the agent has four possible COA‟s  (one of which it has already rejected): 
 COA 1: Do nothing (NOT SELECTED) 
 COA 2: Reorient self  (REJECTED) 
 COA 3: Reorient both (NOT SELECTED) 
COA 4: Reorient teammate (SELECTED) 
  
Agent decides to reorient teammate to achieve better coverage on path P51. Each COA along 
with its advantages follows. Note that even though COA 3 has a better cumulative total 
coverage, the agent does not select it as it leaves path P53 with less than 25 percent coverage. 
Coverage factors shown here represent a cumulative total for each path. Possible COA 
advantages are: 
  
better-path-coverage: overall (total) path coverage is better than current 
 maximum-coverage-on-different-paths: Agent‟s and teammate‟s maximum coverage 
are on different paths (i.e. they are not focusing on the same path). 
 all-paths-<twenty-five or fifty or seventy-five>-percent-covered: each path has at least 
the corresponding percentage of coverage 
  
COA 1: Do nothing (NOT SELECTED) 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 0.676294 for path P49 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 0.192417 for path P51 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 0.460498 for path P53 
Non-selected COA total coverage factor: 1.329209 
Non-selected COA advantage: maximum-coverage-on-different-paths 
 
COA 2: Reorient self (REJECTED) 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 1.26827 for path P49 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 0.466108 for path P51 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 0. for path P53 
Non-selected COA total coverage factor:  1.734378 
Non-selected COA advantage: better-path-coverage 
 
COA 3: Reorient Both (NOT SELECTED) 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 1.32225 for path P49 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 0.653867 for path P51 
Non-selected COA coverage factor: 0.182153 for path P53 
Non-selected COA total coverage factor:  2.15827 
Non-selected COA advantage: better-path-coverage 
 
COA 4: Reorient Teammate (SELECTED) 
Selected COA coverage factor: 0.730275 for path P49 
Selected COA coverage factor: 0.380175 for path P51 
Selected COA coverage factor: 0.642651 for path P53 
Selected COA total coverage factor:  1.753101 
Selected COA advantage: all-paths-twenty-five-percent-covered 
Selected COA advantage: maximum-coverage-on-different-paths 
Selected COA advantage: better-path-coverage 
COA chosen re-orienting teammate to 101.229 degrees 
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7.4.3 Computational Advantage 
One of our computational constraints is for a component to process its representation 
efficiently, yet remain task independent. As we discovered from the Geometry and 
Alphabet experiments, achieving this balance is not always clear. We had to consider 
similar tradeoffs in the Scout domain as we expanded the architecture to include 
transformations of the visual depictive representation using pixel-level rewrites. The new 
component, the VBManipulator, proves useful in determining the enemy‘s hypothesized 
paths as the visual depictive representation takes into account the specific shape of the 
terrain and obstacles. Alternative approaches (shown in the next section) that do not 
consider the specific shape have a lower problem-solving quality, as they do not provide 
as much accuracy.  
In order to incorporate the depictive manipulations, we had to consider not only 
the efficiency of the processing to insure it gave the resulting architecture a 
computational advantage, but also the demarcation between the knowledge and 
architecture. The architectural description in Chapter 6 (specifically 6.2.2.2.4) and the 
more detailed description of the depictive manipulations in Appendix B describe the 
tradeoffs we considered in achieving efficiency (e.g., minimization of the image size 
through an attention window). In our analysis of the separation between knowledge and 
architecture, we considered and compared three alternatives (Figure 7-15). 
Recall that a pixel-level rewrite system includes a shared image, a set of depictive 
rules, and processes to interpret the rules and manipulate the image. Clearly, the image 
structure and processing to modify the image belong in SVI‘s architecture, but where do 
the rules, which contain both procedural (i.e. topological structure of each manipulation) 
and declarative knowledge (i.e. color of pixels to match) reside? One alternative is to 
create a task specific component including both the procedural and task knowledge 
(obstacles, slow-go terrain, distance field colors, etc.) in the architecture. This approach is 
computationally efficient and serves as a baseline measure but if the task changes the 
architecture must change. A second design choice maintains all knowledge and the 
majority of processing in Soar where the pixel-rewrite rules are encoded as Soar 
productions. Each decision cycle SVI‘s VBManipulator sends Soar the current set of 
pixel values. The pixel rewrite rules in Soar determine the current match set and send the 
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results to the VBManipulator for updating the image. An intermediate solution stores the 
depictive manipulations (i.e. the pixel-level rewrite rules) in Soar. Soar transmits the 
appropriate task-specific manipulations to the VBManipulator for processing. 
Figure 7-15 illustrates the amount of processing time (log scale) required by each 
of the alternatives where each implementation executes a distance field flood on a 16x16 
pixel image. As shown on the left of Figure 7-15, the first, task specific/representation 
specific implementation is very efficient compared to our other alternatives. Maintaining 
the majority of computations within the symbolic processor, as shown on the right of 
Figure 7-15, is two-three orders of a magnitude slower than the alternatives. The reason, 
similar to the issue with angles in the Geometry problem, is that there are too many 
alternatives for Soar‘s rule matcher to consider efficiently when the fringe layer in the 
distance field has several matches. Depictive processing that iterates over the image 
handles these fringe layers in a much more efficient manner as it is only considering the 
local (e.g. 3x3) topological structure at any one instance. The intermediate approach 
provides efficient execution (middle of Figure 7-15) coupled with flexibility to change 
task-specific manipulations dynamically. It also provides high-level control so that if 
―important‖ perceptual input interrupts imagery processing, the architecture can respond 
accordingly. 
 




A final alternative, evaluated subjectively, involves encoding the declarative 
knowledge in Soar (i.e. the color of the pixels to match), while keeping the procedural 
knowledge of the rules (i.e. rules for creating distance field flood, rules for marking path) 
embedded in the architecture. Again, as with the first task specific/representation specific 
design, we expect to have slightly better efficiency compared with the intermediate 
solution. However, this requires either knowing a priori every required manipulation that 
we desire the architecture to process or changing the architecture for every task--
defeating the purpose of having a general, purpose architecture. This design choice is 
more appropriate for manipulations that support the detection of low-level, primitive 
visual features (e.g. enclosed spaces). 
To evaluate the responsiveness of the architecture, as in the Geometry and 
Alphabet experiments, we compare the hypothesized human decision cycle time of 50 
milliseconds to the normalized amount of time for each imagery operation. To review, 
the average time of a single imagery operation is calculated as follows. First, the average 
decision cycle time is computed from Soar‘s total CPU time divided by the total number 
of decision cycles. The average amount of time spent in SVI per imagery operation 
(Construct, Transform Object Map, Transform Visual Buffer, Inspect) is normalized to 
the hypothesized decision cycle time where normalized time = (average-real-time-in-
SVI-per-imagery-operation x 50) / average-decision-cycle-time.  
Figure 7-16 illustrates the response times ordered left to right with the most 
responsive operation (Inspect) on the left and the least responsive (Transform Visual 
Buffer) on the right. The line represents the hypothesized human decision cycle time (log 
50 ~ 1.7). Spatial imagery operations (Construct and Transform Object Map) are 2-3 
orders of a magnitude faster, and appear more responsive, than visual imagery operations 
(Generate and Transform Visual Buffer). This result is consistent with our results from 
the Geometry and Alphabet experiments. The inspection processing includes inspections 
of both the quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations. Since in this domain, 
these inspection processes involved relatively few calculations (e.g. direction, distance, 
and orientation between object; size of path), it was very responsive.  
As we previously articulated, the higher response times for visual imagery 
operations may partially be due to our assumption that low-level visual processing 
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exploits parallelism, possibly requiring special hardware that we do not reflect in the 
architecture. For example, a reason for the reflected time to generate a visual depictive 
representation (~4 ms real CPU time) is that the operation includes the time to copy the 
rasterized image pixels from the graphical processing unit‘s memory to main memory. 
We assume that specialized hardware support would achieve a significant speed up. Even 
though the manipulation of the visual depictive representation (Transform Visual Buffer) 
is roughly an order of three magnitudes more efficient when compared to processing the 
representation with symbolic computations (Figure 7-15), it is not as responsive to the 
environment as we would like (right column of Figure 7-16). Note that one visual 
imagery operation (Transform Visual Buffer) includes the execution of many pixel 
rewrite rules (e.g. the rules to create the distance field flood in one attention window is 
counted as one imagery operation as its execution is within one Soar decision cycle).  
 
Figure 7-16: Time Required for an Imagery Operation in the Scout Domain  
Time reflects an average of an imagery operation normalized to the decision cycle time (50 ms). 
 
As with detecting curves and enclosed spaces, it may be that the system is 
attempting to process too much in one decision cycle. Limiting the processing to a 
64x64-attention window did achieve significant speedup (~250 ms real CPU time) and 
appeared ―adequate‖ for this domain. There are also much more efficient pixel-rewrite 
algorithms (Furnas & Qu, 2002), but their implementation is rather complex and not the 
main thrust of this research. Increasing the efficiency of the depictive manipulations 









may be simply that visual imagery take longer to process, suggesting that given a choice, 
humans tend to use spatial imagery in situations where speed is more important than 
accuracy.  
7.4.4 Functional Capability and Problem-Solving Quality 
Although reasoning using visual depictive manipulations is not as responsive when 
compared to the other imagery processes, its advantage is that it provides the architecture 
with functional capability that the system cannot achieve without it. These manipulations 
enable the architecture to support reasoning when there are arbitrary shapes involved (e.g. 
finding paths through undulating terrain, determining the intersection between the view 
and the winding path). Spatial imagery, using quantitative spatial representations, would 
require converting the shapes to convex polygons resulting in a loss of accuracy. Better 
accuracy results in better problem-solving quality.  
To evaluate problem-solving quality, we created three agents modeling the lead 
scout. The first agent (Soar+SVI) uses spatial and visual imagery to observe, analyze, and 
decide on a course of action. The second agent (Soar-SVI) uses the same task 
decomposition (Figure 7-11) but uses strictly symbolic and quantitative representations 
and processing in Soar. For example, it imagines the enemy‘s paths as straight lines and 
the views as a triangle without taking terrain or known obstacles into account. Path 
coverage is determined using basic trigonometry. This is a fair comparison because as 
just discussed, providing the Soar-SVI agent with all known obstacles to include the no-
go terrain would slow its processing significantly (see right hand column Figure 7-15), 
causing it to miss observations. The third agent (Observer) and its teammate simply 
observe the area to their front and send reports to their commander without any re-
positioning (i.e. it only executes the Observe sub task in Figure 7-11).  
To evaluate the generality of the system, we evaluate the same agents in two 
different scenarios. Figure 7-9 shows the first scenario. We will describe the second 
scenario shortly. In general, Enemy Scout-1 and Enemy Scout-2 maneuver in the general 
direction as shown in their initial configuration, but there is some variability in the paths 
they choose. For example, in Figure 7-9 Enemy Scout-2 may initially maneuver in a 
southeasterly direction and then make a sweeping maneuver to the south or west. Enemy 
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Scout-3 randomly decides to follow Enemy Scout-1 or Enemy Scout-2, typically at a 
distance ranging from 500 to 1000 meters. There are times, however, when it closes that 
gap to 50-100 meters. 
We have two evaluation metrics for problem-solving quality. The first is the 
cumulative amount of information the commander receives on the enemy‘s location over 
time (Figure 7-17). The second metric is the number of reported observations of each 
enemy entity (Figure 7-18). Both results reflect the average over 30 trials. In Figure 7-17, 
the x-axis is the current simulation time, and the y-axis measures the amount of 
information per unit time with 1.0 being perfect information and –1.0 indicating no 
information. The measure of information is an average over all three enemy entities at 
simulation time, t, calculated for each enemy as follows: 
𝐼𝑡 =  
−1 𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
1 −  𝛿 𝑜𝑡𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒    
  
where: 
𝛿 =    𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑥 −  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑥 2 +  𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑦 − 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑦 
2
𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  
(obsx,obsy) is the reported location of an entity at time, t and 
(actx,acty) is the actual location of an entity at time, t 
𝑑𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝑡𝑕𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑠𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =   𝑑𝑥2 + 𝑑𝑥2   
𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑥 =  𝑑𝑦 = 500 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
The agent receives a positive score for a given enemy if at simulation time, t, the 
commander‘s knowledge of the particular enemy‘s location is within a 500 x 500 meter 
square of the enemy‘s actual location at that time. Otherwise, the information score is 
negative for that time with a minimum score of -1.0. Note that by assigning a -1.0 to 
unobserved entities effectively ―punishes‖ the scout team.  
The ―Tracker‖ in Figure 7-17 illustrates the amount of information a scout team 
would provide if each scout observed one enemy vehicle each at the beginning of the 
simulation and then ―tracked‖ that entity to the conclusion of the simulation. Assuming 
no terrain occlusions, instantaneous message passing, and the third enemy not in vicinity 
of the tracked entities, the ―Tracker‖ would receive an information score of (1.0 + 1.0 - 
1.0) / 3 = 0.33 for each time unit.  
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The results show that the Soar+SVI agent provides more information upon initial 
visual contact (the slope in Figure 7-17 is steeper) and over a sustained period. 
Furthermore, on average, it sends more observation reports to the commander, indicating 
that the team has detected the enemy more frequently and that the overall architecture 
continues to be responsive as the agent is able to perform other functions (observe, 
report) in addition to imagery (Figure 7-18). The reason the Soar+SVI agent is able to 
reposition its team more effectively is that its analysis is more accurate. The Soar-SVI 
agent often under or overestimates the required adjustments resulting in the scout team 
missing critical observations. 
 
 




Figure 7-18: Number of Cumulative Observations (Scenario-1) 
 
The purpose of the second scenario is to demonstrate the generality of the 
architecture and evaluate our hypothesis that the Soar+SVI agent analyzes the situation 
more accurately and thus, makes better decisions on where to orient its team. The second 
scenario uses the same terrain as in the first scenario, but the enemy‘s direction of attack 
is in the opposite direction and there are several buildings in the western sector that 
provide excellent coverage for the enemy scouts‘ movement (Figure 7-19a). The purpose 
of these reinforcing obstacles is to force the enemy to turn west before it can continue its 
movement north and determine if this sharp turn influences the agent‘s analysis.  
In this scenario, Enemy Scout-2 initially maneuvers north/northwest and 
establishes visual contact with Scout-2 (Figure 7-19a&b). Once it makes contact, Enemy 
Scout-2 signals to Enemy Scout-1 to begin movement in a northwest direction. Enemy 
Scout-1 takes advantage of the buildings and terrain to remain concealed as much as 
possible from Scout-1‘s observation during a majority of the simulation (Figure 7-19c). 
Enemy Scout-3 randomly decides to follow Enemy Scout-1 or Enemy Scout-2. Note that 
in this maneuver the Soar+SVI and Soar-SVI agents begin with the same information as 
both establish visual contact with Enemy Scout-2 at approximately the same time (again, 
with some simulation variability). However, our hypothesis is that the Soar+SVI agent 
will perform a more accurate analysis taking into account the terrain and the building 






(a) Actual Situation (b) Teammate‟s View 
 
 
(c) Agent‟s View (d) Agent‟s Perceived Map / Imagined Situation 
Figure 7-19: Scout Domain (Scenario-2) 
 
Figure 7-20 through Figure 7-23 illustrate the outcome. Figure 7-20 shows the 
cumulative information the agent provides to its commander over time. Initially, 
Soar+SVI and Soar-SVI provide similar amounts of information to the commander but at 
approximately simulation time 280, the Soar+SVI agent begins observing enemy 
movement again while the Soar-SVI agent, on average, does not. As Figure 7-20 shows 
cumulative information, to include Enemy Scout-2 which tends to cancel out the effects 
of observing the other two enemy scouts, Figure 7-21 and Figure 7-22 show the 
information that Soar+SVI and Soar-SVI agents provide on Enemy Scout-1 and Enemy 
Scout-3  respectively from simulation time 280 to 350. The results are more obvious for 
Enemy Scout-1 as Enemy Scout-3 sometimes follows Enemy Scout-2. 
Why is there such a difference in the amount of information and number of 
observations? Figure 7-24 shows that visual imagery, and specifically visual depictive 
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manipulations, provides a more accurate representation of the enemy‘s hypothesized 
path. Using this information together with the generated view frustum that takes into 
account some terrain occlusions, the resulting analysis provides the Soar+SVI agent more 
accurate information to base its assessment. 
 
Figure 7-20: Measure of Information over Time (Scenario-2) 
 
 
Figure 7-21: Measure of Information on Enemy Scout-1 over Time (Scenario-2) 
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Figure 7-24: Two Example Paths Imagined During Scenario-2 
The straight line reflects a quantitative spatial representation of the same path 
 
The gain in computational efficiency in processing the perceptual representations, 
functional capability, and problem-solving quality does not come without a cost. The 
resulting architecture is more complex and requires truth maintenance mechanisms to 
maintain consistency between the components when the agent stops imagining, either 
deliberately or because a more important perception interrupts it. Unlike the initial task 
knowledge of the geometry problem where the agent uses imagery for internal problem 
solving, Figure 7-25 suggests that because of the interaction with perceptual processing, 
additional task knowledge is required. Figure 7-25 shows the number of productions the 
Soar+SVI and Soar-SVI agents have in the Scout domain to include the ―architectural‖ 
visual processing and imagery productions. Although the basic task knowledge (i.e. 
Observe, Decide, Act) is the same between the agents, the Soar+SVI agent requires more 
task productions because of its ability to perform analysis using imagery. This analysis 
includes adding and moving imagined objects, encoding depictive manipulations, and 
writing objects on the map—tasks that the Soar-SVI agent does not perform. The tradeoff 
then is that there is less task knowledge to perform ―internal‖ cognitive tasks but more 









Figure 7-25: Number of Productions in the Scout Domain 
 
7.4.5 Scout Domain Assessment 
The Soar+SVI agent, by combining the symbolic, quantitative spatial, and visual 
depictive representations and then reasoning with them, can paint a relatively accurate 
picture of the situation for its commander sooner and for a longer sustained period of 
time than its counterpart Soar-SVI agent. Visual imagery enables it to provide a better, 
more fine-grained assessment than if it relied solely on spatial imagery. Furthermore, due 
to the number of observation reports, the results show that it is still able to perform other 
cognitive functions (receive and send reports, perceive the environment), demonstrating 
that the imagery system is working in conjunction with the complete cognitive system. 
Although SVI‘s depictive manipulations are not as responsive as we would like, they 
provide a significant computational advantage when compared to processing the 
representation with sentential algorithms and much more generality than a task specific 
implementation. 
7.5 Lessons Learned 
The evaluation demonstrates that the power of incorporating spatial and visual imagery 
mechanisms in a cognitive architecture emerges from the ability to combine their 
representations and reason with them. The experiments highlight tasks where spatial and 
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visual imagery fills in a missing details of a situation, recognizes novel shapes if not 
present visually, and assists an agent analyzing its actions before deciding and acting on 
them. As the results show, imagery is useful for inferring spatial relationships where 
metric information facilitates the reasoning between two or more objects (e.g. ―sense of 
direction,‖ orientation between the enemy and relevant key terrain) or detecting an 
object‘s spatial or visual properties (e.g. curves, enclosed spaces, path size, view 
coverage). In tasks where there are more than a few types of spatial properties or where 
visual features are not explicitly encoded, imagery provides an advantage from a 
computational, functional, and problem-solving standpoint. However, the advantages 
come at a cost to include architectural complexity and challenges in incorporating low-
level components where the separation between knowledge and architecture is not always 
clear.  
As we discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2), each representation offers a 
functional and computational tradeoff. The Alphabet experiment and Scout domain 
highlight both these tradeoffs as visual imagery processing offers a functional advantage 
for reasoning about specific shapes but is less responsive than spatial imagery processing, 
suggesting that it requires greater capacity. Perhaps humans, when given a choice, tend to 
use spatial imagery in situations where speed is important. Maybe this observation is 












Our research presents a synthesis of spatial and visual imagery, visual perception, and 
cognition. We demonstrate that it is computationally feasible to extend a general 
cognitive architecture with comprehensive mechanisms to support spatial and visual 
imagery processing to include quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations; 
shared mechanisms with vision; and incorporation of imagery‘s primary functions. Our 
empirical results and subjective assessment assert that for demanding spatial and visual 
tasks, the resulting architecture provides a computational gain and additional capability 
without trading off generality. As a summary of our work, this chapter reviews our major 
contributions, presents possible directions for future work, and concludes. 
8.1 Research Contributions  
The following list summarizes our major research contributions: 
 
 Integration of spatial and visual imagery‟s functional constraints 
(construction, transformation, generation, and inspection) in an implemented 
cognitive architecture (Chapters 3, 6, 7). We seriously consider the underlying 
behavioral and biological constraints in the design of the system. However, the 
integration focuses on functionality. We describe the representations and 
processes that are architectural and define the knowledge that is necessary to 
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create these representations and control the processing (e.g. visual object 
representations in VLTM, VS-STM, local spatial relationships in symbolic STM, 
a set of spatial and visual primitives, operators to control the high-level 
processing). As evidenced by the experimental results, we demonstrate these 
functions and their advantages in a working system.  
 
 Inclusion of a visual depictive representation and associated processing 
(Chapter 6, 7). An explicit mechanism for encoding and using the visual 
depictive representation is a major distinction between this work and other 
proposals. We demonstrate how the visual depictive representation provides the 
architecture with additional capability for recognizing visual features and spatial 
properties involving specific shapes. Furthermore, we show how it improves 
problem-solving quality when there is sufficient time for reasoning. 
 
 General mechanisms to support efficient processing of the quantitative 
spatial and visual depictive representation (Chapters 6, 7). Specialized 
processing is associated with each representation to gain efficiency. The inclusion 
of specific spatial and visual primitives facilitates communication between the 
processes in a general manner. We describe the challenges associated with 
achieving this generality and articulate the difficulties of determining how an 
agent (or human) decides when to use the appropriate representation. We suggest 
that functional capability, time, and desired accuracy are factors in this decision. 
 
 Description of the types of tasks where imagery provides a computational 
gain, additional functionality, or improved problem-solving quality 
(Chapters 2, 5, and 7). We describe and demonstrate several tasks where 
imagery processing is useful for reasoning because the task has many types or 
numbers of spatial or visual properties. These properties include direction, 
distance, orientation, size, topology, geometry, shape, and color. We suggest there 
are four general tasks where using imagery is useful to infer spatial and visual 




 Filling in missing details of a situation 
 Recognizing novel shapes and spatial properties if not present visually 
 Analyzing or rehearsing the outcome of an action before executing the 
action 
 Replay of a previous event to inform a future decision 
 
 An initial computational theory describing the functional integration of 
visual perception with spatial and visual imagery (Chapter 3, 5, 6). We 
provide a computational theory of how imagery leverages the mechanisms 
provided by higher-level vision to facilitate its processing. Our theory includes the 
shared memories and processes between the two systems along with how bottom-
up visual processing and top-down imagery processes coexist and mutually 
support one another. 
 
 Software engineering tools to support the evaluation and debugging of 
imagery components (Chapter 7, Appendix C). We built two tools to support 
the design, testing, and evaluation of the architecture. First, we integrate an SVI 
module with the SoarJavaDebugger (Figure C-6) to support viewing the contents 
in Visual LTM, the Object Map, and the Visual Buffer. Second, the simulation 
provides an initial attempt at defining an interface between an agent using 
Soar+SVI and an external environment.  
8.2 Future Work 
Based on our lessons learned from our evaluation (see section 7.5), we propose four 
possible directions for future work. There is some overlap between the research 
directions. We will explain each in more detail below. 
 




2) Push up. Explore the integration of spatial and visual imagery with Soar‘s 
declarative long-term memories (episodic and semantic). 
3) Push out. Expand the capability of the current system by improving current 
functionality and expanding to other types of imagery processing such as motor 
imagery.  
4) Push in. Build detailed cognitive models and compare to human data. 
 
The first research direction is to expand our current perceptual theory by pushing 
the architecture closer to sensory input. One domain we would like to explore in more 
depth is robotics and specifically how cognitive processing, to include spatial and visual 
imagery, can provide a robot with higher-level reasoning abilities. Paramount in this 
exploration is an understanding of how our theory of perceptual processing would 
incorporate typical robotic sensors (e.g. light detection and ranging, stereoscopic video 
images, global position system, etc.) and how imagery may prime robotic effectors 
(motor imagery). Kuipers (2000) spatial semantic hierarchy, Yeap‘s and Jefferies‘ (1999) 
absolute space representation, and Ullman‘s (1996) object recognition schemes provide 
some insights here.  
This research direction could also consider the role of imagery in top-down visual 
perception. For example, imagery may support the recognition of an object when bottom-
up visual perception initially fails to recognize the object but suggests possible candidate 
objects (i.e. partial matches). Top-down visual processing using imagery may generate a 
visual depiction of each candidate object transformed from their stored, canonical 
orientation to an orientation congruent with the unrecognized object. The architecture 
attempts to recognize the perceived object by comparing its extracted visual features with 
the features extracted from the visual depiction of the imagined, transformed object. 
Relevant research questions include how many candidate objects to consider and how to 
determine when the transformed imagined object is ―congruent‖ with the orientation of 
the unrecognized object. 
Imagery processing may also support object permanence. Object permanence is 
the memory of a visible object that disappears (through motion) behind another object. 
The architecture may realize such behavior by maintaining the object‘s quantitative 
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spatial representation for some time after it visually disappears from the perceived scene. 
If the object was in motion the architecture combined with knowledge about the object‘s 
motion model (discussed below), may simulate object movement until it reappears from 
behind the occluding object or decays from memory. An important research question to 
address is how long the object should persist after it disappears from the scene.  
The second approach is to explore how imagery integrates and interacts with 
episodic and semantic memories. As an agent has experiences, episodic learning may 
store certain aspects of the experience, including perceptions, internal state, and resulting 
action, as structures in memory. These structures may include symbolic, quantitative 
spatial and, possibly, a few specific visual depictive representations. At some time in the 
future when the agent recalls the experience to inform a decision, it may use imagery 
processing to replay the experience and infer spatial and visual properties that perhaps it 
did not explicitly encode or use as part of its original decision-making. This imagery 
replay capability also presents an opportunity for ―offline‖ learning as the agent can 
reason about new spatial and visual properties that it did not attend to during the actual 
situation (e.g. Alice was seated to the left of Bob at the party last night). 
Semantic memory stores knowledge that is more general rather than specific 
instances. In the context of imagery, this memory is useful for encoding the local spatial 
and visual properties that imagery uses to construct the scene. For example, the fact that a 
place setting has a fork, plate, knife, etc., and that the knife is right of the plate or that the 
enemy typically configures itself in a particular formation (i.e. doctrine) are examples of 
semantic memories. Note that imagery can help keep the encoding of semantic or 
episodic memories compact, as only the local spatial relationships between the objects 
and their explicit visual properties need to be stored. Reconstructing the situation with 
imagery enables the inference of global spatial relationships and visual properties not 
explicitly encoded. 
Together imagery and these long-term declarative memory mechanisms have 
potential to lead to more informed reasoning. For example, in the Scout domain, an agent 
may initially construct the imagined parts of its scene from its semantic knowledge of the 
enemy and the terrain. As the agent acquires more experiences, it may adjust its 
templates. The enemy may change the spatial characteristics (distances, directions, and 
 
 140 
orientations) of their tactics or maneuver through an area the agent previously thought 
was impassable. With these experiences, the agent may then construct and analyze its 
imagined scene using the adjusted templates from its episodic memory. 
The third research direction involves extending our current work by improving 
the communication primitives and algorithms for spatial and visual properties, refining 
our notion of the Visual Buffer‘s attention window, and using motion models in addition 
to one-step transformations to simulate movement. We have designed the system to 
incorporate the basic spatial and visual properties listed in Figure 6-9 thru Figure 6-11. 
Although we offer a small contribution in this work with this list of properties, there does 
not appear to be a cohesive theory detailing the spatial and visual primitives that humans 
use in reasoning. There are researchers (Biederman, 1987; Cohn et al., 1997) who offer 
theories for a specific spatial or visual property type. However, without a coherent theory 
there remain challenges in designing a general-purpose architecture because, as we have 
discussed, the interpretation of these properties tend to constrain each other (e.g., 
constructing a topological relationship between two objects requires knowledge about 
their specific shape and orientation, symmetry may or may not be a primitive feature, 
etc.).  
Related to this issue are the factors an agent uses to determine the representation 
to use for reasoning. The factors we suggest are the following: 
1) Functional capability. I am detecting curves so I have to use visual imagery. 
2) Speed/Accuracy tradeoff. If both representations provide a result but one is 
more accurate and I have time, then use the visual representation. 
3) Number and types of spatial and visual properties. The greater the number and 
types, the more likely reasoning requires a visual depictive representation. 
A future research effort then is to continue to review the literature in an effort to refine 
and improve these low-level primitives and investigate how learning mechanisms may 
use the factors, such as what we suggest above, to assist in choosing the appropriate 
representation.  
The attention window proves useful in improving the efficiency of the depictive 
manipulations. However, its design is brittle as it has a fixed size and shifts only in a 
linear direction based on procedural knowledge. A more flexible approach is to allow the 
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attention window to ―grow‖/―shrink‖ and also shift based on a visual cue (i.e. shift to the 
red object). For example, in the Scout domain if the terrain is very restrictive, it will 
impede the distance field flood. An architectural mechanism could possibly detect this 
―impasse‖ and either inform cognition or automatically expand or shift the attention 
window so that processing can continue. The major research questions for this direction 
is how does the architecture detect and signal this type of ―impasse‖ and how does the 
resize and/or shift occur-- automatically or deliberately through procedural knowledge? 
One interesting phenomenon in humans is their use of motor imagery to rehearse 
potential actions. Such a priming of the motor system, rather than executing a one-step 
transformation, appear to take into account factors such as force and torque using motion 
models of the particular subsystem (Grush, 2004). The use of motion models for 
simulating the motion of other objects, such as the trajectory of a thrown baseball or the 
movement of a vehicle is also applicable here. Note that these motion models may be in 
the form of a quantitative, dynamical system or a set of depictive manipulations. In these 
types of transformations, time is a key parameter, as the architectural processing must 
know how long to run the simulation. A few of the major issues for the incorporation of 
motor imagery and, specifically motion models, is to determine what memory structure(s) 
store these models, how they originate and dynamically adjust, the granularity of time in 
simulating the model, and insuring that the simulation of the model is not an 
unconstrained computation. Wintermute and Laird have begun to investigate these issues 
(2008). 
The final research direction is to explore detailed cognitive models and attempt to 
match human data. As we previously alluded to in the Alphabet Experiment, modeling 
the details of low-level perceptual processing dominates this goal and thus relates back to 
our first research direction of attempting to push the architecture closer to sensory input. 
However, it also relates to our other research directions, as there are some higher-level 
issues to address such as continuing to flush out the spatial and visual primitives to refine 
what knowledge should be ―hardwired‖ into the architecture rather than being encoded in 
a declarative or procedural memory.  
One of our specific ideas for this research path is to run an experiment with 
human subjects performing the same task as the agent in the Scout domain. During the 
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experiment, we would capture fMRI and eye-tracking data, measure response times for 
major decisions (i.e. when the subject decides on a course of action), and conduct post-
experiment interviews in an effort to understand how the individual solved the problem. 
Assuming this dataset provides us with enough evidence that some form of imagery is 
being used (e.g. parietal or visual cortex activation, subject says they ―imagined‖ the 
situation), we could then start building models and try to match the human data in this 
domain. 
8.3 Conclusion 
Past research in cognitive architectures has primarily taken the stance that amodal, 
symbolic representations are sufficient for thought. This research expands this notion by 
beginning to link perceptual-based representations with cognition. This union provides 
functional and computational advantages for reasoning about spatial and visual 
properties. The new capabilities of the resulting architecture that includes both Soar and 
its Spatial-Visual Imagery (SVI) component emerges from its ability to combine multiple 
representations and reason with them. Soar‘s symbolic memories and processes provide 
the building blocks necessary for high-level control in the pursuit of goals, learning, and 
the encoding of amodal, symbolic knowledge sufficient for general, abstract reasoning. 
SVI encompasses the quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations and 
processing specialized for efficient construction and extraction of spatial properties and 
visual features not encoded as symbols. Together these mechanisms are necessary if we 






































While modeling human performance on these tasks is not a goal of this research, the 
following experiments
29
 motivated our theory, design space constraints, resulting 
architecture, and evaluation domains. Each experimental description includes the 
reference, the described imagery functionality (construction, transformation, generation, 
inspection), its task type (spatial or visual imagery), a summary of the experiment, the 
relevant results, and a short discussion.  
A.1 Image Units and Relations 
a. Reference. (Kosslyn et al., 1983). 
b. Functionality. Construction, Generation, Inspection. 
c. Task Type. Visual. 
d. Summary. The experimenters gave the subjects specific instructions on how to 
encode geometric objects (Figure A-1) using either coarse or fine object parts (see 
figure for definition of object parts) and their spatial relationships. After the 
subjects indicated that they had visualized the image (by pushing a button), they 
were probed for a specific feature. For example, in the first figure they might be 
asked if they see a ―bow,‖ a ―cross,‖ or whether the object is symmetrical about 
                                                 
29
The ―island scan‖ experiment discussed in Chapter 2 is another experiment that influenced our theory. 
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the vertical axis. The experimenters recorded the time to visualize the image and 
response to the probes. 
 
 
Figure A-1: Stimulus Patterns 
(1) 2 triangles, 1 square vs. 4 triangles, 4 squares; (2) 1 triangle, 1 square vs. 2 rectangles, 3 triangles; 
(3) 1 hexagon, 2 triangles vs. 2 diamonds, 4 triangles; (4) 2 triangles, 1 square vs. 6 triangles; (5) 2 
triangles vs. 4 triangles, 1 diamond; (6) 2 rectangles vs. 5 squares; (7)  2 squares vs. 2 L‟s, 1 square; 
(8) 1 square, 1 parallelogram vs. 3 triangles; (9) 2 triangles vs. 4 triangles; (10) 2 L‟s vs. 2 rectangles, 
1 square. 
 
e. Results. Subjects who encoded the figures with more parts took more time to 
generate their visual images of the shape. Subjects required less time to see a 
pattern in the image when the feature was congruent with the original description. 
The authors concluded that (1) people construct visual images by amalgamating 
an object‘s parts. The addition of each part to the image requires time. (2) In 
addition to metric shape information, people use descriptive (symbolic) 
information in constructing images; and (3) the ease of visualizing and inspecting 
an object depends on how many parts composes it and its symbolic description. 
f. Discussion. This experiment corroborates the theory that images are constructed 
incrementally by adding parts. It also highlights that the descriptive or symbolic 
representation is dependent on how one originally encodes the object. The 
symbolic description of the object, or its super ordinate category, will not include 
all of the object‘s spatial and visual properties such as whether it has an enclosed 
space or contains four squares. Thus, there is the necessity to visualize and inspect 
the object when attempting to recall these properties. The second capability that 
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this experiment demonstrates is extracting emergent objects (bow, cross) or 
features (symmetry) by composing known objects in novel ways.  
A.2 Detecting Implicit Object Features 
a. Reference. (Thompson et al., in press). 
b. Functionality. Generation, Inspection. 
c. Task Type. Visual. 
d. Summary. The researchers‘ purpose was to gather evidence for the depictive 
nature of representations during visual imagery and compare the underlying 
mechanisms used to those used in visual perception. For both the visual perceptual 
and visual imagery trials, they compared the ease of judging shape properties for 
uppercase letters of the English alphabet. Some of the shape features were 
propositionally explicit (and thus, immediately accessible to the verbal system) while 
others were properties that the subject had to infer because they were not explicitly 
encoded (i.e. in a symbolic representation). Their hypothesis was that that the 
mechanisms enabling visual imagery are similar to visual perception. 
The researchers first determined what features of an uppercase letter are 
explicit by having a group of participants classify each visual appearance of each 
letter and describe its shape properties as though they were talking to a blind person 
who someday may be able to see the letter. For example, the letter ‗A‘ may have been 
described as one diagonal line slanted to the left, connected at the top to one diagonal 
line slanted to the right, with one horizontal line centered between the two diagonal 
lines. The researchers considered the feature explicit if the subjects mentioned it more 
than 50 percent of the time and not explicit if it was mentioned less than 5 percent of 
the time. They discarded features mentioned between 5-50 percent of the time. The 
most represented explicit features mentioned were ―line,‖ ―diagonal line,‖ ―curve,‖ 
and ―semi-circle.‖ The features deemed not explicit (mentioned less than 5 percent) 
were ―enclosed space‖ and ―symmetrical.‖ 
Next, the researchers split a different set of subjects into two groups:  a 
perception group and a visual imagery group. The task for each group was similar 
(Figure A-2). Each group first heard a letter. Then the participants would either see 
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the letter on a display (visual perception) or visualize (imagery) the letter based on the 
previous instruction. Next, the participants heard the feature to evaluate (e.g. 
―enclosed space,‖ ―curve,‖ ―diagonal line,‖ ―vertical symmetry,‖ ―horizontal 
symmetry‖)  and responded by pressing a ―yes‖ or ―no‖ key as quickly as possible. 
The experimenters measured the subjects‘ response times (RT) and error rates.  
 
 
Figure A-2: Trial Format for Detecting Alphabet Letter Features 
 
e. Results. There was no interaction between the visual mode (perception, imagery) 
and method of encoding indicating that visual perception and visual imagery rely on 
the same mechanisms. Additionally, explicitly encoded features (i.e. curves and 
diagonal lines) required less response time than implicitly encoded features 
(symmetry and enclosed spaces) for both visual perception and visual imagery. The 
―symmetry‖ features also produced the largest error rate. 
f. Discussion. This experiment was the basis for one of our evaluations. What it 
demonstrates is that visual perception and visual imagery share similar mechanisms 
and that there are some object features humans do not explicitly encode as a 
descriptive, symbolic representation. Therefore, it highlights the visual imagery 
capability of being able to reacquire these features.   
A.3 Imagery Transformations 
a. Reference. (Shepard & Metzler, 1971). 
b. Functionality. Transformation, Inspection. 
c. Task Type. On a spatial and visual spectrum, this task falls somewhere in 
between. Our hypothesis is that the spatial representation is used to perform the 
transformation, and a visual depictive representation is required to recognize if the 
two objects are the same.  
Auditory  
presentation 
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or perceive  
(perception) 





property to  
evaluate 
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d. Summary. Shepard and Metzler showed subjects pairs of three-dimensional, non-
standard objects and asked them to determine if the objects were the same shape 
(Figure A-3). Some pairs were identical but with one of the objects rotated at a 
different angle than another. Other pairs were mirrored reflections of one another 
so could not be brought into correspondence by a rotation. After shown a pair of 
objects, subjects pulled a right-hand lever if they thought the objects were 
congruent and a left-hand lever if they did not think they were congruent. 
Response times were measured.  
 
Figure A-3: Mental Rotation Shapes 
 
e. Results. Shepard and Metzler measured response times for each subject and found 
that the response times were linear with the rotation angle. The subjects‘ 
introspective reports claimed that in order to make the comparison they had to 
―mentally rotate‖ one of the objects. These two pieces of evidence led them to 
hypothesize that there is some sort of an imagined transformation process in 
three-dimensional space. 
f. Discussion. We are using this experiment to highlight not only the phenomenon 
of being able to rotate three-dimensional objects but also as motivation for 
transformations of quantitative spatial and visual depictive representations in 
general.  
A.4 Combining Perception and Imagery 
a. References. (Kosslyn et al., 1993; Podgorny & Shepard, 1978) 
b. Functionality. Construction, Generation, Inspection. 
c. Task Type. Visual. 
 
 149 
d. Summary. Experiment originally devised by Podgorny and Shepard to measure 
the functional correspondence between visual perception and visual imagery. 
There were two experimental groups. Each experiment started by displaying a 
two-dimensional 5x5 grid to the subjects (Figure A-4a). The perception subjects 
viewed one or two English letter(s) in the grid. A visual probe in the form of one 
or more dots would appear in the grid and the subjects responded as quickly as 
possible as to whether a dot fell on the letter(s). Podgorny and Shepard measured 
response times and recorded other factors such as number of dots and distance 
(number of grids) of the dot(s) from the letter.  
The second imagery group, rather than viewing the letter(s), were 
instructed to visualize it in the grid and press a pedal when they had the letter 
imagined. At that time, the dot(s) probe appeared, and as in the first case, the 
subjects indicated their response as quickly as possible as to whether a dot fell on 




(a) Subjects saw a letter in grid (perception task), 
visualized letter based on a “script cue” (imagery 
task), or waited for „X‟ mark to be removed 
(sensory-motor task) 
(b) Subjects saw script cue, then a 
perceptually degraded upper case 
version of cue (perceptual task), and 
a degraded „X‟ (both tasks) for the 
amount of indicated time 
Figure A-4: Identify the „X‟ On / Off the Letter 
 
Kosslyn et al. (1993) extended the experiment in several ways, a few of 
which are described here. First, they used PET (Positron Emission Tomography) 
to measure the emissions from a radioactively labeled chemical injected into the 
subject‘s bloodstream. The PET data produces two- or three-dimensional images 
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of the distribution of the chemicals throughout the brain and provides an 
indication where brain activity is occurring. Second, rather than seeing one or 
more dots, subjects would see a single ‗X‘ in one of the grids (Figure A-4a). Half 
of the time the ‗X‘ fell on the letter; half of the time if fell off. Additionally, half 
of each type (on/off) was drawn near the segment of a letter that was thought to be 
imagined early in the visualization sequence. The other half was drawn closer to 
those segments thought to be imagined later. The purpose of this experiment 
variability was to test Kosslyn‘s hypothesis that humans build the image of an 
object (in this case a letter) by composing the parts, one part at a time. Third, 
Kosslyn included a control group (the sensory-motor group) that simply saw an 
‗X‘ in the grid and responded when the ‗X‘ disappeared. The purpose of this 
control group was to exclude the activated brain areas and response times that 
sense the ‗X‘ and control the motor response. 
Finally, Kosslyn et al. ran another experiment to induce the recall of visual 
memories (Figure A-4b). They hypothesized that the first task may not access 
visual long-term memory because the tasks were what they call ―attention based 
imagery.‖ In this second task, subjects in the perceptual group were shown a 
script letter, followed by the letter and the grid. Then the ‗X‘ appeared for 200 ms 
in a degraded form. In the imagery group, only the grid and ‗X‖ appeared. The 
idea was that the task would no longer be based solely on attention because the 
subjects could not just fix attention on that region. Rather, they would have to 
recall the letter and the grid from visual memory for both perception and imagery. 
e. Results. In Podgorny and Shepard‘s experiment, they found that the response 
times varied with the number and locations of the dots (whether they were on or 
off the letter) and, as expected, the response times for the imagery group were 
longer than for the perception group. However, the factors influencing the 
variance in response times had a similar affect for both perception and imagery 
leading them to conclude that perception and imagery use similar mechanisms. 
Kosslyn‘s group found subjects required less time to evaluate probes 
where the ‗X‖ fell closer to the line segments of a letter believed to be added 
earlier in the image construction process. The neurological evidence indicated 
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greater activation of visual cortex during visual imagery than during perception 
for both tasks. In addition, for Task 2 they discovered activation in other areas, 
such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), occipital-temporal pathway, 
and parietal regions.  
f. Discussion. This experiment features the intersection between vision and imagery 
to included shared memories (visual cortex, temporal lobe, parietal lobe) and 
processing. It also serves as an example of the ability to ―perceive/imagine/re-
perceive‖ behavior. That is, imagined spatial and visual representations can 
augment visual perception to aid in the decision-making process. The grid and the 
dot/‘X‘ arrive in the visual buffer from vision and are not generated from 
imagery. The subject adds an imagined letter to this perceived scene. This is 
similar to our Scout domain where the agent augments its map by imaging 
different objects and features on it and then re-perceives the image. 
A.5 Map and First-Person Perspective Recon 
a. References.  (Mellet et al., 2000) 
b. Functionality. Construction, Inspection. 
c. Task Type. Spatial. 
d. Summary. The experiment tested the two major sources of information to build a 
topographic representation of an environment, actual navigation within the 
environment (route perspective) and map learning (survey perspective). The 
experimenters used positron emission tomography (PET) to compare the neural 
substrate of the topographic representation built from these two modes.  
Mellet et al. broke subjects into two groups: a ―route perspective‖ and a 
―survey perspective‖ group. The experiment had three phases:  (1) learning, (2) 
training, and then (3) testing. During the learning phase, the ―route perspective‖ 
group walked through a park they had never seen before (Figure A-5). An 
instructor led the walk by taking subjects to seven key landmarks (statue, tower, 
lake, etc) in the order they later would be expected to recall. After the instructor 




The ―survey perspective‖ group‘s learning phase consisted of studying a 
map of the park with the same landmarks annotated on the map as seven different 
colored dots. A path linked the dots. Experimenters then ran subjects through a 
series of seven slides showing each landmark in the same order that had been 
presented to the walking group. The experimenter told the subjects the color of 
the dot on the map that represented the landmark so the subjects could associate 
the dot to the landmark. To insure the subjects learned the map, they were 
required to pinpoint each dot location on a blank map at the end of the learning 
phase. 
 
Figure A-5: Park Map Used in Mellet et al. Experiment 
 
During the training phase (3-4 hours before the testing phase), the route 
perspective group trained on a mental navigation task by being presented with two 
landmark names ("gas station," "phone box") and then were instructed to visualize 
the walk between the two locations by mentally simulating it. When the subject 
imagined their ―arrival‖ at the second location, they pressed a key. The map group 
similarly trained on the mental navigation task by visualizing the map as 
accurately as possible including the seven dots. They were then presented with 
two dot colors (―red,‖ ―blue‖), and had to imagine a laser dot following the path 
segment on the original map between the two dots. Once the second dot was 
reached, the subject pressed a button triggering the release of the next pair of dots. 
The training consisted of three sessions with each session including the mental 
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navigation between five pairs of landmarks. Path segment length varied between 
48 and 172 meters. During the testing phase, the experimenters administered a 
PET scan while the subjects in both groups were either (1) resting with eyes 
closed or (2) mentally navigating as described above. 
e. Results. The right hippocampal and intraparietal sulcus were active in both groups 
indicating the spatial imagery component of the task. There was no activation 
observed in the visual cortex. 
f. Discussion. These two different tasks highlighted differences in encoded material 
(2D vs. 3D) and task demands (egocentric vs. allocentric view). However, both 
showed similar activation. Hippocampus is associated with what we call episodic 
memory indicating possible interaction between the imagery system and episodic 
memory. Task properties included (1) recall of spatial locations and landmarks, 
(2) maintenance of spatial relationships in the scene, and (3) mental simulation of 
displacement from one location to the next. The experiment has some similarities 
with the Scout domain as the agent has to imagine an enemy‘s current location by 












This appendix describes specific algorithms used for detecting curves and manipulating 
depictive representations. For the purposes of this appendix, an image, I, consists of a 
spatial domain X and an F-value set. X is a topological space consisting of points and the 
topology providing the notion of connectivity. For example, a two-dimensional point, x, 
is described as (xi,yi) where xi and yi describe the location of the point in a two-
dimensional space. The graphical representation of a point set, X = nm ZxZ    , is shown in 
Figure B-1. An F-value set is a set of possible values together with a finite set of 
operations. In this discussion, we are concerned with integer and real (float) value sets. 
The image, I, is then represented by a data structure I = s and an element of I, (x, I(x)) is 
called a picture element or pixel. The first coordinate, x, is the pixel location and the 
second coordinate, I(x), is the pixel value of I at location x (Ritter & Wilson, 1996). 
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B.1 Hough Transform 
To detect lines and curves in an image, we use the Hough transform (Mat Jafri  & Deravi 
1994; Olson, 1999; Ritter & Wilson, 1996). The Hough transform is a ―voting‖ algorithm 
that maps edge points in an edge-detected image to parameters in a parameter space. That 
is, given an edge point, x from the edge point-set, E; a set of parameters, Ω, that 
describes the curve; and either an analytical function, f, or a lookup table that 

































Each edge point in the edge-detected image has an opportunity to ―vote‖ on one 
or more sets of parameters. The algorithm collects votes in an array of counters, called 
the accumulator or vote array. The array is a discrete partition of a continuous 
multidimensional space spanning all feasible parameter values defined by either the 
analytical equation or a shape lookup table. Larger counts in the vote array indicate a 
higher probability that the parameter indices of the array are the parameters of the shape 
in the image. A threshold algorithm must determine what set of parameters, if any, are a 
representation of the sought-after shape. Computer vision researchers have used the 
Hough algorithm to detect lines, circles, ellipses, and other non-analytical shapes that 
have an associated lookup table describing the shape. 
There has been little published on using the Hough Transform to detect parabolic 
curves, but it appears to be a good fit for finding general curves in any orientation. We 
use Mat Jafri and Deravi‘s (1994) algorithm and extend it to detect false positives. We 
can define a parabola as a locus of points equidistant to a fixed point called the focus, F, 
and a fixed straight line called the directrix, d. Figure B-2 shows a parabola in its 
―canonical‖ form with its vertex, (x0,y0) at the origin. Its focus, F, is on the x-axis a 
distance, a, from the origin, and its directrix, d, is parallel to the y-axis at a distance, a, 









2                                                                       (1) 
where a represents the length between the focus and the vertex. In the canonical form the 
focal point is located at (a,0), and the focal length, a, defines the "curvature" or the width 
of the curve. The default value for a given the equation x = y
2
 is 0.25. As a approaches 0 
the parabola becomes "skinny" to where the two ends would eventually converge into a 
line. As the focal length approaches infinity, the parabola widens. At infinity the curve 
straightens into the line, x = 0 (the y-axis).   
 
 
Figure B-2: Parabola in Canonical Form 
 
Figure B-3 shows a parabola in its general form with the vertex translated (x0 y0) 
from the origin and a counterclockwise angle of rotation, Θ, from the x-axis. We can 
describe a translated parabolic curve without rotation as the following equation: 
2
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Figure B-3: General Parabola 
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Substituting (4) back into (3) results in the equation: 
 






































































Equation (5) serves as the analytical function, f, which we use to determine the possible 
set of parabolas where a particular edge pixel may fall. The parabola is parameterized by 
Ω = (x0, y0, Θ). To calculate the slope of the line tangent to the parabola at a pixel edge, 
p, (dy/dx in equation (4)) we use the edge gradient information (Figure B-3). The 
gradient is determined by,  















                                                                (6) 
where 
gx = edge gradient in the x direction 
gy = edge gradient in the y direction 
Φ= orientation of the edge normal vector 
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λ = orientation of the edge direction vector  
dy/dx = slope of the line tangent to the parabola at a point, p. 
 
Each pixel in the edge image over a certain threshold votes for all the possible 
parabolas (defined by the parameters) constrained by the analytical function in equation 
(5). Parabolas are then ―peaks‖ in the parameter space. We use a simple threshold to 
calculate a peak. For each possible parabola detected, the algorithm must also maintain 
the calculated focal length, a,  for the parabola ―peak‖ where ―peak‖ is defined as the 
edge pixel furthest from the parabola vertex. Again, the focal length determines how 
narrow or wide the detected parabola is.  
We add a post-processing step to remove false positives and consolidate several 
similar detected parabolas. The false positive parabolas are the result of discretetization 
errors (assumption that each edge pixel center is the center of the pixel) and localization 
errors. Localization errors result either when the parameters of a curve do not receive 
votes from edge pixels that are a part of the curve or because the discretization errors 
causes a single bin in the vote/accumulator array to receive a large number of votes from 
edge pixels that cannot lie on the same curve. The assumption is that the bin size is 
sufficient to receive the votes for parabolas of interest but small enough not to receive 
votes from false positives (Olson, 1999).  Because of this induced error, we post process 
the parabolas by ―walking the parabola‖ a few pixels in either direction from the vertex to 
make sure there are a sufficient number of edge pixels on the parabola to classify it as a 
curve.   
The general algorithm follows: 
1. Convert the source image to a grayscale image 
2. Use an edge detector (we used a rotation invariant kernel mask) 
to find the set of edge pixels in the image along with their 
associated gradient information in both the x and y directions (gx, 
gy). 
3.  For each edge pixel 
a. Calculate the edge slope, dy/dx, according to equation (6) 
b. Iterate through some fixed rotation angle, Θ, from 0 to π by 
some step size, s 
1. Iterate through each possible x0 (x coordinate of 
possible vertices) 
a. Calculate y0 according to equation (4) 
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b. If (x0 ,y0) is an edge  
1. Transform to canonical form (zero degrees of 
rotation from the x-axis with the vertex at the 
origin). 
2. Determine actual angle (angle may be Θ + π) 
3. Determine focal length, a, based on equation (1) 
4. If the focal length is within constraints (i.e. not a 
straight line and the parabola has an edge pixel 
opposite the current edge pixel), then cast a vote for 
the curve parameters (x0 ,y0, Θ). If the current pixel 
is the ―peak‖ pixel, then record its focal length for 
these parameters. 
4.  Post process to remove any false positives. 
    
Parameters: 
 amin  = 5 
 amax = 40 
 vote threshold = 340 
 step size, s = 5 degrees (0.087 radians) 
 
Although the representation used for detecting curves is ―depictive,‖ the Hough 
transform is a ―sentential‖ algorithm. That is, the algorithm detects curves by fitting the 
representation to analytical algebraic equations. One could argue that it is ―biologically‖ 
inspired since it is highly parallelizable with a short dependency tree. We could 
parallelize an iteration through the set of edge pixels and angles of rotation, as each edge 





, where e is the number of edge pixels in the image, s is the 
angle step size, and m the width of the image in pixels. We may obtain speedup using 
randomization and decomposition as described in (Olson, 1999) and implementing with 
multiple processors. 
B.2 Depictive Manipulations 
Some of the VBManipulator‘s (Figure 6-14) processing units are implemented as a pixel-
level rewrite system (Furnas, 1990, 1991; Furnas et al., 2000; Yamamoto, 1996). Unlike 
sentential algebraic algorithms, such as a Gaussian filter or the Hough transform that take 
advantage of the geometric properties of the depiction, this type of processing takes 
advantage of the topological structure and color of a depictive representation. This 
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section will discuss our specific implementation details of this type of processing and the 
rewrite rules used in the experiments.  
A pixel-level rewrite system has a set of depictive rules and a shared image. 
Similar to a production system, the depictive rules have a left-hand side (LHS) and a 
right-hand side (RHS) but rather than predicate symbols, the LHS conditions and RHS 
actions are visual depictive representations. The color of each LHS pixel and their spatial 
arrangement, or shape, determines a match rather than the syntactic structure of the 
symbols. Figure B-4 shows an example of two depictive rules. The top rule is a 2x1 rule 
stating, ―if there is a black pixel adjacent to a gray pixel, then change the gray pixel to a 
white pixel.‖ Similarly, the bottom rule is a 2x2 rule that says, ―if there is a black pixel 
diagonally adjacent to a gray pixel, then change the gray pixel to a white pixel.‖ The 
asterisks represent wildcard values where the processing ignores those pixel values in the 
determination of a match. Note that ―color‖ simply implies that the pixel has an integer 
value (F-value). In addition to the orientation shown, a rule may specify that the 
processing also check for matches at 90, 180, and 270 degrees or for reflection. For 
example, the second rule, rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise matches a pattern in the 
image where there is a black pixel in the lower right corner and a gray pixel in the upper 
left corner. The RHS action changes the upper left pixel to white.   
 
 
Figure B-4: Pixel-level Rewrite Rules 
 
The processing iterates over the image, searching for a match of any rule‘s LHS 
pattern. If there is a match, the RHS action rewrites the appropriate pixel(s). Processing 
terminates when there are no rules matching a pattern in the image. To achieve control, 
each rule has a priority associated with it so if there are multiple matches in a particular 









and modifications are local in nature and extend no further than a 3x3 neighborhood in 
our particular algorithms, the overall effects of the manipulations have global 
consequences. The pixel rewrite model used in this first implementation has some details 
that might not be biologically reasonable (e.g., global conflict resolution with only one 
rewrite proceeding at a time), its essential nature of computation by iterated local 
transformations does not seem at all beyond the realm of neuro-biological possibility. 
In order to integrate the pixel-level rewrite rules with the Soar+SVI architecture, 
we made the following three extensions. Yamamoto (1996) also investigated some of 
these extensions. First, one or more depictive rules are encoded in Soar as operator 
elaborations
30
 (Figure B-5). When Soar selects the operator for application, the depictive 
rules are added to Soar‘s output-link. The VBManipulator receives the rules, and 
specialized processing units interpret and execute the matching and firing of rules. As 
shown in Figure B-5, each depictive rule has a name (for debugging), a priority, number 
of pixels (to indicate if it is a 1x1, 1x2, 2x2, or 3x3 rule), and any other rotation angles to 
check for a match (90, 180, 270). Rules may also have reflections associated with them 
although we did not use them in any of our tasks. 
The second extension we made is to distinguish processing between three types of 
rules. Each rule is a member of a rule-set where all rules in a rule-set are constrained to 
be of the same type. The rule-set type signals to the VBManipulator the form of 
processing, and the rule-set number serves as a sequencing method (i.e. process rule-set 
0, then 1, then 2, etc). We define three types of rule-sets: Threshold, Pattern, and Mark. 
Threshold rule-sets are rules with either a 1x1 or a 1x2 image on both the LHS and a 1x1 
image (i.e. 1 pixel) on the RHS. The VBManipulator processes these rules by making one 
pass through the image and ―thresholding‖ each pixel based on the LHS value where a 
1x1 LHS signals an exact match and a 2x1 LHS image indicates a minimum and 
maximum range of values.  
This functionality is different from a pixel-rewrite system in that rather than 
specifying a rule for each possible pixel value requiring change, a 2x1 LHS in a threshold 
rule specifies a range of pixel values where the values are on an ordinal rather than a 
nominal scale. We found this functionality useful in the Scout domain for marking known 
                                                 
30
An operator elaboration is a type of Soar production or rule. 
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obstacles such as buildings and ―no-go‖ terrain that could be defined roughly as a range 
of pixel values in the original image. We think a similar type of rule-set based on location 
may also be useful (e.g., we know the enemy is maneuvering through locations in a 9x9 
region centered on location (x, y) even though it is considered impassable). However, we 
have not implemented this type of rule.  
 
 
Figure B-5: Example Soar Operator Rule (in English format) for Depictive Manipulations 
 
The second type of rule-set is the pattern. The pattern rule-set processing is 
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Much more efficient algorithms are possible (Furnas & Qu, 2002), but their implementation is rather 
complex and not the main thrust of this research. Their increased efficiency would only strengthen the 
claims of this research. 
while (!quiescence) 
quiescence = true 
 for each pixel in the image 
    get the 3x3 neighborhood  
     check for a match in order of rule priority 
    if match then quiescence = false 
If there is an imagery operator proposed to transform a visual buffer layer with a set of depictive 
rules and there are distance-field-flood color layers then elaborate the operator as follows: 
   rule: 
 name: <rule-name>             # for debugging 
rule-set: <rule-set-number>  # 0 – N 
type: <rule-type>             # Threshold,Pattern,Mark 
 priority: <rule-priority>     # priority within this rule-set 
 number-of-pixels: 1,3,4,9    # 1x1, 1x2, 2x2, 3x3 
 rotate: 90 180 270            # rotations to check for match 
 lhs:              # Left-hand side (lhs) 
      pixel:                  # one for each pixel (2, 4, or 9) 
          number: 0 - 8         # pixel number based on its location in the 1x1, 2x1,  
      # 2x2, or 3x3 LHS image 
           type: exact min-value max-value wildcard # type of match 
           vector: 
  red:   <red-value>    # 0-255 
  green: <green-value>  # 0-255 
  blue: <blue-value>    # 0-255 
 rhs:              # Right-hand side (rhs) 
     similar to lhs 
 
Legend: 
        #              Comment 




The algorithm asymptotic run time is O(nr) where n is the number of pixels in the image 
and r is the number of rules. If n or r is large, then we pay a computational cost. We 
currently have no constraints imposed on the number of rules (r). However, by focusing 
the computations on a subset of the image, we can keep n small so our algorithm is 
effectively linear in the number of rules.  
One way to keep the image size small is a consideration of our third type of rule 
processing, the mark. Again, processing is similar to the pixel-level rewrites in that the 
local neighborhood of the pixel determines activation. However, rather than processing 
the entire image, the processing starts at a location specified in the rule-set header (not 
shown in Figure B-5) and only considers the local 3x3 neighborhood of the current pixel. 
The rule-set may specify location as a pixel location or a visual object in the Object Map 
that is then projected onto its 2D pixel location. For this type of rule, the processing only 
considers the local 3x3 neighborhood of the current pixel rather than the entire image. 
The processing proceeds in a fashion similar to pixel rewrites in that if there is a match in 
the current pixel neighborhood, the pixel is marked according to the rule RHS. For mark 
rules, the RHS always specifies a modification of the center pixel. The next 3x3 
neighborhood considered for matching is in the direction of the current match.  
For example, in Figure B-6, if the current pixel is white and its diagonal pixel is 
gray (in any direction), then the current pixel is marked orange, and the processing shifts 
to the gray pixel. If the rule has a match in more than one orientation, then the processing 
records any other matching pixel locations and pushes them on a stack. After processing 
in the chosen direction is exhausted, the pixel locations on the top of the stack are 
iteratively popped and, if not already marked,
32
 they are processed. For these types of 
rules, their depictive specification automatically includes all rotational directions (i.e. 90, 
180, 270), and they are constrained to a 2x1 or 2x2 diagonal rule. 
 
 
Figure B-6: Mark Type Rule 
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This situation may occur when processing a closed region. 










A mark rule-set is also distinguished from a pattern rule in that in addition to 
performing the pixel rewrites, the VBManipulator creates a symbolic shape object and 
adds it to the current scene‘s Visual Feature Set
33
 in VS-STM. The shape object includes 
an emergent-id, the marking color, and the set of points defining the shape. We found this 
rule-set type useful for marking the hypothesized enemy paths in the Scout domain and 
propose that this form of processing is useful for marking salient objects by the Saliency 
Inspector during bottom-up visual processing. 
The final extension we made to the pixel-rewrite system is to create an attention 
window in order to keep the image size (n) small. Since the depictive representation in the 
Visual Buffer contains more information than can be processed, an attention window 
focuses the processing effort (Kosslyn, Thompson, & Ganis, 2006). In our 
implementation, the attention window is a fixed, m x m region of the image, where m is a 
factor of two. The size of the attention window and its shift direction is task knowledge 
transmitted from Soar to the VBManipulator every decision cycle in which the 
manipulation is active.  
For example, in the Scout Domain the attention window is set to 64x64 pixels. 
During the distance field flood, the attention window starts centered at the key terrain. 
After the flood completes in the current attention window, a Soar operator tells the 
VBManipulator to shift the window towards the enemy map-icon. Since the visual object 
of the enemy map-icon is in VS-STM, the VBManipulator simply looks up the visual-
object‘s scene graph node, determines its location, and then projects that 3D location to a 
2D pixel location on the image. It then ―shifts‖ the attention window a fixed distance in a 
straight-line towards the provided location based on the attention window dimensions and 
a shift factor sent from Soar. For example, if the attention window is 64 x 64 and the shift 
factor is 0.25, the shift is 64 * 0.25 = 16 pixels towards the given location. Note that this 
is an internal shift of the cognitive focus. The agent‘s ―head‖ is not turning. We use the 
rectangle shape for simplicity and its amenability to the rest of Soar (of importance 
because of the strategic role of attention allocation). Furnas and Qu (2003) have also 
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If the marked shape is a subset of a specific object (e.g. the enclosed space of the letter A), then it is 
added to the Visual Feature Set of the corresponding Visual Object in VS-STM. 
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explored the notion of an attention window but where the processing is restricted to 
arbitrarily shaped regions rather than a fixed rectangular region. An interesting extension 
would be to explore using this more depictive (rather than spatial) notion of attention 
control. 
As an example of how an agent uses pixel-level rewrites to infer new visual and 
spatial properties, consider the following rules from the Alphabet experiment. To find 
enclosed spaces in a letter, there are two basic pattern-matching rules (Furnas, 1990, 
1991; Furnas & Qu, 2003). Blob reduce modifies a 2x2, 2x3, or 3x2 blob by removing 
the center pixel (Figure B-7a). Nibble tips reduces columns or rows of pixels in the image 
by removing the end of the column or row segment (Figure B-7b). Using these two basic 
algorithms, the general algorithm for finding enclosed spaces is as follows (sequenced 
using rule priorities): 
 
Figure B-8 shows the letter B before and after processing using these manipulations. 
 
  
(a) Blob Reduce (b) Nibble Tips 






























1. Reduce 2x2 blobs 
2. Reduce 2x3 or 3x2 blobs 
3. Nibble Tips 




Figure B-8: The Letter B Before and After Pixel Rewrites  
 
As another example, consider a task from the scout domain. The agent may 
analyze its team‘s position by imagining a hypothesized path from the current location 
(source) of each enemy vehicle to a key terrain location (sink). After the imagined path(s) 
are marked for each enemy/key-terrain pair, the agent imagines the team‘s view to 
determine if they have adequate coverage of the paths. The analysis should take into 
account the agent‘s knowledge about the surrounding terrain and known obstacles. A 





(a) Distance field 
flood 
(b) Mark Path 
Figure B-9:  Example Use of Pixel Rewrites from Scout Domain 
 
This task knowledge can be encoded as depictive rules using the following three 
rule-sets (Figure B-10). The first rule-set, shown in Figure B-10a in order of rule priority, 
1. Mark all known obstacles and ―slow-go‖ terrain on the map with a color 
(yellow) by applying a set of known threshold values. Mark all other pixels 
gray. 
2. Grow an iso-distance contour field avoiding any previously marked barriers 
(Figure B-9a). 
3. Walk the contour field from source to sink, marking the path along the way 




is a set of threshold rules to mark the known obstacles, steep terrain, and open terrain. For 
example, the agent marks known obstacles in green on the original depiction so the top 
rule changes those values to yellow, signaling an obstacle or barrier. Likewise, the middle 
two rules mark the steep and open terrain as yellow obstacles based on pixel ranges 
determined from an off-line analysis. The last threshold rule signals that any pixel in the 
image not meeting the above criteria should be marked gray to facilitate building the 
distance field flood.  
 
  
(a) Obstacles (b) Distance Field Flood 
 
(c) Mark Path 
Figure B-10: Depictive Rules for Scout Domain 
 
The second rule-set, shown in Figure B-10b, are a subset of the rules used to 
create a temporary iso-contour distance field flood starting from the ―purple‖ sink (i.e. 


























green (not shown), purple, black, etc around the sink one pixel layer at a time (Furnas et 
al., 2000). Figure B-10b shows the rule for layer 0 (purple) to layer 2 (white). The even-
to-odd layers match both orthogonal and diagonal pixels while the odd-to-even layers 
match only orthogonal pixels. Four colors are sufficient to preserve the topological shape 
around the yellow obstacles. The processing fills in the gray background pixels with the 
contours. The end effect is a downhill field gradient that has both distance and directional 
information that serves as an attractor for the subsequent, path-marking phase. 
The final rule-set, shown in Figure B-10c, are rules that mark the path starting 
from the red source (i.e. enemy map icon) to the purple sink (i.e. key terrain). The rules 
take advantage of the direction and distance information of the iso-contor distance field 
to find the shortest path from source to sink that avoids the yellow obstacles. Figure B-
10c illustrates the first few rules that fire, marking the path orange (assuming the red 
source is initially adjacent to a white distance field layer—other rules are required for the 
remaining initial possibilities). Note that once the top rule fires, moving the processing 
from the source (i.e. red) to a distance field color (purple, black, white, or green), the 
rules are simply the opposite from the rules in Figure B-10b used to create iso-contour 
field. Each layer ―attracts‖ the path from the previous layer while avoiding obstacles. 
Orthogonal directions are preferred (i.e. have a higher priority) than diagonal directions. 
 There is a default rule (not shown in the figure) that fires when there is not a 
match on the current pixel, and the current pixel is not purple (i.e. not the sink). In the 
Scout domain, this situation may occur at the start or sometimes on the border of an 
attention window when the current pixel being processed is yellow, or an obstacle. For 
example, the enemy map-icon may be located on a piece of terrain that the agent thought 
was ―no-go‖ terrain. In this situation, the default rule behavior is to move towards the 












The following appendix describes the software design and implementation in enough 
detail to give the reader an understanding of the major software components, classes and 
their associations, and the symbolic representations in Soar‘s working (i.e. short-term) 
memory. We will start by listing the software libraries and their dependencies. Then, 
similar to the architectural discussion in Chapter 6, we will discuss SVI memories and 
processes for spatial and visual imagery processing (Figure 6-1) using the Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) diagram notation. As outlined in the architectural view, 
connections between components imply both data and control constraints. We model 
these constraints as UML associations (aggregate, composition, inheritance). The last 
section describes the relevant Soar structures. 
For performance, functionality, and usability reasons, the system is a layered 
architecture with the mathematical functionality and image processing written in the C++ 
programming language and the software interfacing SVI, Soar, and its debugging tool, 
the SoarJavaDebugger, written in the Java programming language. We use the following 
open source software packages: CImg (Tschumperlé 2008), OpenGL (Shreiner et al., 
2006) and the corresponding LWJGL ("Lightweight Java game library (LWJGL)", 2008), 
Soar ("Soar", 2008), SWT ("The standard widget toolkit (SWT)", 2007), SWIG (Beazley 
et al., 2002), and Wild Magic (Eberly, 2005).  Wild Magic provides the basic 
mathematical package and scene graph support, CImg has the image data structure and 
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algorithms, OpenGL is a software interface to graphics hardware, and SWT is a toolkit 
for graphical user interfaces. We use the Soar Markup Language (SML) to interface Soar 
with SVI and SWIG to generate the wrapper code for bridging C++ and Java code. 
Figure C-1 and Figure C-2 illustrate the major software components and dependencies. 
 
 
Figure C-1:  SVI Libraries 
 
 




C.1 Class Diagrams 
The VisualObject is a basic class in the system. It is composed of zero or more 
VisualObjects, VisualFeatures and SpatialProperties (Figure C-3). Along with its 
instance-id, and if ―recognized,‖ visual-id, a VisualObject has a boolean flag indicating 
whether or not it is perceived or imagined. A VisualFeature may be a Color or a Shape 
and has a unique emergent-id. A SpatialProperty is an instance of Direction, Distance, 
Orientation, Topology, Geometry, or Size and has a relative-instance-id or –emergent-id 
and perhaps a base-instance-id or –emergent-id depending on the type (i.e. unary, binary, 
tertiary) of spatial property and the VisualObject(s) or Shape(s) defining it. Visual-Spatial 
short-term memory (Figure 6-6) is simply an instantiation of a VisualObject that 
represents the current scene. The VisualBuffer, ObjectMap, and VisualLTM share this 
VisualObject, effectively binding the ―what‖ and ―where‖ pathways.  
 
 
Figure C-3: Visual Object Class Diagram 
 
Within the Java SVI component, a SoarAgent class serves as an object adapter for 






ISoarComponents (‗I‘ is the Hungarian notation for ―interface‖) that are either memories 
(i.e. VisualLTM) or processes (i.e. an Inspector). The SoarAgent class defines two inner 
classes, InputLink and OutputLink, each consisting of a collection ISoarInputLink and 
ISoarOutputLink objects. During initialization, each ISoarInputLink and 
ISoarOutputLink object in the system registers with the SoarAgent‘s respective InputLink 
and OutputLink objects for the commands it handles. During Soar‘s output phase, the 
OutputLink object parses Soar‘s output-link and, for each type of command, calls 
ISoarOutputLink object responsible for parsing and executing the specific symbolic 
structures. Likewise, prior to the input phase, the InputLink object calls each of the 
registered ISoarInputLink objects to create or modify symbolic structures on Soar‘s 
input-link.  
 
Figure C-4: Soar Agent Class Diagram 
 
Every SVI component derives from either an AgentMemory or AgentProcess class 
that in turn derive from the AgentComponent class (top of Figure C-5). AgentComponent 
encapsulates basic information and behavior that all of the processes and memories 






AgentMemory includes basic memory behavior, such as storing and retrieving, posting 
inspector results, and notifying listeners of those results. AgentProcess simply serves as a 
placeholder to distinguish between the two types of components using run-time type 
information. 
 
Figure C-5: Visual Buffer Class Diagram 
 
The VisualBuffer derives from AgentMemory and contains attributes for its 
height, width, and background color (Figure C-5). It encapsulates the depictive 
representation that the VisualBufferRefresher creates by rendering the scene to a display 
canvas (for debugging). The VisualBufferRefresher reads the pixels from the graphic 
processing unit (GPU) pixel buffer into a CImg (Tschumperlé 2008) data structure by 
calling the VisualBuffer‘s CreateDepictiveRepresentation function. For efficiency and 
functionality purposes, the pixel buffer is read only when the agent issues a generate 
command. Otherwise, the VisualBufferRefresher renders the image to the display canvas 






VisualBufferManipulator and inspection process create other images from the base image 
as required and store them temporarily in the VisualBuffer as a set of CImg structures. 
All agent components written in C++ for SVI are extended in Java and have a 
corresponding Soar<ComponentName> class (e.g. SoarVisualBuffer). These classes 
serve three purposes. First, they implement the ISoarComponent (Soar Component 
Interface) providing them with the interface to register as components of the SoarAgent 
object (Figure C-4 and Figure C-5). This requirement is for ownership purposes so that 
the SoarAgent object maintains responsibility for the memory allocation of its 
components. Second, some of the Soar+SVI classes interface with Soar‘s input and/or 
output links. For example, the SoarVisualBufferRefresher and 
SoarVisualBufferManipulator implement the ISoarOutputLink interface. This standard 
interface provides each component with the functionality to receive commands (i.e. 
generate, transform) from Soar. Third, the Soar+SVI classes may provide additional 
functionality specific to their Java implementation. For example, the SoarVisualBuffer 
implements an SWT OpenGL drawing canvas (GLCanvas) that is specific to Java 
facilitating the integration of SVI with Soar‘s debugging tool, the SoarJavaDebugger 
(Figure C-6). The SoarVisualBufferRefresher implements the necessary threading and 
Lightweight Java Graphics Library to draw a scene to the GLCanvas.  
 
 




VisualLTM (Figure C-7) is a hash table indexed by a visual-id. Each VisualEntry 
includes a visual-id, a scene graph representing the object, and an association with other 
entries containing the object‘s parts. To assist construction, the VisualEntry class stores 
basic statistics concerning each object‘s vertices (e.g. minimum and maximum vertices). 
VisualLTM also provides an interface to load and store scene graph objects from a file 
system. SoarVisualLTM extends VisualLTM so it can register as a Soar component.  
 
 
Figure C-7: Visual Long-term Memory Class Diagram 
 
Every memory has one or more IMemoryListener interfaces associated with it. 
For VisuaLTM there is a C++ IVisualLTMListener and a corresponding Java 
SoarVisualLTMListener (Figure C-7). The SoarVisualLTMListener implements the 






recognition of a visual object, manipulation of the VisualBuffer, or inspection for visual 
features, the SoarVisualLTMListener receives a signal from the appropriate process. 
During the subsequent input phase, the SoarVisualLTMListener creates the appropriate 
symbolic structures on Soar‘s input-link from the information in VS-STM.  
The ObjectMap and IObjectMapListener have a similar design to VisualLTM and 
IVisualLTMListener (Figure C-8). The ObjectMap has a Node representing the current 
scene graph and a View that represents the location and direction of the agent‘s 
viewpoint. The ObjectMapConstructor and ObjectMapManipulator have direct access to 
the ObjectMap so that they can construct and manipulate the scene graph or change the 
ObjectMap‘s viewpoint. Their corresponding Soar class definitions implement the 
ISoarOutputLink interface in order to receive commands (construct, transform) from 
Soar. The SoarObjectMapListener communicates spatial query results stored in VS-STM 
by creating symbolic structures on Soar‘s input-link. 
 






An InspectorManager object maintains a reference to all registered 
VisualSpatialInspectors in the system (Figure C-9). These processes inspect the 
VisualBuffer or ObjectMap in response to an automatic bottom-up query or top-down 
imagery inspection. There are three types of VisualSpatialInspectors. The first is a 
SaliencyInspector that is responsible for initially marking and attempting to recognize 
objects in the perceived scene. To facilitate recognition, the saliency inspector through 
the InspectorManager may call the other two types of inspectors, VisualFeatureInspector 
and SpatialPropertyInspector. Both of these classes have several derived, concrete 
classes implementing the algorithms for a specific type of visual or spatial property (i.e. 
line, enclosed spaces, direction, topology, geometry, etc.).  
 
 









The SoarInspectorManager (bottom of Figure C-9) is responsible for parsing the 
inspect command from Soar and initiating the inspection process within SVI. When the 
SoarInspectorManager receives the command to inspect, it first creates an 
InspectorQueryResult object (top right of Figure C-9) that encodes the specific query and 
stores the collected results. The InspectorQueryResult has a query-id (a unique symbol 
generated by Soar prior to the inspection for tracking purposes), an optional set of query 
parameters (e.g. parameters for Hough transform, attention window size, query 
constraints) and one or more VisualSpatialProperties. The VisualSpatialProperty is an 
abstract base class for the VisualFeature, VisualObject, and SpatialProperty classes 
previously discussed (Figure C-3). 
After marshalling the query by creating the InspectorQueryResult structure, the 
SoarInspectorManager calls the inspect function of the base class. Based on the run-time 
type information of the first visual-spatial property in the query, the InspectorManager 
determines and dispatches the appropriate VisualSpatialInspector by calling its 
corresponding Inspect function (Figure C-9). The InspectorManager knows what 
inspector to dispatch because during initialization, each inspector registers the type of 
visual-spatial property it is capable of processing.  
The first inspector called during a query becomes the lead inspector and is 
responsible for posting any results to VS-STM. If during the inspection, the lead 
inspector comes across a visual-spatial property that it cannot handle, it dispatches the 
appropriate inspector through the InspectorManager by calling the second Inspect 
function shown in the VisualSpatialInspector class (Figure C-9). This function signals to 
the called inspector to perform the inspection, store the results in the provided 
VisualSpatialProperty object, and return to the caller without posting results. For 
example, if the first visual-spatial property in a query is for the direction between two 
visual objects and after finishing the inspection, the DirectionDistanceInspector comes 
across a request for the topological relationship of the visual objects, it accesses the 
TopologyInspector via the InspectorManager and dispatches it. When the 
TopologyInspector finishes, it stores its results and returns control to the 
DirectionDistanceInspector. The DirectionDistanceInspector consolidates the results in 
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the original InspectorQueryResult structure, stores it in VS-STM, and notifies the 
appropriate memory listener that there are results waiting processing.  
C.2 Soar Symbolic Structures 
Now that we have discussed the SVI classes, we can explain within this context how 
spatial and visual imagery processing works from Soar‘s perspective. We will discuss the 
symbolic structures from the point of view of someone writing an agent. Soar‘s short-
term or working memory elements (WME) are a three-tuple (identifier, attribute, value). 
A value may be a primitive (integer, float, string) or another symbolic identifier. In most 
cases we only represent the attribute with a caret (e.g. ^attribute). If the attribute has sub-
structure, we represent it either with a new-line and indentation or by connecting it with a 
dot to its parent attribute (e.g. ^attribute.sub-attribute). Bold entries are permanent 
architectural structures. Entries shown in italics are WMEs that the system creates 
(currently through productions) in response to input or a command. Normal text entries 
are working memory elements (WMEs) the agent creates with productions (i.e. task 
knowledge). Finally, entries in <angle brackets> are items suggesting the types of values 
that might augment the existing structure. 
The imagery subsystem includes SVI and a set of Soar productions that initialize 
some working memory structures and facilitate communication with SVI through Soar‘s 
input- and output-links. We consider these productions and structures as ―architectural‖ 
rather than knowledge. The imagery system uses Soar‘s subgoaling mechanism to 
implement the imagery processing specific to the input- and output-links. Soar‘s top-state 
working memory structure has a visual-spatial working memory (vs-wmem) attribute 
(Figure C-10a). This attribute has three architectural substructures: imagery, visual-ltm, 
and visual-object-instances. The agent issues imagery commands (construct, transform, 
generate, inspect) and receives results by augmenting the imagery attribute. We discuss 
this structure in more detail shortly. When a VLTM listener informs Soar that a visual 
object has been stored in VLTM,
34
 an operator creates a visual-object structure under the 
visual-ltm attribute. Figure C-10b shows an example of a visual-object structure. Based 
                                                 
34
In the current implementation, this input implies that the visual-object scene graph has been loaded from 
the file system. 
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on input from the VLTMListener, only the visual-id and has-a attributes are initially 
present in a visual-ltm visual-object. The name is optional and added by the agent to 
assist in identifying instances of the object and associating it with other symbolic 
structures (e.g. enemy tank). The agent adds explicit visual features and spatial properties 
as it acquires them (programmed or learned). Although we implemented the visual-ltm 
structure in working memory, we assume that it is better suited for one of Soar‘s long-







Figure C-10: Top-state Visual-Spatial Working Memory Structure 
 
The visual-object-instances (Figure C-10a) also store a set of visual-object 
structures. Unlike the structures augmenting the visual-ltm attribute, however, these 
symbols are short-lived instances of what the agent has recently perceived or imagined. 
^spatial 
      ^relative-visual-object/shape 
      ^base-visual-object/shape 
      ^base-visual-object/shape-tert 
      ^direction 
           ^qualitative above below left-of 
                             right-of  in-front-of behind  
             ^vector 
      ^distance 
            ^qualitative near far 
           ^scalar  
     ^orientation 
           ^qualitative n nw w sw s se e ne 
           ^scalar 
     ^topology 
          ^qualitative dc ec po tpp ntpp eq 
     ^geometry 
          ^qualitative angle intersect parallel  
                             perpendicular congruent 
      ^size 
           ^qualitative small medium large 
           ^scalar 
           ^vector 
 ^visual-feature 
     ^emergent-id 
     ^color 
         ^qualitative red green blue 
         ^scalar <color-index> 
         ^vector 
             ^red 
            ^green 
           ^blue 
      ^shape  
           ^number-of-points 
           ^is-closed true false 
           ^color <marking-color> 
           ^qualitative point line curve    




   ^visual-id <unique-integer> 
    ^instance-id <unique-integer> 
    ^is-imagined 
    ^has-a <visual-object-parts> 
   ^name <name-assigned-by-agent> 
   ^visual-features 




      ^imagery 
          ^command 
           ^result 
     ^visual-ltm 
           ^visual-object         
     ^visual-object-instances 
           ^visual-object         




When the architecture first recognizes a visual object (i.e. an incoming visual-object 
structure on Soar‘s input-link with a visual-id and an instance-id), it builds a visual-object 
working memory structure under the visual-object-instances. The agent identifies the 
visual-object by associating it with its entity (e.g. the visual-object, ―S‖ is associated with 
the letter ‗S‘, the visual-object ―enemy-tank‖ is associated with an enemy entity). The 
visual-object structure contains a visual-id, instance-id, and, if the agent ―imagined‖ 
rather than perceived the object, an is-imagined attribute. The has-a, visual-features, and 
spatial-properties attributes are inherited from the visual-object‘s corresponding visual-
object structure with the same visual-id encoded in visual-ltm. The agent optionally adds 
a name.  
Subsequent observations of a visual-object do not create a new visual-object 
structure but simply match the incoming instance-id with the stored instance-id. If there is 
not a match before building a new visual-object structure, the system determines if the 
perceived object is the same as an existing visual-object based on the visual-object‘s 
egocentric location and known velocity (semantic knowledge). If the incoming visual-
object is within a certain radius (task knowledge) of an existing visual-object instance, 
the system assumes the incoming and existing visual object are the same and does not 
create a new structure. Any imagined visual-object is removed when the system switches 
from imagining to perceiving. Other visual-object instances, in theory (not implemented), 
decay over time and are removed from working memory when the current episode 
completes. 
Figure C-10c-d also shows examples of a working memory structure for a single 
visual feature and spatial property that is similar to the SVI class diagram for those 
properties (Figure C-3). This information arrives on Soar‘s input-link from either the 
VisualLTMListener or ObjectMapListener and may augment a visual-object‘s visual-
features or spatial-properties. The visual-feature attribute has an emergent-id and either a 
shape or a color sub-attribute. The color is expressed qualitatively (e.g. red, green, etc.) or 
quantitatively as a scalar or RGB vector. The shape attribute has a type (line, curve, etc.), 
number of points, a flag signaling whether or not it is closed (i.e. a region), and marking 
color. The spatial attribute describes the visual-object(s) or shape(s) involved with the 
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relative- and base-instance/emergent-ids. Except for topology and geometry, each spatial 
property may be described in qualitative or quantitative terms. 
An agent invokes the imagery system by creating a command on the 
^imagery.command structure (Figure C-11). The system augments each command with 
a unique command-id and after processing the request, creates a corresponding result 
structure with the same command-id. The purpose of the command-id is to facilitate the 
tracking of an agent‘s request with the result from the system. 
An agent composes two visual-objects or adds a visual-object or shape to the 
current scene by augmenting the ^imagery.command structure with a compose or add 
command (Figure C-11a). The command includes a spatial structure (Figure C-10d) 
signaling to SVI how to configure the visual-object/shapes. For a compose command, 
both the relative- and base-visual-objects are from the set of visual-object structures in 
the vltm structure (Figure C-10a-b). The relative-visual-object is also from the vltm 
structure for an add command, but the base-visual-object is from the visual-object-
instance structure as it is already an instance of the scene. If adding a shape as a first-
class visual-object, then the agent must either specify the shape structure with its 
corresponding emergent-id so that SVI can access its vertices, or the agent must specify a 
set of points and their connections (not shown in Figure C-10c). After processing the 
command, the imagery system creates the visual-object structure on the ^visual-object-
instances structure (Figure C-10a) and records the instantiated visual-object(s) on the 
^imagery.result.retrieved structure (Figure C-11b). To manipulate the quantitative 
spatial or visual depictive representations, an agent creates a transform-om or -vb 
structure (Figure C-11b-d). To transform a visual object in the ObjectMap, the agent 
builds the spatial structure (Figure C-10d) with the relative-visual-object as the 
transforming entity. The agent may change its imagined viewpoint by specifying 
qualitative or quantitative information. To transform an image in the VisualBuffer, the 
agent creates the transform-vb structure with the information shown in Figure C-11e. The 
vb-layer is the image to transform. If using depictive rules to specify the manipulation 
then the attention window specifies its parameters (see Appendix B.2). If the 
manipulation is of type mark, then the system records a relative-shape structure on the 





(a) Construct Command (b) Construct Result 
 
 
(c) Transform ObjectMap Command (d) Transform ObjectMap Result 
 
 
(e) Transform VisualBuffer Command (f) Transform VisualBuffer Result 
 
 
(h) Generate Command (i) Generate Result 
 
 
(j) Inspect Command (k) Inspect Result 
Figure C-11: Imagery Command and Result Working Memory Structures 
^imagery.result 
     ^retrieved.inspect 
          ^command-id <same-as-original> 
          ^visual-feature 
         ^visual-spatial 
  
           
 
           
 
^imagery.command.inspect 
     ^command-id <unique-symbol> 
     ^visual-object/vb-layer # visual-feature 
     ^visual-feature  
     ^visual-spatial 
^imagery.result 
     ^retrieved.generate 
          ^command-id <same-as-original> 
          ^vb-layer <generated-layer-num> 
           
 
           
 
^imagery.command.generate 
     ^command-id <unique-symbol> 
     ^visual-object-instances 
         ^add-visual-object  
         ^remove-visual-object 
^imagery.result 
     ^retrieved.transform-vb 
          ^command-id <same-as-original> 
          ^relative-shape # if mark rule 
           
 
           
 
^imagery.command.transform-vb 
     ^command-id <unique-symbol> 
     ^vb-layer <image-to-transform> 
     ^attention-window 
         ^width    <number-of-pixels> 
         ^height   <number-of-pixels> 
         ^shift-factor<between 0.0-1.0> 
         ^base-visual-object      # start location 
         ^relative-visual-object #stop location 
     ^transform  # image processing 
         ^rotate 
         ^scale 
      ^rules  #depictive manipulations 
           ^rule # See Appendix B.2      
 
^imagery.result 
     ^retrieved.transform-om 
          ^command-id <same-as-original> 
           
 
           
 
^imagery.command.transform-om 
     ^command-id <unique-symbol> 
     ^spatial <spatial-struct> 
     ^viewpoint 
          ^qualitative front/top/side 
          ^quantitative 
               ^location 
               ^direction 
               ^up      
 
^imagery.result 
     ^retrieved.compose/add 
          ^command-id <same-as-original> 
          ^relative-visual-object/shape   
          ^base-visual-object  # compose only  




     ^command-id <unique-symbol> 
     ^spatial <spatial-struct> 
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An agent issues a generate command by augmenting the ^imagery.command 
with a generate attribute (Figure C-11h). The agent may create either one or more ^add-
visual-object or ^remove-visual-object attributes to specify the visual-objects it wants 
generated in the visual depictive representation. After generating the image, the system 
augments the ^result.retrieved.generate structure with the generated vb-layer number 
(Figure C-11i) to support further reasoning such as manipulation of the image or queries 
for visual features. 
Finally, the agent initiates the inspect command by creating the inspect structure 
as shown in (Figure C-11j). The ^visual-feature and ^visual-spatial structures are as 
illustrated in Figure C-11c-d. If the query is for a visual-feature, the agent must specify 
either the visual-object or vb-layer to inspect. SVI can determine a visual-object‘s 
associated vb-layer image from VS-STM (Figure 6-6). However, sometimes it is easier to 
specify the vb-layer if the agent just generated it and there are two or more visual-objects 
involved in the inspection (e.g. two lines).  
After processing the inspect command, the imagery system creates the result 
structure (Figure C-11k). In the case of spatial queries with only a single, relative-visual-
object specified in the original inspection command (e.g. what are all of the visual-
objects left-of the fork), the ^result.retrieved.inspect structure contains a ^spatial 
attribute for each pair of visual-objects satisfying the constraint. For binary or tertiary 
spatial queries (e.g. is the plate right-of the fork), the system creates a single ^spatial 
structure if the assertion is true; otherwise, the attribute will be missing. If the agent 
desires quantitative information, then in the original command it specifies the attributes it 
desires. For example, for the query ―What is the direction and distance between enemy-1 
and the key-terrain in the west,‖ the structure would look like the following: 
 
The result structure includes the values. Likewise, if the agent desires the answer in 
qualitative terms, it includes the qualitative attribute without a value, and the resulting 
structure will have the closest qualitative value.  
^imagery.command.inspect 
     ^command-id <unique-symbol> 
     ^visual-spatial 
          ^relative-visual-object <enemy-1-visual-object> 
          ^base-visual-object <key-terrain-west-visual-object> 
          ^direction.vector 
          ^distance.scalar 
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The imagery system uses Soar‘s subgoaling mechanism to implement spatial and 
visual imagery processing. When an agent augments the top-state imagery attribute with 
a command, the system proposes an imagery operator. If the operator is selected (it may 
not be selected because of current, more immediate task demands), then an operator no-
change impasse occurs and Soar creates an imagery state structure. Imagery processing 
commences in this state and remains active until either the corresponding result structure 
of the command is created or another operator is selected in a superstate (e.g. in the Scout 
domain an operator to attend to the teammate‘s report). 
The imagery subgoal includes operators to compose, add, transform-om, 
transform-vb, generate, inspect, and attend-to-input-link. With the exception of the 
transform-vb, each imagery command requires two decision cycles. The first decision 
cycle involves selecting the operator associated with the agent‘s imagery command and 
sending it to SVI by augmenting Soar‘s output-link. The second decision cycle attends to 
the results returned by SVI on Soar‘s input-link and creates ^vs-
wmem.imagery.result.retrieved structure in the top-state. For the compose and add 
commands, this second decision cycle (attend-to-input-link) creates the ^vs-
wmem.visual-object-instances.visual-object structures. The transform-vb operator may 
require additional decision cycles depending on the number of required attention-window 
shifts. In this case, the attend-to-input-link operator creates the appropriate output-link 
structures to affect the shift. 
The primary purpose of each operator is to translate the agent‘s command into its 
primitive elements, augment missing structures with default values, and communicate 
with SVI via Soar‘s output- and input-link (Figure C-12a-b). For example, the structures 
illustrated in Figure C-11 are similar to the substructures augmented on the output-link 
except rather than specifying the relative- or base-visual-object identifier symbols, the 
primitive visual-ids and instance-ids are used. If information is missing, the selected 
operator augments the outgoing structure with its default values (e.g. topology defaults to 
disconnected, distance to 1.0, orientation to zero degrees, etc.).  
After imagery finishes processing in SVI, the VisualLTMListener and 
ObjectMapListener augment the incoming ^what-link and ^where-link respectively. 
Both structures have a ^recognize and ^result attributes. The listeners automatically 
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update the two recognize attributes during each input phase. The ^what-link.recognize 
attribute has one ^visual-object structure for each salient object (either perceived or 
imagined) in the current scene. The ^where-link.recognize attribute has on ^spatial 
structure for each visual-object in the scene. The base-instance-id is the visual-object 
instance-id for the agent and the relative-instance-id is the salient object. Direction, 
distance, orientation, and relative size between the agent and perceived object are always 
provided on the incoming ^recognize.spatial attribute. So, for example, when the agent 
adds an imagined visual-object to the scene, the VLTMListener will automatically add its 
^what-link.recognize visual-object structure. The ObjectMapListener will add its ^where-
link.recognize spatial structure with the direction, distance, orientation, and size 
information specified relative to the agent. After each imagery operation, the listeners, at 
a minimum, augment each link‘s ^result attribute with the command-id. Other attributes 
include the vb-layer, shift, visual-feature, or spatial result similar to the top-state ^vs-
wmem.imagery.result.retrieved structure previously discussed.  
 
  
(a)  (b)  
 
 
(c)  (d)  
Figure C-12 Imagery Output-link and Input-link Working Memory Structure 
^input-link.where-link 
     ^recognize 
          ^spatial 
               ^relative-instance-id 
               ^base-instance-id 
               ^direction 
               ^distance 
               ^orientation 
               ^size 
     ^result 
          ^command-id 
         ^spatial # inspect command 
              ^emergent-id  
              ^shape 
                    
^input-link.what-link 
     ^recognize 
          ^visual-object 
               ^visual-id 
               ^instance-id 
     ^result 
         ^command-id 
        ^vb-layer      # after generate command 
        ^shift true false # during vb transforms 
         ^visual-feature # inspect command 
              ^emergent-id  
              ^shape 
              ^color 
                    
^input-link 
     ^what-link 
          ^recognize      # bottom-up,automatic 
          ^result             # imagery results 
          ^store/remove  # visual-ltm  
                                   # store/remove 
     ^where-link 
          ^recognize      # bottom-up,automatic 
          ^result            # imagery results 
^output-link 
     ^imagery.command 
          ^compose  
          ^add 
          ^transform-om 
          ^transform-vb 
          ^inspect 
# Note similar structure as in Figure C-11 
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